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Time Limitations Under State
Occupational Disease Acts
By JORDAN H. LEIBMAN* and TERRY MOREHEAD DWORKIN**
For so runs the oracle of our inspired teacher: "When you come
to a patient's house, you should ask him what sort of pains he has,
what caused them, how many days he has been ill, whether the bowels
are working and what sort of food he eats." So says Hippocrates in his
work Affections. I may venture to add one more question: What oc-
cupation does he follow?1
Since early this century, workers suffering injury by accident in the
workplace have been able to secure relief from their state workers' com-
pensation systems without regard to the fault of either employer or em-
ployee. 2 Later, states began to provide coverage for occupational
diseases arising out of and in the course of a worker's employment.
Eventually, all states amended their workers' compensation acts, or en-
acted new statutes, to include coverage for work-related health impair-
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Indiana University, Graduate School of Busi-
ness-Indianapolis.
** Associate Professor of Business Law, Indiana University, Graduate School of Busi-
ness-Bloomington.
1. B. RAMAZZINI, DISEASES OF WORKERS 13 (W. Wright trans. 1964) (original Latin
text, DE MORIBUS ARTIFICUM, published in 1713).
2. The first workers' compensation law enacted in the United States was a narrow and
short-lived statute passed by Maryland in 1902 to compensate miners injured by accidents. It,
as well as the next few statutes passed by other states, was soon declared unconstitutional.
In 1908, Congress enacted coverage for certain federal employees. Several states followed
with legislation designed to avoid the early constitutional problems. In 1917, the Supreme
Court upheld different forms of workers' compensation legislation. See New York Cent. R.R.
v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 208 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 213-14 (1917); Moun-
tain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 225-26 (1917). Declaration of the constitution-
ality of these acts led to enactment of similar schemes in other states. By 1920 all but eight
states had enacted such legislation. I A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§§ 5.20, .30 (1964 & Supp. 1984).
While at times fault plays a role in denying a worker compensation under judicial and
statutory exceptions for injuries caused by willful or intentional acts such as horseplay, e.g.,
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-8 (Bums 1974 & Supp. 1984), or assault, ag., Armstead v. Sommer,
126 Ind. App. 273, 280-81, 131 N.E.2d 340, 344 (1956), as a general rule fault is irrelevant to
the issue of whether a worker is to be compensated for his or her injury. 1 A. LARSON, supra,
§ 1.20; NATIONAL COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, COMPENDIUM
ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 21-26 (1973). With respect to the employer's intentional
tortious conduct, there has been even less of a tendency to find additional fault-based liability
either within or outside the workers' compensation system. See infra note 496.
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ments that generally are caused not by specific and sudden traumatic
events, but rather are the result, at least in part, of exposure to toxic
substances found in the place of employment.
3
From the outset, it was recognized that occupational diseases, par-
ticularly those caused by substances specific to the workplace, were often
slow to develop. 4 During these extended gestation periods, other causa-
tive elements often played a role, sometimes the dominant role, in pro-
ducing the deteriorations of health ultimately leading to the worker's
disablement or death.5 Nevertheless, these work related diseases were a
3. Massachusetts was the first state to grant occupational disease coverage, which was
accomplished through judicial interpretation. P. BARTH & H. HUNT, WORKERS' COMPENSA-
TION AND WORK-RELATED ILLNESSES AND DISEASES 2 (1980).
In addition to the legislation of the 50 states, see Summary Chart in the Appendix, fed-
eral legislation has extended coverage to American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Guam,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, as well as to federal workers, Federal Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8101 (1982), longshoremen, Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1982), and coal miners, Black Lung Benefits Act, 30
U.S.C. § 901 (1982).
As late as the early 1970's, nine states (Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Vermont, and Wyoming) provided coverage for specified diseases
only. Larson, Occupational Diseases Under Workmen's Compensation Laws, 9 U. RICH. L.
REV. 87, 88-89 (1974); Note, Compensation and the Asbestos Industry, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1073, 1079 n.46 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Compensation]. Currently, all states provide
for universal coverage of occupational diseases, see UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COM-
MERCE, ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS 10-15, chart IV (1984), though a
number of state statutes retain their earlier lists of enumerated diseases along with a catchall
provision. See, e.g., infra notes 158-61 & accompanying text.
4. The connection between extensive workplace exposure and certain diseases has been
known for a surprisingly long period of time. Byssinosis, for example, was known to afflict
textile mill workers in the early 1800's. P. BARTH & H. HUNT, supra note 3, at 8. See gener-
ally id. at Table 1.1 for a timetable of the discovery of occupational cancers. While Pliny
(A.D. 50) mentions that weavers producing wicks for the vestal virgins' lamps wore masks to
avoid inhaling asbestos dust, Note, Issues in Asbestos Litigations, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 872
n.7 (1983) (citing J. CROFTON & A. DOUGLAS, RESPIRATORY DISEASE 589 (3d ed. 1981))
[hereinafter cited as Note, Issues], general awareness of the dangers of asbestos did not occur
until this century. The British were conducting studies on asbestos dust inhalation by 1924,
and regulated its distribution and use soon thereafter. Note, Compensation, supra note 3, at
1077.
P. BARTH & H. HUNT, supra note 3, at 5, cite the slow development of many of the
"classical" occupational diseases, such as lead or mercury poisoning, as one of the reasons why
there has been general public apathy about occupational disease. By the time the disease de-
velops, its occupational nature may not be clear; rather, it may be perceived as part of the
aging process.
5. For example, there is substantial evidence that smoking greatly increases the risk of
developing asbestosis. Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 916, 923-24 n.59 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Compensating Victims]; cf Olson v.
Federal Am. Partners, 567 P.2d 710, 712-13 (Wyo. 1977) (no compensation for lung cancer to
uranium mine worker who also smoked). In addition, a worker's exposure to asbestos outside
the workplace may contribute to asbestosis. An estimated 3000 commonly used products con-
[Vol. 36
STATE OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ACTS
reality of industrial employment; legislators realized that compensation
for their effects had to be subsumed into the statutory schemes. To lessen
the uncertainty from multiple causation, however, the various statutes
included limitation provisions generally tied to the date of the employee's
last exposure to the injurious hazard6 and to the date upon which the
worker finally became disabled and unable to work. 7 State legislatures
enacted these limitation statutes to deter spurious and doubtful claims,
trusting that the great majority of meritorious claimants would obtain
relief. The early statutes attempted to strike this balance by establishing
an optimum period for filing claims on the assumption that within the
period following a final exposure to the toxic hazard the affected workers
would exhibit clear symptoms, become disabled, and be able to file their
claims.
8
Not surprisingly, the pattern of occupational disease onset often
failed to follow the legislators' expectations. Certain substances mani-
fested their toxic effects more slowly than was anticipated, while worker
sensitivity to many of these materials proved more variable than was first
tain asbestos. Mansfield, Asbestos: The Cases and the Insurance Problem, 15 FORUM 860, 861
(1980).
Workers exposed to carbon tetrachloride are much more likely to die if they have also
consumed alcohol. Risk of liver and kidney damage from exposure to trichlorothylene is also
substantially increased by alcohol consumption. P. BARTH & H. HuNT, supra note 3, at 12.
A major current problem with respect to causation is the relationship between workplace
stress and emotional or physical illness. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORKERS' COM-
PENSATION & WORKPLACE LIABILITY, FINAL EDITED PROCEEDINGS 309, 311 (1981) (re-
marks of Ronald E. Gots, M.D.) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS].
6. See infra notes 100-224 & accompanying text.
7. Disablement is generally a predicate for filing a claim under workers' compensation
statutes. In the case of a slow-developing disease, this requirement can produce harsh results
when combined with a last exposure rule. See infra note 526 & accompanying text; see also
Bunker v. National Gypsum Co., 441 N.E.2d 8, 18 (Ind. 1982) (Hunter, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that claimant should be barred because he was not yet disabled even though he was exper-
iencing asbestosis symptoms).
Another limitation designed to ensure that the disease is occupationally caused is a mini-
mum exposure requirement. These statutes generally require exposure to the hazardous sub-
stance in the workplace for five to 10 years. See infra notes 225-41, 374-79 & accompanying
text.
Many states also require plaintiffs to prove, in contested cases, that their diseases were
occupationally related, and in some states that they were not "ordinary diseases of life." See,
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 114-803 (1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.802(a) (1983).
8. Most states initially used the same time period for occupational diseases as for acci-
dental injury. Generally, this statutory time period began to run at the time of injury or acci-
dent. P. BARTH & H. HuNT, supra note 3, at 120. As the etiology of occupational diseases
became known, many states adjusted the period allowed for occupational diseases.
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assumed. 9 In addition, the lengths and intensities of exposure from case
to case varied more than had been expected. 10 A common legislative
response to this problem was to carve out statutory exceptions granting
victims of exposure to specific workplace substances, such as asbestos
dust and silica dust, extended periods in which to bring their claims."
Increased relief for victims also came from judicial interpretation of the
key operative terms of the limitation statutes, such as "time of injury,"'
2
"time of disablement,"' 1 3 and "time of contraction."'
14
Ultimately, in a number of jurisdictions legislatures enacted, and
courts construed, "discovery" rules to govern these cases. 15 Under such
provisions, the limitation periods begin when claimants discover, or
through due diligence should discover, the nature of the occupational
diseases that have disabled them. Although discovery rules may provide
the maximum justice to the individual claimant, they also create the ac-
tuarial uncertainty that is anathema to workers' compensation insurance
underwriters.16 In addition, if fewer claims are barred through the oper-
ation of statutes of limitation, the compensation insurance premiums of a
state's employers are likely to rise. This factor of workers' compensation
rates looms ever more important in the states' increasingly competitive
9. Asbestosis, for example, generally manifests itself 10 to 40 years after significant ex-
posure. I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, ASBESTOS AND DISEASE 42-56 (1978).
Moreover, the toxicity of the materials can vary. There are 30 different minerals in the
asbestos family, six of which are in common use. Chrysotile, the most widely used asbestos
fiber, is the least dangerous. It is used in asbestos textiles, cement products, friction materials,
insulation, and paper products. Crocidolite, used in pipes, textiles, felts for plastics and cement
products, is the most dangerous. Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and Political
Issues Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND. L. REV. 573, 579 n.1 (1983).
10. While exposure often continues for years, disease can develop from very limited expo-
sure. In fact, spouses and children of asbestos workers run an increased risk of developing the
disease from coming in contact with the clothes and person of asbestos workers. G. PETERS &
B. PETERS, SOURCEBOOK ON ASBESTOS DISEASES B7, C5 (1980); N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1981, at
D 11, col. 6 (citing a study released by the American Lung Association).
11. See P. BARTH & H. HUNT, supra note 3, at 6; Summary Chart in the Appendix.
Another kind of response, generated by fears that the compensation system would be
overwhelmed, was to carve out exceptions for diseases such as silicosis when their pervasive-
ness became known and to limit compensation for them. New York, for example, changed its
law giving comprehensive coverage for all occupational diseases so that coverage of partial
disability resulting from silicosis or other dust diseases was eliminated, and benefits for death
or total disability were limited. P. BARTH & H. HUNT, supra note 3, at 3; see also Kutchins,
The Most Exclusive Remedy Is No Remedy at All: Workers' Compensation Coverage for Occu-
pational Disease, 32 LAB. L.J. 212, 219 (1981).
12. See infra notes 293-301 & accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 293-301 & accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 311-16, 335-40 & accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 293-379 & accompanying text.
16. P. BARTH & H. HUNT, supra note 3, at 124.
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"chase for smokestacks" as the types of recognized compensable claims,
as well as their frequency, increase dramatically year after year.
17
If, however, both a state's legislature and its courts decline to pro-
vide a discovery rule for occupational disease, a claimant who is barred
by a limitation period can still attack the limitation statute itself on con-
stitutional grounds. A limitation that is too short to provide the remedy
promised may deny due process of law to the injured party.18 A limita-
tion statute that classifies claimants arbitrarily and invidiously arguably
denies equal protection of the laws. 19 Additional alleged constitutional
infirmities have also been found in provisions specific to certain state
constitutions.2
0
This Article reviews the various limitation statutes that currently
govern state occupational disease acts. Because of the great variety of
these provisions, we focus the discussion on the degree of success that a
prototypical claimant might attain under them. The prototype is based
on a fact situation which recently triggered the operation of a limitation
statute in the state of Indiana. In Bunker v. National Gypsum Co.,21 the
claimant was exposed to asbestos dust for a twenty-two month period
during the late 1950's. He then left the asbestos-laden environment and
in the late 1970's began to experience respiratory difficulty, which was
unequivocally diagnosed as asbestosis. The Indiana Industrial Board de-
nied Bunker's claim for compensation benefits under the Indiana Occu-
pational Diseases Act.2 2 On appeal, the claimant mounted one of the
17. In the Alexander Grant & Co. rating of manufacturing climates in the 48 contiguous
states, workers' compensation insurance rates are a key factor in determining rankings. Grant
surveys manufacturer trade associations in the states to determine the relative importance to
the associations of 22 factors. These factors are then ordered and weighted and used to deter-
mine a state's manufacturing climate. In the 1983 report, workers' compensation rates ranked
fifth in importance (behind energy costs, level of unionization, taxes, and wage rates). Indian-
apolis Star, May 22, 1984, at 9B, col. 1; see also Michigan Firm is Moving to Muncie, Indianap-
olis News, Feb. 26, 1982, at 26, col.5 (reporting that lower workers' compensation premiums
may induce a Michigan-based company to relocate seven factories in Indiana).
18. See, e.g., Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagarty, 416 So. 2d 996, 1004 (Ala. 1982);
Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 527, 464 A.2d 288, 296-97 (1983); see also infra
notes 72-79, 434-42 & accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 526, 464 A.2d 288, 296
(1983); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 932-33, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (1980); see also infra notes
58-71, 405-59 & accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Battila v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980); Kennedy v
Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195, 198-99 (R.I. 1984).
21. 441 N.E.2d 8 (Ind. 1982), rev'g 426 N.E.2d 422 (Ind. App. 1981), appeal dismissed,
103 S. Ct. 1761 (1983). Bunker also brought an action for common-law negligence. 406
N.E.2d 1239 (Ind. App. 1980).
22. IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-22 (Burns 1974 & Supp. 1984); Bunker v. National Gypsum
Co., 426 N.E.2d 422, 422 (Ind. App. 1981).
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most comprehensive challenges to such a statute seen to date. Eventu-
ally, Bunker's claim was denied by the Indiana Supreme Court and the
United States Supreme Court.
23
The Bunker case was significant for several reasons. First, Bunker's
argument included a strong constitutional attack on the Indiana statute.
Second, the Indiana court had to decide which law determined the limi-
tation period for filing a claim: the law at time of exposure, the law in
force when symptoms emerged, or the law in effect at yet some other
trigger date. 24 Between Richard Bunker's period of exposure to asbestos
and the first manifestation of his asbestosis symptoms, the Indiana Gen-
eral Assembly amended its workers' compensation statute so that Bunker
and his employer were thereafter covered by the system. Prior to 1963,
noncovered employees' remedies against their employers had to be found
in common-law tort;25 after 1963, injured employees were bound by the
sole remedy provision of the Indiana workers' compensation statute.2 6
Variations of this controlling law problem have significantly affected oc-
cupational disease claims under a number of state statutes.2 7 Finally, the
decision in Bunker is significant because claimants such as Richard
Bunker constitute a substantial class of potential victims of delayed man-
ifestation occupational diseases. 28 The arguments raised by Bunker are
sure to arise in states whose limitation statutes operate similarly to
Indiana's.
23. His constitutional argument prevailed in the Indiana Court of Appeals. See 426
N.E.2d at 425. The decision was reversed by the Indiana Supreme Court, and his direct appeal
to the United States Supreme Court was diimissed for want of a substantial federal question.
103 S. Ct. 1761 (1983).
24. 406 N.E.2d at 1240.
25. The 1950 act was applicable "only to those who had affirmatively accepted it." 406
N.E.2d at 1240. The court found that there was no evidence that defendant National Gypsum
had accepted the act. Id.
26. Current version codified at IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3-7-I to -38 (Burns 1974 & Supp.
1984).
27. See infra notes 380-404 & accompanying text.
28. Delayed manifestation injuries from asbestos are expected to number several million.
Estimates vary from eight million, National Cancer Institute and National Institute of Envi-
ronmental Health Sciences, Estimates of the Fraction of Cancer Incidence in the United States
Attributable to Occupational Factors 1-2 (draft summary Sept. 11, 1978), to around 20 mil-
lion. The number of persons developing asbestos-related diseases each year is not expected to
level off until the 1990's. Special Project, supra note 9, at 580.
A twelve-year study by Dr. Irving Selikoff of the Environmental Sciences Laboratory of
the Mount Sinai School of Medicine, of 20,000 workers of the International Association of
Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers, found that the death rates among these
workers was 37% higher than normal rates among blue-collar workers of similar ages and
lifestyles. The study estimated that 18.8 million workers had "significant" exposure to asbes-
tos since 1940 and that 201,000 of the 14.1 million who were still living would die from asbes-
tos-related cancers by the end of the century. Seven million living workers had less exposure,
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36
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Part I of the analysis presents the Bunker case in detail. In part II
but were at some risk. Many of those who did not die would be disabled. Lauter, Who Pays
Asbestos Victims?, Nat'l L.J., July 26, 1982, at 14, col. 2.
Thirty-six percent of the insulation workers who died of asbestos-related cancer applied
for benefits; only 38% received any award. Id. In another study, 23% of widows claiming
benefits for workers who died from asbestos-related diseases did not receive benefits. This
number is significant because the median survival time for mesothelioma victims is 4-12
months from diagnosis. Thus the victim himself often has little chance to collect. Note, Is-
sues, supra note 4, at 877 n.42. Only 700 workers had received compensation for asbestos-
related diseases by 1980. Reutter, Workmen's Compensation Doesn't Work or Compensate, 35
Bus. & Soc'y Rnv. 39, 42 (1980).
The recovery figures are not much better for occupational diseases generally. The prior
study found that only 5% of occupational disease victims received compensation. Id. at 39.
Since there are as many as 100,000 occupational disease deaths and 390,000 new cases of
occupational disease per year in the United States, thousands are going without compensation.
PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 111 (1972). These figures
may be conservative. Note, Compensating Victims, supra note 5, at 916 n.2. One study sug-
gests there are at least 70,000 deaths a year from occupational cancers; another that 150,000
deaths a year occur from occupational respiratory diseases. Id. Such diseases are generally
slow to develop. For a comprehensive list of occupational disease by occupation, see P.
BARTH & H. HUNT, supra note 3, at Appendix C.
Of course, there are many reasons why recovery for occupational disease is not higher.
See, eg., P. Barth & H. Hunt, supra note 3, at 61-134; Note, Compensating Victims, supra note
5; Special Project, supra note 9, at 731-56. One study, for example, found that a majority of
survivors of asbestos workers "had no idea of their legal right to workers' compensation."
NATIONAL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 5, at 295, 298 (remarks of Peter Barth).
The limitations discussed in this paper, however, play a major role.
Some other workplace substances which are having an increasing impact due to delayed
manifestation of injuries are formaldehyde, polyvinylchoride (PVC), radiation, and micro-
waves. The impact of injuries from these substances on the compensation systems could be as
great or greater than that from asbestos. Suits arising from exposure to microwaves, which has
occurred almost exclusively in the workplace, have been predicted to become the broadest-
based product liability litigation ever. Nat'l L.J., Sept. 14, 1981, at 24, col. 1. Formaldehyde,
which has been described as ubiquitous, Nat'l L.J., May 10, 1983, at 1, col. 1, is used in a wide
variety of ways in the workplace. Use has been especially heavy in the forest-products indus-
try, which uses one-half of the formaldehyde produced, and the textile industry, which uses
one-quarter. In all, about 1.4 million people come into contact with formaldehyde solutions in
the workplace. Wall St. J., May 21, 1982, at 23, col. 1. The U.A.W., which along with 14
other unions sued OSHA to set stricter exposure standards in factories, claims that as many as
one percent of workers exposed at current levels may die of formaldehyde-related cancers.
Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1983, at 1, col. 5. The AFL-CIO cited formaldehyde as a health hazard
to workers in beauty salons and barber shops where it is used in sterilizing solutions and in
some beauty products. Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1983, at 1, col. 5.
Almost monthly, new workplace carcinogens and suspected carcinogens are being identi-
fied. These include newspaper ink, see, eg., Hanna v. Sun Chem. Corp., No. C-81-1967 (N.D.
Ohio 1981); Grady v. Sun Chem. Corp., No. C-81-1696 (N.D. Ohio 1981), asphalt fumes, Wall
St. J., Apr. 27, 1983, at 1, col. 5, and fluorescent lights, Wall St. J., Apr. 12, 1983, at 26, col. 4.
Recently it was disclosed that wood-model makers in the auto industry are 50% more likely to
develop cancer, although the specific carcinogen has not been identified. Simison, Cancer
Peril Disturbs Wood-Model Makers in the Auto Industry, Wall St. J., Jan. 3, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
Even VDTs (video display terminals) have become suspect, and at least nine states are consid-
ering legislation to regulate their use. Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1984, at 1, col. 5.
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the Article reviews the various state workers' compensation statutes of
limitation together with other limitation provisions, such as minimum
exposure rules and presumptions, that can operate to abrogate occupa-
tional disease claims. Because it is often difficult to determine from the
face of many of these provisions how they operate in a specific situation,
the Article analyzes the major court decisions interpreting the statutes.
Each statute is subjected to the same final inquiry: would a claimant like
the one in Bunker v. National Gypsum Co. have recovered compensation
benefits in the jurisdiction? By using this method the various limitation
provisions are classified according to practical operational criteria.
The final part of this Article considers several public policy
problems inherent in these limitation schemes, as well as the constitu-
tional constraints operating on them. A critical concern is the control-
ling law problem mentioned above. Many workers who were originally
exposed to slow acting toxic substances while restrictive limitation provi-
sions were in force now find that these statutes have been amended and
"liberalized" prior to the time of the workers' disablement and thus may
no longer bar the recovery of benefits. The result could be that employer
liability, once believed to be in repose, may be reactivated depending on
judicial interpretation and doctrinal analysis. The final section also com-
pares judicial review of tort limitation and repose statutes with that ap-
plied to the limitation provisions under workers' compensation and
occupational disease statutes. We then comment on the need for greater
national uniformity of workers' compensation law and the importance of
coordinating the workers' compensation system more closely with the
tort system, with regulatory schemes governing the workplace, and with
other social compensation mechanisms. We end with a number of con-
clusions and recommendations for legislators of occupational disease
acts.
Bunker v. National Gypsum Company
Richard Bunker worked in Indiana for the National Gypsum Com-
pany from February 1949 to March 1966.29 For the first twenty-two
months of his employment he supervised a blending process for the man-
ufacture of an acoustical treatment product. During this assignment he
was exposed to asbestos fibers, but then was transferred to other work
that was asbestos free.30 Shortly after leaving National Gypsum, Bunker
secured employment in Iowa as a technical salesman, a job involving no
29. 441 N.E.2d at 9-10.
30. Id. at 10.
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contact with asbestos. 31 In July 1976, Bunker entered the hospital for
exploratory surgery to determine the cause of some difficulty he was en-
countering with his breathing.32 His condition was diagnosed as asbesto-
sis. Bunker filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits under the
Indiana Occupational Diseases Act,33 seeking recovery for his medical
expenses as well as lost wages for the approximately four-week period
during which he had suffered temporary total disability.34 He also
brought a companion action for negligence against National Gypsum.
35
Common-Law Negligence-Which Law Controls?
Bunker's civil action alleging "gross negligence in the failure to pro-
vide safe working conditions" 36 was dismissed for failure to state a claim
for which relief could be granted. 37 The Indiana Court of Appeals af-
firmed, holding that Bunker's sole remedy under Indiana law lay in the
Indiana Occupational Diseases Act.
38
The issue before the Indiana Court of Appeals was whether the law
at time of exposure or the law in operation after 1963 controlled Bunker's
claim. Bunker had argued that his entire exposure to asbestos had oc-
curred prior to 1963, the year that the statute was amended to make cov-
erage mandatory unless the employee "exempted himself from the
provisions of the act."' 39 Thus, during the entire period he was exposed
to the hazards of asbestosis, neither he nor his employer was covered by
the Act. The gist of his argument was that, without such coverage, the
employee should be free to bring a common-law action.
4°
The court ruled that, because a claim for benefits under the Act can
be maintained only after the claimant becomes disabled, the law at the
time of disablement must govern the claim.41 Because Bunker was first
31. Id. at 16 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 10; see also Record of the Proceedings at 47, Bunker v. National Gypsum Co.,
426 N.E.2d 1239 (Ind. App. 1980), rev'd, 441 N.E.2d 8 (Ind. 1982) (transcript of the evidence)
[hereinafter cited as Record].
33. Current version codified at IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3-7-1 to -38 (Bums 1974 & Supp.
1984).
34. See Record, supra note 32, at 5 (Indus. Bd. of Ind., Form 9, claim for compensation
"for total disability during exploratory surgery and post operative recovery").
35. 406 N.E.2d 1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
36. Id. at 1240.
37. Id. at 1242.
38. Id. at 1241.
39. Id. at 1240.
40. Id. at 1240-41.
41. Id. at 1241 (citing Hibler v. Globe Am. Corp., 128 Ind. App. 156, 147 N.E.2d 19
(1958)).
One can argue that the court's decision equated "disablement" with "injury" which may
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disabled in 1976,42 the law in effect at that time was held to control. Ef-
fective in 1963, the law provided that the Indiana Occupational Disease
Act was the exclusive remedy available to an occupational disease vic-
tim. 43 But had Bunker become disabled prior to 1963, presumably he
could have maintained his common-law action for negligence.
Even if the court had recognized Bunker's right to bring a common-
law action against his employer, he would have run afoul of the Indiana
general tort statute of limitations for personal injury. Under that statute
a plaintiff has two years to file a claim after his cause of action accrues.
44
In states that follow a discovery rule in tort actions, the issue of
which law-tort or workers' compensation-governs a delayed manifes-
tation case can be crucial in determining whether tort benefits, or any
benefits at all, will be available to a victim of an occupational disease.
The Occupational Diseases Act Claim
Bunker was also unsuccessful in his workers' compensation claim
under the Indiana Occupational Diseases Act.45 The Indiana Industrial
be a valid assumption under an occupational disease act, but is not necessarily so under com-
mon-law tort. An employee can suffer a health impairment without becoming disabled accord-
ing to the meaning of the disease statute, yet still be able to prove tort damages. The answer to
this argument, of course, is that once Bunker accepted the coverage of the Indiana Occupa-
tional Diseases Act by not expressly exempting himself, he accepted all its terms which in-
cluded surrender of all unfiled employment-related personal injury tort claims against his
employer, including those that were inchoate in 1963.
42. The term "disablement" is defined in the Act as follows:
The term 'disablement' means the event of becoming disabled from earning full
wages at the work in which the employee was engaged when last exposed to the
hazards of the occupational disease by the employer from whom he claims compen-
sation or equal wages in other suitable employment and 'disability' means the state of
being so incapacitated.
Id. at 1241 (quoting Hirst v. Chevrolet, 110 Ind. App. 22, 27, 33 N.E.2d 773, 775 (1941)
(quoting Indiana definition of "disablement" and "disability", currently codified at IND. CODE
ANN. § 22-3- 7 -9(e) (Burns Supp. 1984)).
In this Article the terms "disablement" and "disability" are used interchangeably.
43. 406 N.E.2d at 1240-41.
44. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-2 (Burns 1974 & Supp. 1984). When Bunker brought his
action, there was some doubt as to when negligence claims accrue in Indiana: when the harm
is ascertainable (discovery rule), or when the plaintiff's rights are invaded, even if the plaintiff
has no way of discovering the invasion. See Leibman, Workmen's Compensation, 1981 Survey
of Recent Developments in Indiana Law, 15 IND. L. REV. 453, 467 & n. 116 (1982). The issue
appears to have been settled by Shideler v. Dwyer, 417 N.E.2d 281, 289-90 (Ind. 1981), in
which the Indiana Supreme Court relied on a leading New York "dust" case, Schmidt v.
Merchants Dispatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936), for the proposition that
a cause of action accrues, absent fraudulent concealment, when the defendant sets in motion
the force that ultimately results in harm to the plaintiff.
45. Current version codified at IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3-7-1 to -38 (Burns 1974 & Supp.
1984).
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Board ruled that the statute of limitations had run out three years after
Bunker was last exposed to the injurious hazards of asbestos dust, thus
barring him from recovering compensation.
46
Bunker presented several arguments challenging the validity of the
limitation provision.47 First, he contended that his exposure to the
hazards of asbestos had not ended in 1960 when he transferred from the
hazardous job environment; rather, the exposure was continuous because
the harmful asbestos fibers had been irreversibly incorporated into the
tissues of his respiratory system, where they continued to expose his body
to harm.48 Second, Bunker argued that the Indiana statute created clas-
sifications of claimants which are arbitrary, invidious, and discrimina-
tory, and, as a result, certain classes of employees received privileges and
immunities while others were denied equal protection of the laws.49 Fi-
nally, Bunker claimed that a statute of limitations which runs before the
victims of slowly developing diseases exhibit the symptoms and have a
right to file their claims denies due process of the law.
50
Continuing Exposure
Medical evidence supported Bunker's assertion that his fibrotic lung
condition, known as asbestosis, resulted because, once inhaled, the as-
bestos dust fibers were neither absorbed nor excreted from his body.51
After they are in place, the fibers expose the pulmonary and digestive
tissues to continuing irritation, finally leading to seriously impaired
breathing.5 2 The fibers remain in situ increasing the damage they do with
46. 441 N.E.2d 8, 9 (Ind. 1982). The statute invoked by the Board reads as follows:
No compensation shall be payable for or on account of any occupational diseases
unless disablement, as defined in subsection (e) of this section, occurs within two [2]
years after the last day of the last exposure to the hazards of the disease except in
cases of occupational diseases caused by the inhalation of silica dust, coal dust, or
asbestos dust and in such cases, within three [3] years after the last day of the last
exposure to the hazards of such disease. However, in all cases of occupational dis-
ease caused by the exposure to radiation, no compensation shall be payable unless
disablement, as defined in subsection (e) of this section, occurs within two [2] years
from the date on which the employee had knowledge of the nature of his occupa-
tional disease or, by exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the exist-
ence of such disease and its causal relationship to his employment.
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-7-9(0 (Bums Supp. 1984).
47. See Brief for Appellant, Bunker v. National Gypsum Co., 426 N.E.2d 422 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Appellant's Court of Appeals Brief].
48. See infra notes 51-57 & accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 58-71 & accompanying text. This argument was raised substantially
for the first time on appeal.
50. See infra notes 72-79 & accompanying text.
51. Appellant's Court of Appeals Brief, supra note 47, at 7.
52. 426 N.E.2d at 424-25 (discussing the work of Dr. Irving Selikoff and others).
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the passage of time. Because the Indiana statute referred only to the
"last day of the last exposure to the hazards of such disease,"' 53 Bunker
argued that the "last day" had not yet arrived because his body was con-
tinuously exposed to the irritating asbestos fibers lodged irretrievably in
his lungs.
5 4
The Indiana Industrial Board was sympathetic to Bunker's medical
analysis, but not to his statutory interpretation: "While Plaintiff's expo-
sure may be a continuing one, that is, continuing as a result of the perma-
nent deposit of asbestos fibers within his body, the Legislature cannot be
said to have intended the term 'last exposure' to mean other than 'last
exposure' during and 'in the course' of employment. ' 55 Bunker's con-
struction of the Indiana statute could not be sustained because to do so
would be to remove all temporal limitations from the statutory scheme
for asbestosis and a host of similar conditions. Although a three-year last
exposure rule may be overly harsh, virtually every state provides some
time limit in which a claimant must file or at least give notice of injury to
the employer. 56 The essential differences between the state statutes are
the points in time at which the various limitation periods begin and the
length of time those periods run.
5 7
Equal Protection
Bunker identified two classification schemes by which the Indiana
statute of limitations conferred disproportionate benefits to occupational
disease victims without any rational basis. 58 First, the statute distin-
guished between radiation claimants and dust disease claimants.5 9 Both
sets of victims suffer delayed manifestation disease, yet radiation victims
can bring their claims after discovering the nature of their illness, while
dust disease victims are subject to a complete bar three years after their
last exposure to the hazard. Moreover, the bar can operate before their
disease symptoms become manifest and before knowledge of the causal
relationship between the symptoms and the employment is discoverable
53. See IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-7-9(0 (Bums Supp. 1984).
54. Appellant's Court of Appeals Brief, supra note 47, at 7.
55. Id. at 3 (quoting Award from Indus. Bd. of Ind., Dec. 26, 1979). Many states follow-
ing a last exposure rule have avoided this problem by qualifying the expression "last exposure"
with a phrase such as "within the employment." E.g., Alabama. See infra notes 87-89 &
accompanying text.
56. Even states with discovery rules require the claimant to file a claim or give notice to
the employer within a fixed time from the discovery of disease and disability and/or knowledge
of the occupational relationship of the disease. See infra notes 293-345 & accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 80-379 & accompanying text.
58. Id. at 21-22.
59. See supra note 46 & accompanying text.
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by the claimant.6°
The second invidious class noted by Bunker was based on a distinc-
tion between employees whose contact with asbestos terminated less than
three years prior to their ultimate disablement and those whose exposure
to the hazard terminated more than three years prior to disablement.
Bunker argued that like the first class, members of the second class were
subject to contracting asbestosis given the cumulative effect of continu-
ous in situ irritation by the inhaled fibers over a long gestation period. 61
The employer argued that Bunker had failed to prove that there was
no essential distinction between radiation and dust disease claimants;
therefore, disparate treatment was not irrational. 62 Although the Indiana
legislature had several opportunities to provide identical treatment to the
two classes, it had not done so, indicating that it saw enough difference
between radiation sickness and dust disease to grant a discovery rule to
victims of the former type but not to the latter.63 Respondent also ar-
gued that dust victims whose contact with the hazards were terminated
more than three years prior to disablement were not unfairly discrimi-
nated against because all dust disease victims were subject to the three
year from last exposure rule.64
The Industrial Board saw no merit in Bunker's equal protection ar-
gument and ruled for National Gypsum.65 The Indiana Court of Ap-
peals reversed, 66 primarily on due process grounds,67 but commented
that it saw no rational basis "to divide exposed workers for purposes of
coverage into those continually exposed for the necessary 20 to 30 year
gestation period and those not."
' 68
The Indiana Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of
appeals. 69 In essence, the supreme court deferred to the judgment of the
legislature.70 The majority opinion addressed the due process arguments
found persuasive by the court of appeals, but concluded that a statute of
limitations affords due process so long as it provides a reasonable time for
bringing an action, and a determination of its length is the legislature's
60. Appellant's Court of Appeals Brief, supra note 47, at 22-24.
61. Id. at 24-25.
62. Id. at 30-31.
63. Id. at 30.
64. Id. at 31.
65. Id. at 3 (quoting Award from Indus. Bd. of Ind., Dec. 26, 1979).
66. 426 N.E.2d at 425.
67. See infra notes 72-75 & accompanying text.
68. 426 N.E.2d at 425 n.7.
69. 441 N.E.2d at 9.
70. Id. at 12.
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prerogative, unless the period is so manifestly insufficient that it repre-
sents a denial of justice.
7 1
Due Process
Bunker's due process argument was grounded on certain medical
peculiarities associated with asbestosis and similar diseases. Asbestosis
develops slowly and during much of that development is often undetect-
able.72 Workers exposed to the asbestos dust may show no symptoms,
not even x-ray abnormality, for decades, then suddenly discover that
they suffer from a disabling disease contracted in the course of their em-
ployment. 73 Thus, a provision that bars claims made three years after
the employees' last exposure cuts off a significant number of claimants
whose symptoms develop more than three years after their last exposure.
In addition, even if the disease is detected before the three year period
has run, no claim can be filed, nor will the statute be tolled, until disable-
ment occurs.
74
Indiana's three year limitation was enacted in 1937, when less was
known about the development of asbestosis. The Indiana Court of Ap-
peals, after reviewing current medical facts, held "that the statute can no
longer stand. To impose its ban is to violate the classic constitutional
mandate, because to do so amounts to a practical denial of the very right
to recovery that the statute was intended to provide."
'75
In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court emphasized
that a presumption of constitutionality must be afforded acts of the legis-
lature. 76 The court found that the three year limitation was reasonable
71. Id.
72. 426 N.E.2d at 424-25 (discussion of studies published by Dr. Irving Selikoff and
others).
73. Id. Bunker's claim before the Industrial Board of Indiana did not raise the constitu-
tional issues. "The record reveals that Bunker's claim was predicated solely on the argument
that . . . his 'exposure' to the asbestos was a continuing one .... ." 441 N.E.2d at 17
(Hunter, J., dissenting). Nor did his claim cite the Selikoff medical studies. When Bunker
raised the due process argument in his appellate brief, the Indiana Court of Appeals conducted
its own independent review of the medical evidence that was available. 426 N.E.2d at 424-26.
74. See IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-7-9(0 (Burns Supp. 1984) quoted supra note 46. The
statute requires "disablement" as a predicate for compensation. This point is discussed by
Justice Hunter in his supreme court dissent. 441 N.E.2d at 15-17.
75. 426 N.E.2d at 425. Judge Hoffman dissented, arguing that the repose interest in
establishing statutes of limitation should prevail; a three year period may be short, but a limita-
tion effectively running decades imposes too great a burden on the workers' compensation
system. The legislature has the right, he held, to protect the defendant's right to be confronted
with fresh evidence. Id. at 425-26 (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
76. 441 N.E.2d at 11-12. While once looked upon with disfavor, the presumption is now
true for statutes of limitation. Id. at 12.
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when enacted and sufficiently reasonable today to withstand a due pro-
cess challenge.77 Acknowledging that some claimants will be cut off by
the three year statute, the court concluded that the unfortunate abroga-
tion of some meritorious claims is in the nature of limitation periods.
Moreover, the medical evidence indicated that manifestation of asbesto-
sis is a function of length of exposure to the dust.78 Thus, most claimants
will have to spend much of their working life in contact with asbestos
dust before the exposure will result in their disablement and will gener-
ally be well within the three year limitation period.
79
The next part of this Article considers how a claimant like Bunker
would fare in other states.
State Statutes of Limitation
The various state statutes of limitation and other timing provisions
governing occupational disease claims present so many special require-
ments, trigger dates, and exceptions that any attempt at a general classifi-
cation scheme would result in substantial over-simplification. Because
the purpose of this Article is illustrative rather than encyclopedic, the
focus is on a narrower model for analysis than that presented by occupa-
tional disease claims in general. This section examines how each state's
limitation for filing claims would affect a claimant who, like Bunker, had
limited exposure to asbestos dust and neither manifested symptoms nor
discovered the disease until many years later.80 In addition, the analysis
indicates how victims of delayed manifestation occupational diseases
under certain variant, yet similar, factual circumstances might fare under
77. kLa at 14.
78. Id
79. "If this statute requires further updating through amendment, it remains the duty
and responsibility of the legislature to do so." Id at 14. In addition, the supreme court ruled
that the court of appeals had improperly relied on medical evidence found outside the record.
Id at 14 (citing Hales & Hunter Co. v. Norfolk W. Ry. Co., 428 N.E.2d 1225, 1227 (Ind. App.
1981)).
The United States Supreme Court dismissed Bunker's direct appeal for want of a substan-
tial federal question. 103 S. Ct. 1761 (1983). Bunker's appeal was brought under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257(2) (1982), which provides that a decision may be reviewed by the Supreme Court "[b]y
appeal where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its
being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is
in favor of its validity." Id
It is unknown whether this ruling can be interpreted as any sort of comment on the merits
of Bunker's claim, and we decline here to find one, but it is entirely possible that the high court
found the Indiana Court of Appeals use of outside medical evidence to be an adequate state
ground for dismissing the case.
80. See infra notes 100-379 & accompanying text.
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the same statute.81 In this way, the economic and political forces under-
lying the various state limitation provisions are highlighted.
82
The state laws are divided initially into two categories: those states
in which the Bunker-type claimant is barred,83 and those states in which
he would recover benefits. 84 A summary chart of the material discussed
in Part II appears in the appendix to this Article.
Statutes Which Bar the Bunker-type Claimant
Last Exposure Rules
Alabama
Several states commence their occupational disease disability limita-
tion period from the date of the employee's last exposure to an injurious
occupational hazard such as asbestos dust.85 Alabama has one of the
shortest limitation periods under this rule.86 The Alabama statute re-
quires an employee to file a verified complaint within one year of the date
of injury.8 7 Bunker's argument that his exposure was continuous would
not succeed in Alabama because the statute specifically provides that the
last exposure to the disease hazards must take place within the employ-
ment.88 Both the manifestation of Bunker's disease and his discovery of
81. Where significant, a state's treatment of asbestos exposure is compared with other
dust disease hazards, with radiation, with chemical poisons, and with occupational diseases,
generally.
82. It is beyond the scope of this Article to trace the legislative histories of the states'
special treatments of specific hazards such as lead, silica dust, cotton dust, ionizing radiation,
compressed air, and, of course, asbestos. These individualized treatments do, however, pro-
vide clues to the industrial and political backgrounds of various regions of the country.
83. See infra notes 85-292 & accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 293-379 & accompanying text. The discussion is limited to the rules
affecting disablement. The work-related death of the claimant creates a host of additional
statutory complications; to consider the time limitations governing survivorship benefits would
have made the paper unmanageable. For similar reasons we do not discuss the problem of
multiple and successive employers, nor the question of which of these employers are, or should
be, at risk. We do consider the controlling law question at several stages in the survey which
follows, and we summarize our views on this issue in Part III of this Article.
85. For the Indiana rule, see supra note 46 & accompanying text.
86. ALA. CODE § 25-5-147 (1977). This section provides the limitation period for "occu-
pational pneumoconiosis," defined as "[a] disease of the lungs caused by the inhalation of
minute particles of dust over a period of time, which dust is due to causes and conditions
arising out of and in the course of employment. ... Id. § 25-5-104(1). Although asbestosis
is not specifically included in this section, presumably it would be governed by this limitation
period. Special provisions are made for pneumoconiosis of coal miners. See id. § 25-5-170 to
-180. The limitation period for occupational diseases generally is found at § 25-5-117.
87. Id. § 25-5-247.
88. "The date of injury shall mean ... the date of last exposure to the hazards of the
disease in the employment of the employer in whose employment the employee was last ex-
posed to the hazards of the disease." Id. § 25-5-11.
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its cause occurred after he left National Gypsum. Bunker was in Na-
tional Gypsum's employ, however, for several years after his exposure to
asbestos. If he had discovered his illness while still employed by Gyp-
sum, he could argue that his earlier exposure to asbestos continued
within his body, and thus he was continuously exposed "to the hazards
of the disease" while still "in the employment." There is no appellate
record of cases litigating this point in Alabama, nor has there been any
recent challenge to the shortness of the limitation period.8 9
Arkansas
The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act 90 provides that:
a claim for compensation for disability on account of silicosis or asbes-
tosis must be filed with the Commission within one [1] year after the
time of disablement therefrom, and such disablement must occur
within three [3] years from the date of the last injurious exposure to
the hazards of silicosis or asbestosis .... 91
Thus, an Arkansas victim of silicosis or asbestosis must not only be dis-
abled within the three year limitation period, but also must be aware of
the causal connection between his disability and the workplace hazard to
bring his claim within the year following onset of the disease.
Hamilton v. Jeffrey Stone Co.92 illustrates how these two require-
ments may bar claims. In Hamilton, the claimant left his occupation as a
rock crusher operator due to a breathing difficulty which had been diag-
nosed as nonoccupational tuberculosis. The victim then worked as a se-
curity guard, but eventually his respiratory condition forced his total
89. In McLain v. GAF Corp., 424 So. 2d 1329, 1330 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982) an asbestosis
claimant unsuccessfully argued that he could bring a claim for medical payments after the one
year statute of limitations had run. He conceded that the statute barred his claim for disability
compensation, but argued that the term "compensation" in the Alabama Workmen's Compen-
sation Act excluded medical payments. Id. at 1329-30. He did not assert, however, that the
shortness of the limitation period denied him his constitutional due process rights.
In 1980, the Alabama legislature amended its civil code to provide for a discovery rule in
tort personal injury actions arising out of asbestos exposure. ALA. CODE § 6-2-30(b) (Supp.
1984). The constitutionality of this provision with respect to actions not already barred at the
time it was enacted was upheld in Tyson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 So. 2d 263, 267
(Ala. 1981). Nevertheless, the last exposure and minimum exposure requirements of ALA.
CODE § 25-5-147 (1977) covering workers' compensation remain in force.
90. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-1301 to -1363 (1976 & Supp. 1983).
91. Id. § 81-1318(a)(2) (1976). A similar requirement is found at id. § 81-1314(a)(7). A
rebuttable minimum exposure requirement for asbestosis and silicosis is provided at id. § 81-
1314(b)(2). An employee who cannot show five years exposure in the last 10 years preceding
disablement can still rebut the presumption that his disability was not work related. Id. A
claimant must also have resided in Arkansas for two of the five years; the residency require-
ment, however, is excusable if all five years were with the same employer. Id.
92. 641 S.W.2d 723 (Ark. CL App. 1982).
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retirement. Subsequent to his retirement, however, his respiratory prob-
lem was diagnosed as silicosis, a disease arising out of Hamilton's em-
ployment as a rock crusher. Hamilton immediately filed a claim.
The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission denied Hamil-
ton's claim because the claim was not filed within one year of disable-
ment.93 On appeal, Hamilton argued that under the statute both
limitation periods commence from the time of correct diagnosis, rather
than from the times of exposure and disablement, respectively. 94 Alter-
natively, Hamilton argued that unless construed with a discovery rule,
the statute unconstitutionally violated his fourteenth amendment
rights. 95
The Arkansas Court of Appeals declined to find a discovery rule
implied in the statute,96 but it remanded the case to the Workers' Com-
pensation Commission for consideration of the constitutional issues.97
On remand, 98 Hamilton raised an equal protection argument which cen-
tered on two allegedly invidious classifications created by the limitation
statute.99 First, the limitation period for nonoccupational disease inju-
ries runs "from the date of injury."' 1° In some Arkansas workers' com-
pensation cases, however, a discovery rule has been judicially adopted for
nonoccupational diseases.101 Thus, Hamilton argued, occupational dis-
ease victims are discriminated against in favor of "general injury"
victims.
Second, Hamilton argued that the statute irrationally discriminated
between silicosis and asbestosis victims, on the one hand, and other occu-
pational disease claimants, on the other. 10 2 Although the former class
may bring its claims within three years of the date of exposure, 10 3 in
contrast to only two years for the latter class, asbestosis and silicosis vic-
tims are saddled with an additional limitation period which requires
93. Id.
94. Id. at 724.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 725.
97. Id.
98. Claimant's Brief before the Arkansas Worker's Compensation Comm'n, Hamilton v.
Jeffrey Stone Co., Claim No. D016118, on remand from 641 S.W.2d 723 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Claimant's Brief].
99. Claimant's Brief, supra note 98, at 2-8.
100. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1318(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. 1983).
101. See Claimant's Brief, supra note 98, at 3 (citing Woodard v. ITT Higbie Mfg. Co.,
609 S.W.2d 115 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980)).
102. Id. at 3.
103. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1318(a)(2) (1976).
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them to file within one year of disablement.'14 Although the cost of sili-
cosis cases may once have been exceptionally high, thus providing a ra-
tional economic basis for the Arkansas Legislature to treat silicosis
victims more restrictively, the disparity in cost is no longer the case. 10 5
Georgia
The limitation periods in Georgia for asbestosis and silicosis dust
diseases are similar to those of Arkansas: the statute bars claims if dis-
ablement occurs more than three years after the last exposure, or if the
claim is filed more than one year after disablement. 10 6 In 1982 the dust
disease provision was amended to include byssinosis, commonly known
as brown lung. 10 7 Claims for all other occupational diseases must be
brought within one year of the date of last injurious exposure. 10 8 Like
Alabama, Georgia requires exposure to "the hazard of such disease in
such employment."'10 9 Thus, no recovery is possible more than four years
after termination of the employment in which the exposure to the hazard
occurred."10 Like many other states, Georgia provides a discovery-rule
104. Id.
105. Claimant's Brief, supra note 98, at 4-8.
106. GA. CODE ANN. § 114-801(b)(3) (1983). "Disablement" for asbestosis and silicosis
means an incapacity to receive remuneration in either the worker's last employment or in any
other occupation. Id. § 114-813. "Remuneration" means the lesser of weekly wages in excess
of 33 1/3% of wages received at time of last exposure or $20 weekly. Id. Like Arkansas,
supra note 91, Georgia also has a rebuttable minimum exposure presumption of five out of the
preceding 10 years and an excusable, two year in-state residence requirement. Id. § 114-814.
The state also has a system of medical examinations for asbestos and silica workers. Id. § 114-
816. Finally, workers with either asbestos or silica-related diseases who are not yet disabled
and who wish to continue in the employment may waive full compensation for any resulting
aggravation of their condition. Id. § 114-817.
107. Id. § 114-801. An employer's constitutional challenge to this amendment on the
ground that it was an impermissible retroactive impairment of contract was rejected in Canton
Textile Mills, Inc. v. Lathem, 253 Ga. 102, 317 S.E.2d 189 (1984), petition for cert. filed, 53
U.S.L.W. 3281 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1984) (No. 84-309). The court, in expressly overruling its earlier
decision in Bussey v. Bishop, 169 Ga. 251, 150 S.E. 78 (1929), agreed with the view expressed
by Justice Jackson in Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945) that "[s]tatutes of
limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic." Canton,
253 Ga. at 105, 317 S.E.2d at 192. Thus, where the legislature has expressed an intent to apply
its statute retrospectively to substantive matters, it can revive a claim that would have been
barred under an earlier statute of limitations, especially a claim under the Worker's Compen-
sation Act which is to be liberally construed in order to afford the injured claimant a remedy.
Id. at 106, 317 S.E.2d at 192-93.
108. GA. CODE ANN. § 114-801(b)(3) (1983).
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. See Vaughn v. Coal Operators Casualty Co., 106 Ga. App. 129, 130, 126 S.E.2d 428,
429 (1962); Patterson v. Employer's Mutual Liab. Ins. Co., 99 Ga. App. 325, 328, 108 S.E.2d
146, 148 (1959).
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exception for radiation disease." '
A recent case applying Georgia law presented a controlling law is-
sue similar to that in Bunker."12 In Hall v. Synalloy Co., 1 3 the plaintiffs,
who had been exposed prior to the 1971 to a chemical called beta-
napthyline (BNA), attempted to bring a common-law claim for negli-
gence against their employer. Before 1971 only certain enumerated
hazards could give rise to an occupational disease under the Georgia Oc-
cupational Disease Act, and BNA was not among them. The statute was
amended in 1971, however, to allow coverage, according to five criteria,
for certain hazards not specifically enumerated in the Act. 114 Under
these criteria, BNA exposure was a covered occupational disease.
The plaintiffs argued that, because their exposure occurred prior to
the 1971 amendment, the law at the time of their exposure should govern
their claim even though their disablements occurred after 1971." - If the
pre-1971 law governed, the plaintiff's injuries would not be covered by
the Act, and they could pursue a common-law remedy against their
employer.
The district court ruled that the date of injury was defined as the
date of disablement for those employees who were employed by the de-
fendant companies after the amendment was passed." 16 The court held
that those employees and their employers by implication incorporated
the new occupational disease criteria into their ongoing employment con-
tractual relationships and would be bound by them later when disable-
ment finally occurred.' 17 But employees whose contractual relationship
terminated prior to 1971 had not accepted the new law, and this group,
the court ruled, could maintain common-law actions against their
employers. ' 1
A claimant like Bunker seeking common-law relief in Georgia under
the Synalloy theory would be frustrated because asbestosis was one of the
enumerated diseases prior to 1971.119 If, however, the claimant alleged
111. GA. CODE ANN. § 114-801(c) (1983).
112. See supra notes 36-44 & accompanying text.
113. 540 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
114. See GA. CODE ANN. § 114-802(3)(F) (1983). This subsection defines occupational
disease as "those listed in this paragraph." Id. The paragraph includes a number of chemical
poisonings caused by exposure to X-rays, asbestosis, silicosis, and other occupational diseases.
Id. Until the legislature enacted a catchall provision, GA. CODE ANN. § 114-802(3)(F) (1983),
the enumerated list of diseases was exclusive.
115. 540 F. Supp. at 266.
116. Id. at 274.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See supra note 114.
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byssinosis due to exposure to cotton dust before 1971 and, like Bunker,
had left the employment prior to 1971, when byssinosis presumably was
included under the five criteria test,120 under Synalloy the claimant
would retain common-law rights. In Georgia, the right to bring a tort
action based on a pre-1971 exposure has real value for a plaintiff because
Georgia, unlike Indiana, recently adopted a liberal discovery rule for tort
claims. 12' The tort statute of limitations in Georgia begins running only
when plaintiffs discover both the nature of their illness and its causation
by the tortfeasor's act.'
22
Idaho
Idaho, like some other states, 23 subscribes to a version of the last
exposure rule. The occupational disease section of Idaho's Workmen's
Compensation Law' 24 enumerates certain diseases and hazards, 125 but
states that, because "additional toxic or harmful substances or matter are
continually being discovered and used and misused, the above enumer-
ated occupational diseases are not intended to be exclusive .... ,a126
Although additional diseases are compensable, claims for "hazards
which are common to the public in general" are barred.127 Asbestosis is
not among the enumerated diseases, but silicosis is.128
The Idaho claim limitation period is one year from "the last injuri-
ous exposure to such disease in such employment,"'129 granting a four
year exception for silicosis 30 and a discovery rule for ionizing radia-
tion.131 An occupational disease must be incurred in the employment, 32
120. Byssinosis became a listed dust disease in 1982, but arguably it could have qualified
earlier under the catchall section. GA. CODE ANN. § 114-802(3)(F) (1983).
121. See King v. Seitzingers, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 318, 319-20, 287 S.E.2d 252, 255 (1981)
(alleged negligence of nonemployer caused plaintiff's lead poisoning).
122. The King court found
that the appellant's cause of action did not accrue and the statute of limitations did
not run against him until he knew or through the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have discovered not only the nature of his injury but also the causal connec-
tion between the injury and the alleged negligent conduct of appellee. Id. at 320, 287
S.E.2d at 255.
123. Illinois, infra notes 148-53 & accompanying text, Indiana, supra notes 45-50 & ac-
companying text, Iowa, infra notes 154-57 & accompanying text.
124. IDAHO CODE § 72-437 to -450 (1973 & Supp. 1984).
125. Id. § 72-438.
126. Id. § 72-438(12).
127. Id.
128. Id. § 72-438(11).
129. Id. § 72-439 (1973).
130. Id.
131. Id. § 72-448(2) (1973 & Supp. 1984).
132. Id. § 72-102(17)(a) (1973 & Supp. 1983); id. § 72-439 (1973).
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and disablement must be total. 133 A silicosis claim requires exposure to
silica dust five out of the ten years preceding disablement, and of those
five years of exposure, two must have been in Idaho. 134 In addition, the
claimant must give notice of an occupational disease within sixty days of
its first manifestation 135 and within five months of cessation of the em-
ployment in which the disease was contracted.' 36 Finally, an employer
"shall not be liable for any compensation for a nonacute occupational
disease unless the employee was exposed to the hazard of such disease for
a period of sixty (60) days for the same employer."' 137
In Jones v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 138 the Idaho Supreme Court de-
scribed the above requirements as "a maze of limitations."' 139 The claim-
ant in Jones suffered allergic contact dermatitis that was attributed to
chromate in the cement with which he worked. The surety had paid the
medical expenses Jones had incurred for a prior attack of dermatitis
while employed by Morrison, but refused a new claim by Jones following
an interruption in his employment with Morrison. Jones had left Morri-
son to work with cement for other employers and then returned to work
for Morrison. Although he then did no cement work, the dermatitis
continued.
The surety advanced several limitation defenses. First, it argued
that more than one year had elapsed between the claimant's last exposure
to chromates and his "disablement.' 4° The supreme court acknowl-
edged that the claimant may have been disabled within the meaning of
the Idaho statute because he had developed an allergy that prevented
him from working "in any occupation which exposes him to chro-
mates." ' 4' The Idaho statute defines disablement as the employee's total
incapacitation "from performing his work in the last occupation in which
[the employee was] injuriously exposed to the hazards of such dis-
ease." ' 42 Thus, in Idaho, a person capable of working at a wide variety
of jobs apparently could be considered totally disabled if an occupational
133. Id. § 72-102(17)(c) (1973 & Supp. 1983). Partial disability from silicosis is not com-
pensable, id. § 72-444 (1973), but discharge for nondisabling silicosis is. Id. § 72-446.
134. Id. § 72-443 (1973). The two year residency requirement is excusable if the entire five
year exposure period occurred during employment with the same employer. Id.
135. Id. § 72-448 (1973 & Supp. 1984). Silicosis claimants, however, may give notice at
any time during the four year limitations period.
136. Id. But see infra note 147 & accompanying text.
137. Id. § 72-439 (1973).
138. 98 Idaho 458, 567 P.2d 3 (1977).
139. Id. at 460, 567 P.2d at 5.
140. Id. at 460-61, 567 P.2d at 5-6.
141. Id. at 462, 567 P.2d at 7.
142. IDAHO CODE § 72-102(17)(c) (Supp. 1984).
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disease rendered him physically unfit for the employment he was in at
the time of exposure. In Jones, however, the Industrial Commission had
failed to fix dates of last exposure and disablement, or to find that the
claimant was in fact disabled; thus, the court remanded the case to the
Commission for findings on these issues.
143
The court also rejected the Commission's interpretation of the sixty
day exposure rule to require continuous exposure to the hazard prior to
the first manifestation of disease.144 The court held that any sixty days
sufficed, continuous or not, even after the employee became aware of the
affliction. 145 The court also noted that the claimant's notice to the em-
ployer occurred both within sixty days of the first manifestation of his
disease and while he was still in the initial employ of this employer. 146 In
the court's view, this notice was sufficient to satisfy the sixty day notice
requirement; the five month termination provision applied only when the
first manifestation occurred after the employee has left his
employment.147
143. 98 Idaho at 464-65, 567 P.2d at 7.
144. Mia at 462-63, 567 P.2d at 7.
145. Id. at 462, 567 P.2d at 7.
146. Id. at 462-63, 567 P.2d at 7-8.
147. Id at 463, 567 P.2d at 7-8. Once an employee contracts a disease and notifies his
employer of its manifestation, "it does not require a notice to the employer upon each manifes-
tation of the disease." Id at 463, 567 P.2d at 8.
The court also observed that the claimant was requesting additional compensation, rather
than pressing an original claim. Id In additional compensation cases, the court noted, it was
first necessary to resolve a conflict between two contradictory code provisions. One subsec-
tion, a specific statute which is part of the Occupational Diseases Act, bars claims for addi-
tional compensation brought more than one year after the last payment for compensation. Id.
at 464, 567 P.2d at 9 (citing IDAHO CODE § 72- 448(3)). This provision, standing alone, would
have barred Jones' claim. Another, more general, code section provides for a limitation period
which gives a claimant "five (5) years from [the]. . . date offirst manifestation of an occupa-
tional disease, within which to make and file with the commission an application requesting a
hearing for further compensation and award." Id (quoting IDAHO CODE § 72-448(3)) (em-
phasis added).
The court chose to recognize the general limitation over the specific. It gave three rea-
sons for this atypical interpretation. First, the language in the general provision dealing with
occupational disease was an amendment enacted after passage of the specific one year rule. Id.
A second ground was found in the general principle "that the Workmen's Compensation Act
is to be construed liberally in favor of claimants." Id Third, the court noted that the Idaho
Occupational Diseases Act "suffers from over-complexity" implying that the court's interpre-
tation of the statute would be more likely to rationalize the limitation scheme of the Act,
rather than to destroy it, as had been argued by the respondent. Id. The Idaho Supreme
Court made clear that it was impatient with the legislature's efforts to constrain the objectives
of the state's workers' compensation system by means of complex limitation statutes, and that
it would construe this limitation legislation narrowly. Id. at 464 n.7, 567 P.2d at 9 n.7 (quot-
ing State v. Boyenger, 95 Idaho 369, 509 P.2d 1317 (1973)).
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Illinois
The Illinois Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act 148 contains limi-
tation language similar to that of the Indiana Occupational Diseases
Act. 149 Illinois claimants may bring claims within two years from the
date of last exposure, although the period is extended to three years for
exposure to silica or beryllium dust. 150 Illinois, however, provides a
twenty-five year limitation period for radiation sickness instead of a dis-
covery rule.151 The practical result of the Illinois and Indiana ap-
proaches to slowly developing radiation sickness may in most cases' 52 be
similar, yet the Illinois legislature has demonstrated a predisposition for
closure, which may retain for its workers' compensation scheme the high
degree of predictability fundamental to the legislation. In 1984 Illinois
increased its last exposure rule to twenty-five years for asbestos, 153 which
would still be too short a period for the Bunker-type claimant to recover.
Iowa
Iowa also follows a general limitation of one year "after the last
injurious exposure to such disease," granting a three year exception for
pneumoconiosis, 154 the characteristic fibrotic condition of the lungs
caused by the inhalation of dust particles. 155 This three year exception,
once limited to silicosis but now clearly embracing asbestosis, is also con-
strained by the following presumption:
In the absence of conclusive evidence in favor of the claim, disa-
bility or death from pneumoconiosis shall be presumed not to be due to
the nature of any occupation. . . unless during the ten years immedi-
ately preceding the disablement of the employee who has been exposed
to the inhalation of dust particles over a period of not less than five
years, two years of which shall have been in employment in this
state. 1
56
148. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 172.36-.62 (Smith-Hurd 1966 & Supp. 1984-1985).
149. See supra notes 45-79 & accompanying text.
150. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 172.36(l)(f) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985).
151. Id.
152. Not in all cases, however. See Cleanup to End Downstate City's Radioactive Stigma,
Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 13, 1984, at 30, col. 1 (This article reports the cleanup of radioactive
wastes in Ottawa, Illinois, known as "town of the living dead" because many female workers at
the now closed Luminous Processes Inc. plant allegedly suffered high cancer incidence from
licking radium-tipped brushes used to paint clock-faces back in the 1920's and 1930's. While a
number of victims worked at the plant until the 1970's, others left much earlier. Their last
exposures were more than 25 years prior to the onset of their symptoms.)
153. WORKERS' COMP. L. REP. (CCH) No. 67, at 5 (June 22, 1984).
154. IOWA CODE ANN. § 85A.12 (West 1984).
155. Id. § 85A.13(l).
156. Id. § 85A.13(2).
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One commentator has concluded that this rebuttable presumption based
on exposure to dust requires "more than merely being subject to a con-
tract to work in a place where such a hazard exists; the claimant must
physically have spent the required time in actual contact with the...
dust."15 7
Kansas
The Kansas statute treats occupational diseases like injuries by acci-
dent15 8 and no longer contains a list of enumerated diseases caused by
corresponding industrial processes.15 9 Because the states that follow the
enumerated diseases' 6° model now generally provide that the lists are
nonexclusive, the practical results from the two treatments have become
similar. Under each approach, however, the occupational disease must
be "connected with the particular type of employment and have resulted
from the source as a reasonable consequence of the risk."1
61
A claim is compensable under the Kansas statute if filed within one
year of the last exposure, although the statute provides for a three year
exception for silicosis resulting in death and no limitation on claims for
disablement due to radiation.1 62 In the case of silicosis, Kansas, like
other states, 163 establishes a rebuttable presumption if the victim was ex-
posed for five of the ten years preceding disablement. 164 If, however, a
claimant is employed by the same employer for those five years, his right
to compensation is not impaired although he worked outside of Kansas
157. Note, The Iowa Occupational Disease Law, 34 IOwA L. REv. 510, 515 (1949) (citing
Bingaman v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 159 Pa. Super. 29, 46 A.2d 512 (1946)).
158. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44.5a01 (1982).
159. Prior to 1963, the Kansas statute provided that occupational diseases were injuries by
accident, but it also listed as compensable an exclusive set of occupational diseases. In Watson
v. International Milling Co., 190 Kan. 98, 372 P.2d 287 (1962), the claimant argued that his
bronchial asthma was the result of a continuing series of accidents caused by his sensitivity to
wheat dust. The court ruled, however, that claimant's condition was in the nature of an occu-
pational disease, rather than a series of successive traumas, and that his wheat dust sensitivity,
not being listed, was uncompensable. Id. at 100, 372 P.2d at 288.
160. For a discussion of early problems dealing with defining the term "occupational dis-
ease," see Angerstein, Legal Aspects of Occupational Disease, 18 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 240,
256-74 (1945-1946). Defining occupational disease "by schedule" is attributed primarily to
precedent established in the English Workmen's Compensation Act of 1925. Id. at 266-72.
161. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44.5a01 (1982). Some states follow a combined approach, defin-
ing occupational diseases as injuries by accident and also listing a number of them together
with a catchall section for those occupationally related diseases not specifically mentioned.
See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-52 (1979).
162. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44.5a01(c) (1982).
163. See, eg., Iowa's broader pneumoconiosis exception supra note 154 & accompanying
text.
164. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44.5a10 (1982).
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part of that time. 
165
Maine
The Maine Workers' Compensation Act 16 6 requires that the em-
ployee file her claim "within 2 years after the date of injury."'1 67 For
occupational disease claims, "[t]he date when an employee becomes...
incapacitated . . . from performing his work in the last occupation in
which he was injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease shall be
taken as the date of injury under the Workers' Compensation Act."' 16
These two provisions would form a discovery rule based on disability
except that the date of incapacity is further limited by a section which
provides that occupational disease victims cannot recover unless their in-
capacity "results within 3 years after the last injurious exposure to such
disease in the employment."'
169
In addition to this general last exposure rule, a special provision for
silicosis states that:
[i]n the absence of evidence in favor of the claim, disability or death
from silicosis shall be presumed not to be due to the nature of the
occupation, unless during the 15 years immediately preceding the date
of disability the employee has been exposed to the inhalation of silica
dust over a period of not less than 2 years.'
70
Until recently, this rebuttable presumption governed asbestos-related dis-
eases and silicosis. 1 71 If Bunker had claimed under the Maine statute
when the presumption applied to asbestos, he might have prevailed.
Although his exposure to asbestos was less than two years and nonexis-
tent during the fifteen years preceding his temporary disability, the une-
quivocal diagnosis of his asbestosis presumably could rebut the statutory
presumption that his impaired respiratory function was nonoccupational.
In 1983 the Maine minimum exposure presumption for asbestos-re-
lated diseases was replaced by a section exempting these diseases from
the three-year last exposure rule. 172 This exemption, however, applies
only to cases in which the last injurious exposure occurred on or after
November 30, 1967.173 Thus, the 1983 exemption from the Maine last
exposure requirement does not provide relief to all asbestosis
165. Id.
166. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, §§ 1-196 (1978 & Supp. 1979-1983).
167. Id. § 95.
168. Id. § 186.
169. Id. § 189.
170. Id. § 194.
171. Id. § 194A (Supp. 1979-1983) (repealed 1983).
172. Id. § 194B(6).
173. Id. § 194B(2).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36
STATE OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ACTS
claimants. 174
Like Indiana, Maine has encountered a controlling law question. In
Davis v. Bath Iron Work Corp.,175 the plaintiff, an asbestosis victim,
brought a negligence claim against his employer arguing that asbestosis
became a disease covered by the statute in Maine only after his employ-
ment had terminated. As in Bunker, the court decided that a claim
under the Workmen's Compensation Act was Davis' sole remedy. The
court apparently conceded that its holding gave retrospective effect to the
statute, but it justified its decision on the ground that "the Legislature
gave special consideration to the gradual, degenerative nature of asbesto-
sis1'176 when it inserted the fifteen year presumptive period for the disease
to develop and for the symptoms to become manifest. In Davis, however,
the claimant, unlike Bunker, was eligible for compensation under the
Maine statute.
North Carolina
North Carolina's occupational disease statute177 follows the enumer-
ated disease model 178 and the injury by accident model. 179 The legislative
history of section 97-53(13) reveals increasing sophistication about the
range of medical conditions caused by workplace exposure to toxic sub-
stances. Prior to 1963, this section covered "[i]nfection or inflammation
of the skin, eyes or other external contact surfaces or oral or nasal cava-
ties due to irritating oils, cutting compounds, chemical dust, liquids,
fumes, gasses or vapors, and any other materials or substances."'1 80 In
1963 the provision was amended to include infections or inflammations of
"any other internal or external organ or organs of the body caused by
exposure to one of the above-named substances." 181 And in 1971, the cur-
174. Bunker was last exposed to asbestos dust before 1967. Interestingly, the new statute
provides that for incapacity from asbestos-related diseases occurring prior to October 1, 1983,
late claim filing can be excused until January 1, 1985. Id § 194B(5). Unfortunately for a
Bunker-type claimant, the statute also provides that no retroactive compensation will be avail-
able for pre-1983 periods of incapacity. Id. § 194B(6). Bunker's total temporary disability
took place entirely in 1976.
175. 338 A.2d 146 (Me. 1975).
176. Id. at 148.
177. The sections of North Carolina's Workers' Compensation Act dealing with occupa-
tional disease are found at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-52 to -76 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
178. Id. § 97-53.
179. Id. § 97-52.
180. Wood v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 297 N.C. 636, 642, 256 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1979) (quoting
Act of Mar. 26, 1935, ch. 123, 1935 N.C. Pub. Laws 131, as amended by Act of June 12, 1957,
ch. 1396, § 6, 1957 N.C. Sess. Laws 1590).
181. Id. at 642, 256 S.E.2d at 697 (quoting Act of June 13, 1963, ch. 965, § 1, 1963 N.C.
Sess. Laws 224).
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rent statutory language was enacted expanding the catchall section to
include "[a]ny disease . . . proven to be due to causes and conditions
which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation
or employment, but excluding all ordinary diseases of life."'18 2 In Booker
v. Duke Medical Center,183 the North Carolina Supreme Court observed
that the "clear intent of the General Assembly in enacting the current
version of G.S. 97-53(13) was to bring North Carolina in line with the
vast majority of states by providing comprehensive coverage for occupa-
tional diseases."
' 184
In North Carolina, the term "occupational disease" now includes
diseases exhibiting either gradual or rapid onset. In Booker, the court
held that serum hepatitis, contracted by a hospital employee, was an oc-
cupational disease despite being "caused by a single exposure to a vi-
rus," ' 85 rather than by gradual, "prolonged exposure to harmful
conditions," 1 86 the incremental process commonly associated with the
term "occupational disease." The court did observe, however, that the
slow development of most occupational diseases complicated fixing the
time of disablement under the North Carolina statute. 87 Section 95-52
provides that "[d]isablement or death of an employee resulting from an
occupational disease . . . shall be treated as the happening of an injury
by accident."' 88 The court noted that the date of "disability" is defined
in other jurisdictions, as well as in North Carolina, as "incapacity be-
cause of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving in the
same or any other employment"' 89 and ruled that the date of the acci-
dent was the date of disability, the day full wages were terminated. 90
Claimants in North Carolina must bring their claims within two years of
"the accident" and, though Booker concerned a death claim, presumably
the same definition of "injury by accident" running from date of disable-
182. Id. at 643, 256 S.E.2d at 697 (quoting Act of June 14, 1971, ch. 547, § 3, 1971 N.C.
Sess. Laws 477).
183. 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979).
184. Id. at 469, 256 S.E.2d at 196. The court reviewed the historical shift in occupational
disease provisions from exclusive lists of covered diseases to coverage for any disease which
can be shown to be occupationally related. Id. at 469 & n.1, 256 S.E.2d at 196 & n.1.
185. Id. at 470, 256 S.E.2d at 197.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 483, 256 S.E.2d at 204-05.
188. Id. at 482, 256 S.E.2d at 204.
189. Id. at 483, 256 S.E.2d at 205 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(9) (1979)).
190. Id. at 483, 256 S.E.2d at 205. Booker's hepatitis was diagnosed on July 3, 1971. He
worked until October 1, 1973. He was paid in full until October 1, 1973 and died January 3,
1974. The statute leaves open the question of whether an employee who can no longer work
because of an occupational health impairment, but who continues to receive salary, will have
the statute of limitations tolled for him.
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ment would govern a claim for disability benefits.1 91
The North Carolina statute has an independent scheme for asbesto-
sis, silicosis, and lead poisoning victims.1 92 Prior to 1981, employers' po-
tential liability terminated two years after their employees' last exposure
to those diseases.1 93 In addition, employees exposed to asbestos or silica
dust were-and still are-required to undergo periodic medical examina-
tions provided by their employers.1 94 If asbestosis or silicosis are discov-
ered, then after hearings the Industrial Commission can order the
removal of the employee, with compensation, from the occupation. 195 A
1981 amendment removed silicosis from the last exposure rule, increased
the limitation period for asbestos exposure to ten years, and left in place
the requirement for a two-year exposure to lead poisoning.1 96 The basic
scheme of medical examinations, hearings, and removal with compensa-
tion 197 for asbestosis and silicosis exposure was left intact.198
A claimant like Bunker would be barred in North Carolina because
the manifestation of his symptoms and the occurrence of his temporary
total disability occurred more than ten years after his exposure to asbes-
tos.199 If, however, he had been exposed to silica dust, rather than asbes-
tos dust, the last exposure bar probably2°° no longer would apply to him
if he were finally and totally disabled after 1981 when silica dust was de-
leted as a "last exposure" hazard.
201
The 1981 amendment was the basis for a controlling statute issue
similar to that in Bunker. The North Carolina Supreme Court addressed
191. For survivors to recover death benefits, the statute provided that the employee must
die within two years of the accident (disability or inability to earn wages). The Booker court
noted that there was no similar restriction for disablement from most occupational diseases. It
must be noted, however, that disability itself triggers the benefit payments; there is no later
event, Le. death, that need occur. The court did note the legislative restrictions placed on
asbestosis, silicosis, and lead poisoning, but ruled that any inequity resulting from such special
treatment was a matter for the legislature to remedy. 297 N.C. at 484, 256 S.E.2d at 205.
192. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-58 to -76 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
193. Id § 97-58 (1979) (amended 1981).
194. Id § 97-60 (1979).
195. Id § 97-61.5 (Supp. 1983).
196. Id § 97-58.
197. Id § 97-61.7 (1979).
198. Id §§ 97-60 to -61.7 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
199. Bunker's last exposure was in 1950; his four week disability was in 1976.
200. So long as the post-1981 version of § 97-58 is held applicable to his claim, the bar will
not apply.
201. If, under the rule in Booker v. Duke Medical Center, the claimant's disability oc-
curred in 1981, that event would set the date of his "accident." See supra notes 183-91 &
accompanying text. To discover whether this analysis will also be determinative in settling the
issue of which statute applies in North Carolina, see infra notes 202-15 & accompanying text.
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this issue in Wood v. J. P. Stevens.20 2 The claimant in Wood sought bene-
fits for disablement resulting from byssinosis caused by exposure to tex-
tile dust prior to 1958, the date the claimant had left the hazardous
employment. The claimant became totally disabled in 1975. The lower
court observed that under the pre-1963 definition 20 3 byssinosis could
qualify if the term "pulmonary air passages" was included in the term
"oral or nasal cavities. ' '2°4 Thus, the lower court ruled that Wood
should have been permitted to present evidence that the statutory defini-
tion in effect during her exposure to textile dust was sufficient to support
a compensable claim.20 5 But the court also noted that Wood might be
able to invoke the catchall definition of occupational disease that was
enacted in 1971.206 Although byssinosis is not one of the enumerated dis-
eases in North Carolina, byssinosis might qualify as an occupational dis-
ease under the "catchall" of section 97-53(13) enacted in 1971.207
The North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that the 1971 amend-
ment was inapplicable to this case because the amendment applied only
to cases originating before 1971.208 It held that occupational disease cases
"originate" when the diseases are contracted, and contraction cannot oc-
cur after the employee leaves the hazardous employment. 20 9  The
supreme court, however, held that a case originates when a cause of ac-
tion accrues and that in occupational disease cases accrual takes place
202. 297 N.C. 636, 256 S.E.2d 692 (1979).
203. See supra note 180 & accompanying text.
204. 297 N.C. at 640-42, 256 S.E.2d at 695-96.
205. Id. at 641-42, 256 S.E.2d at 696.
206. Id. at 642-43, 256 S.E.2d at 697. The court ruled that Wood could present evidence
that she had become disabled after the 1971 amendment had been enacted. If she could prove
post-1971 disablement, then she could invoke the language of the later statute. Id. at 643, 256
S.E.2d at 702.
207. See supra note 182 & accompanying text. The Wood court remanded the claim to the
Commission for a hearing de novo. The Commission's earlier denial was based on applying
definitions of occupational disease taken from earlier versions of § 97-53(13). On its face, the
1971 amendment (current version) presented no bar to recovery for byssinosis.
In the subsequent case of Smith v. American & Efird Mills, 305 N.C. 507, 290 S.E.2d 634
1982), the claimant was disabled by byssinosis. "The defendants did not take exception to or
make any cross assignments of error with regard to the Industrial Commission's finding
adopting the consulting physician's opinion that plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled
by byssinosis in 1978." Id. at 515, 290 S.E.2d at 639 (Meyer, J., dissenting). In his dissent,
Justice Meyer noted that the definition of byssinosis was consistent with the catchall section of
§ 97-53(13) as it existed prior to 1971. Id. at 516-17, 290 S.E.2d at 640. He noted, however,
that the Commission had not made a "determination that the claimant's disease is 'due to
causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation
or employment,'" as required under the 1971 amendment. Id. at 518, 290 S.E.2d at 643.
208. 297 N.C. at 643, 256 S.E.2d at 697.
209. Id.
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upon disablement.210 The court endorsed the proposition that "the date
of disablement [provides] the most workable solution to the difficult
problem of determining which law to apply in cases of occupational
disease.",2
11
In response to the argument that applying the amendment to pre-
enactment employment and exposures allows retroactivity, the court
agreed with the view that a "law is not retroactive merely because part of
the factual situation to which it is applied occurred prior to its enactment
... . [T]he right to compensation does not accrue and the rights of the
parties do not become fixed until the occurrence of the event, in this case
appellant's disability ....
Finally, the court ruled that applying the law in effect at the time of
disablement was not an unconstitutional impairment of the employment
contract. While recognizing contrary authority, the court held that the
relationship between a covered employee and his covered employer was
distinct from the traditional contract in which the rights and duties of
the parties are fixed at the time of contract formation. 213 In an employ-
ment contract the rights and liabilities imposed by law (for example, the
workers' compensation law) can change at any time as the law is revised,
even after the employment relationship has been terminated. The essen-
tial constitutional question that the court would consider "is not whether
the amendment affects some imagined obligation of contract but,
whether it interferes with vested rights and liabilities. ' 214 Inasmuch as
the employee has no claim prior to disablement and the employer no
liability, those rights and liabilities have not yet vested.
215
210. Id. at 643-44, 256 S.E.2d at 697.
211. Id. at 645, 256 S.E.2d at 698 (quoting 4 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 95.21).
212. Id. at 646, 256 S.E.2d at 699 (quoting Frisbie v. Sunshine Mining Co., 93 Idaho 169,
172, 457 P.2d 408, 411 (1969)).
213. Id. at 648-49, 256 S.E.2d at 700-01.
214. Id. at 650, 256 S.E.2d at 701.
215. Id. For a further analysis of the Booker and Wood cases, see 1979 Survey of Develop-
ments in North Carolina Workers' Compensation Law, 58 N.C. L. Rnv. 1185, 1185-95 (1980);
see also Smith v. American & Efird Mills, 305 N.C. 507, 290 S.E.2d 634 (1982). In Smith the
claimant was permanently partially disabled by byssinosis in 1970, but filed no claim for disa-
bility or medical expenses until 1978 at which time he was determined to be totally disabled.
He was given an award for his prior partial disability, but denied lifetime medical expenses for
his total disability pursuant to a post-1973 amendment to the statute. Ultimately, the supreme
court addressed the issue of which law controlled Smith's claim for total disability. The em-
ployer argued that when Smith was partially disabled in 1970, his rights vested because he was
then able to bring a claim for partial disability under the statute. The supreme court held,
however, that Smith's total disability was a separate claim and, following its rule in Wood,
would be governed by the statute in effect at the time of total disability. The Smith court's
holding might be limited, however, to cases in which no claim for partial disability is made
prior to the enactment of a liberalizing amendment. Because this point was not clear, Justice
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In North Carolina, the statute in effect on the date of disablement
controls a claim. A silicosis claimant protected by the 1971 amendment,
but with a history of exposure like Bunker's, would lose because of that
state's minimum exposure and residence requirement rule; employer lia-
bility for asbestosis or silicosis may arise only if the employee has been
exposed to the dust within North Carolina for at least two years. 216 In-
terestingly, this provision differs from most minimum-exposure residence
requirements by requiring that "no part of such period of two years shall
have been more than ten years prior to the last exposure, ' 217 rather than
requiring that the disablement must have taken place in the ten year pe-
riod preceding disablement.
South Carolina
In South Carolina, the employee must file a claim within two years
of receiving a diagnosis of an occupational disease. 21 8 The statute further
requires, however, that the employee's disease must be "contracted"
within one or two years of exposure to the hazard, depending on the
disease.
2 19
In Glenn v. Columbia Silica Sand Co.,220 the South Carolina
Supreme Court addressed the issue of determining the date of contrac-
tion of an occupational disease. The court ruled that to construe "con-
traction" as "referring to a point in time prior to that when, medically,
the disease has been definitely found to be present, would be to inject
uncertainty into the calculation of the period limited for the filing of
claims. ' 22 1 Under the court's interpretation, a disease is contracted no
earlier than the date of definite diagnosis. If, however, that diagnosis
occurs more than one year after last exposure to a hazard, or two years in
the case of pulmonary diseases, the claimant presumably would be
barred. In Vermont, occupational diseases are treated as injuries by acci-
Meyer, in dissent, feared "that the majority opinion will open a Pandora's box of claims never
contemplated by the legislature." Id. at 520, 290 S.E.2d at 642 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
216. N.C. STAT. ANN. § 97-53(13) (Supp. 1983). Bunker was exposed to asbestos dust for
only 22 months while in Indiana. See supra notes 29-31 & accompanying text.
217. Id.
218. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-15-40 (Supp. 1983).
219. Id. § 42-11-70 (1976).
220. 236 S.C. 13, 112 S.E.2d 711 (1960).
221. The Glenn court was not required to fix the date of contraction to decide the case
before it. It ruled that, for liability to attach to an employer or its carrier, total disability (no
compensation for partial disability at the time in South Carolina) had to occur. Id. at 19-20,
112 S.E.2d at 714-15. In the case at bar, medical determination of causation and disablement
occurred at the same time.
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dent.222 In the case of an occupational disease, an injury occurs when a
licensed physician sets out in writing on a proper form that the claimant
has an occupational disease.223 Except for radiation sickness, to receive
compensation all occupational disease claimants must be disabled within




Of the twelve "last exposure" statutes discussed in the previous sub-
section, nine have some type of minimum exposure requirement in addi-
tion to their last exposure bars.225 This subsection discusses two states,
Nevada and New Mexico, which have minimum exposure provisions
that are sufficient to bar claimants like Bunker even without last expo-
sure rules. A later subsection discusses minimum exposure provisions




Nevada has a nonrebuttable minimum exposure rule for silicosis
227
and other dust diseases. 228 Claimants must be exposed within Nevada to
harmful quantities of dust for not less than three out of the ten years
preceding disablement or death.229 These provisions bar claimants with
an exposure history like Bunker's. Occupational disease claims generally
must be filed "within 90 days after the employee has knowledge of the
disability and its relationship to his employment ... 230
Nevada occupational diseases claims are compensable only for tern-
222. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1001 (1978 & Supp. 1984).
223. Id. § 1004.
224. Id § 1006.
225. Only Illinois, Indiana, and Vermont do not.
226. See infra notes 374-79 & accompanying text.
227. NEv. REv. STAT. § 616.460(4) (1983).
228. Id. § 617.470.
229. d. §§ 617.460(4), .470. These provisions would bar Bunker-type claimants.
230. Id. § 617.330. Until it was amended in 1983, the Nevada statute required that occu-
pational disease disablement claims be brought within 12 months of the disease's contraction.
Id. § 617.440 (amended 1983). "Contraction," however, was not defined in the Nevada stat-
ute. If disease contraction were interpreted as an event occurring no later than the cessation of
employment, the 12-month limitation would require disability to have occurred within the
critical year following employment and would effectively be a last employment rule. If, how-
ever, contraction were liberally interpreted to mean the manifestation of symptoms, the 12-
month period could, in the case of slow-developing diseases, begin running long after the em-
ployment ended. See infra notes 313-16 & accompanying text.
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porary and permanent total disability. 23 1 In cases of injury by accident,
however, benefits for partial disability are also payable. In Holt v. Ne-
vada Industrial Commission,2 32 the claimant argued that the classifica-
tion created by the two types of injury recognized by Nevada
compensation law-accident and disease-was a denial of equal protec-
tion. The Supreme Court of Nevada held, however, that the legislature
was justified in making the distinction because the slowly developing na-
ture of occupational disease and its "exacerbation-remission cycle makes
it difficult to assess the anatomical percentage which may be assigned to a
partial disability.
' 233
If the Nevada Legislature later seeks to provide such compensation
to a diseased employee, 2 34 it should be prepared for an additional conse-
quence: an amendment to recognize claims for partial disability may also
affect which occupational disease law will apply to specific claims. In
Prescott v. United States,235 the federal court ruled that a Nevada claim
for compensation was governed by the law in effect at the time of disabil-
ity, not at the time of contraction, because the claim does not arise until
disability occurs.23 6 Occupational disease statutes frequently have been
amended. Thus, if a claim accrues at the moment of disability and the
term "disability" includes partial disability, different laws or amend-




Section 52-3-42(A) of the New Mexico Occupational Disease Dis-
ablement Law238 provides that a claim "based upon silicosis, asbestosis,
231. NEv. REV. STAT. § 616.430(1) (1983) provides: "Every employee ... [is] entitled
to the compensation provided . . .for temporary disability, permanent disability, or death
232. 94 Nev. 257, 578 P.2d 752(1978).
233. Id. at 258, 578 P.2d at 753.
234. The court recommended that it would "be a better practice to provide such compen-
sation to a diseased employee." Id.
235. 523 F. Supp. 918 (D. Nev. 1981). When discussing the claimant's argument, the
court uses the word "injury" instead of "contraction."
236. The court noted that this rule was "a well-settled exception to the 'vested rights'
general rule." Id. at 926.
237. Under the "12 months of the disease's contraction" rule in effect prior to the 1983
amendment, supra note 230, a second effect from recognizing partial disability could be ex-
pected: the operation of the 12-month limitation period between disease contraction and dis-
ablement may prove to be less harsh. Partial disability frequently precedes total disability.
Thus, some claimants who ultimately will become totally disabled could maintain a claim for
their partial disability before the 12-month period expires.
238. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-3-1 to -59 (1978 & Supp. 1984).
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poisoning by benzol. . or any other disease. . . must be filed within
one year of the beginning of disablement of the employee. ' 239 This pro-
vision is further limited by section 52-3-1O(A)(2) which requires that the
silicosis or asbestosis claimant must have worked, during the ten years
preceding disablement, 1250 work shifts (approximately five to six years)
while being exposed to the harmful dust.24°
The concept of estoppel was used to block a minimum exposure rule
defense in New Mexico. In McDonald v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,241 the com-
pany relied on section 52-3-1O(A)(2) to deny a miner's claim for compen-
sation for silicosis. The court ruled, however, that the company could be
estopped from raising the minimum exposure rule of this section as a
defense because when the claimant was originally hired, Kerr-McGee al-
legedly failed to notify him that he was already suffering from pneumo-
coniosis, even though his pre-employment examination x-ray had
revealed that condition to the company. The court remanded the case to
the district court to determine whether the defendant's concealment of
known facts had induced the claimant's reliance and his subsequent act
of accepting the dangerous employment.
Last Employment Rules
At least four states have limitation periods running specifically from
the time of last employment. In this subsection provisions of the Mon-
tana, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah statutes will be discussed.
Montana
Montana's Occupational Disease Act242 allows the claimant to file
one year "from the date the claimant knew or should have known that
his total disability resulted from an occupational disease. ' 243 If the
claimant "could not have known that the claimant's condition. . . was
related to an occupational disease," the period can be extended two addi-
tional years.244 In no event, however, may a claim "be maintained unless
the claim is properly filed within three years after the last day upon
which the claimant. . . actually worked for the employer against whom
compensation is claimed." 245 This provision would permit recovery by a
claimant who was transferred to a nonhazardous occupation within the
239. Id. § 52-3-42(A) (1978).
240. Id. § 52-3-10(A)(2).
241. 93 N.M. 192, 598 P.2d 654 (1979).
242. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-72-101 to -714 (1983).
243. Id. § 39-72-403(1).
244. Id. § 39-72-403(2).
245. Id. § 39-72-403(3).
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same employment and who became disabled within three years of leaving
his employer. Thus, a claimant who, like Bunker, was transferred after
twenty-two months of exposure to asbestos dust within the company,
but, unlike Bunker, remained with the employer in a nonhazardous envi-
ronment, would be eligible for total disability benefits under this Mon-
tana last employment rule even though he would have lost under a last
exposure rule.
Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania Occupational Diseases Act 246 contains a host of
timing provisions governing the filing of claims and notification to the
employer. The Pennsylvania limitation provisions are complex, and only
the general features are highlighted here. Section 1401(c) limits compen-
sation to compensable disabilities "occurring within four years after the
date of. . .last employment in such occupation or industry. ' 247 In Ry-
den v. Johns-Manville Products,248 the court ruled that a compensable
disability requires a reduction of the claimant's earning capacity.
249
Therefore, a compensable disability under this subsection alone cannot
occur prior to the manifestation of disability,250 although presumably it
could occur upon the manifestation of symptoms that result in less than
total disablement. Section 1401(e), however, bars compensation "for par-
tial disability due to silicosis, anthraco-silicosis, coal worker's pneumo-
coniosis, or asbestosis. ' ' 251 Thus, an asbestosis victim who is less than
totally disabled four years after leaving either the job or industry in
which the hazard was encountered is barred from recovery. 252 Section
1401(d) requires the dust disease claimants to show an "aggregate em-
ployment of at least two years in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
246. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 1201-1603 (Purdon 1952 & Supp. 1984-1985). In Penn-
sylvania, occupational disease benefits can also be awarded under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. Id. tit. 77, §§ 1-1066. Under this Act, the disability must occur within 300 weeks
after last exposure. Id. § 302(2).
247. Id. § 1401(c) (Supp. 1984-1985).
248. 518 F. Supp. 311 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
249. Id. at 323.
250. Le., a reduction in wages because of health impairment.
251. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1401(e) (Supp. 1984-1985).
252. In Pennsylvania, the date when an occupational disease victim becomes totally dis-
abled is a matter that "must be determined independently on the facts of each case." Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'n Appeal Bd., 35 Pa. Commw. 58,
60, 384 A.2d 1046, 1048 (1978) (citing Novak v. Mathies Coal Co., 29 Pa. Commw. 122, 370
A.2d 435 (1977)). The court held that neither the date of final exposure nor the date of diag-
nosis was automatically dispositive of the issue. Id. For a discussion of when the Penn-
sylvania tort statute for personal injury begins to run in dust disease cases, see Grabowski v.
Turner & Newall, 516 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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during a period of ten years next preceding the date of disability, in an
occupation having a silica, coal, or asbestos hazard. ' 253 Each of these
sub-sections would be sufficient to bar a claimant like Bunker in
Pennsylvania.
Another Pennsylvania limitation requires either that the parties
agree on compensation, or that a petition be filed, within sixteen months
after compensable disability begins.254 The employer must receive notice
of the disability within twenty-one days after compensable disability be-
gins, or "no compensation shall be due until such notice be given;" if
notice is not given within 120 days, "no compensation shall be
allowed."
255
If dust disease claimants are barred under any timing provision of
the Pennsylvania statute, they need not go away entirely empty-handed.
Section 1401(i) provides benefits of seventy-five dollars per month to every
totally disabled employee who has not "been compensated because his
claim was barred by any of the time limitations prescribed by this act."
'256
To qualify for the special compensation, the claimant must have been
exposed to the dust for two years within Pennsylvania, and after 1969 the
claimant must be a Pennsylvania resident.
257
South Dakota
An occupational disease claimant in South Dakota has two years
from the time of disability to bring a claim.258 A silicosis victim, how-
ever, must have a minimum of two years exposure to silica dust under a
contract of employment.259 In addition, the statute has notice provisions
requiring all disease claimants, except radiation victims, to give written
notice of disease contraction within six months of leaving the employ-
253. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1401(d) (Supp. 1984-1985).
254. Id. § 1415.
255. Id. § 1411.
256. Id. § 1401(i).
257. Id. The Pennsylvania limitations and their interactions are complex.
258. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 62-8-11 (1978).
259. Id. § 62-8-14. An earlier version of this provision required a five year exposure out of
the 10 years preceding disablement the last two of which were required to be in South Dakota,
1947 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 426. Under the former statute, a miner who received far more than
five years exposure during his working life could still be barred if at least five full years of that
exposure did not take place within the decade adjacent to his disablement. See Carr v. Home-
stake Mining Co., 88 S.D. 27, 215 N.W.2d 830 (1974). Carr received no compensation
although he was exposed to silica dust for over 25 years in South Dakota; only a little over a
year of exposure occurred in the decade preceding disablement. Under the current statute, the
claimant in Carr could recover, but a Bunker-type claimant with less than two years total
exposure could not.
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ment.260 Presumably notice may be given before disability occurs, but
some manifestation of disease symptoms would appear to be neces-
sary,261 a requirement that might effectively bar claimants like Bunker
from recovery in South Dakota.
Utah
Section 35-2-48 of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Com-
pensation Act 262 bars claims brought more than one year after "the cause
of action arises."'2 63 The section provides that "[t]he cause of action shall
be deemed to arise on the date the employee first suffered incapacity from
the occupational disease and knew, or in the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence should have known, that the occupational disease was caused by
his employment. ' 264 This discovery rule, however, is subject to a further
limitation found in section 35-2-13. This section states that "[n]o com-
pensation shall be paid for a disease other than silicosis unless total disa-
bility results within one year from the last day upon which the employee
actually worked for the employer against whom compensation is
claimed. ' '265 Silicosis victims' claims for total disability must be brought
within three years of such last employment, although silicosis victims
whose disease is complicated by active tuberculosis are given five
years. 266 Compensation for silicosis is subject, however, to a further
minimum exposure rule requiring that the claimants have been exposed
to silicon dioxide dust for a total of five years in the state out of the
fifteen years preceding disability.
267
One might surmise from the above provisions that Utah employees
who suspect they have an occupational disease will be motivated to re-
main in injurious employment until they become totally disabled lest the
one year from last employment limitation should run against them. Sec-
tion 35-2-56, however, provides for partial compensation to an employee
who is deemed by an appointed "impartial medical panel" to be partially
disabled.268 In addition, this section provides funds for some of the em-
ployee's vocational rehabilitation. 269 This compensation for partial disa-
260. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 62-8-29 to -30 (1978).
261. Presumably, one cannot give notice without presenting some evidence of incipient
disease.
262. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 35-2-1 to -65 (1953 & Supp. 1983).
263. Id. § 35-2-48(a) (1953).
264. Id. § 35-2-48(c).
265. Id. § 35-2-13(a)(2).
266. Id. § 35-2-13(a)(3).
267. Id. § 35-2-13(b)(2).
268. Id. § 35-2-56 (Supp. 1983).
269. Id. § 35-2-56(2).
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bility, however, requires the claimant to have been exposed to the
deleterious substance within two years of the disablement.270
Bars to Retroactive Application of New Statute
Even though a state legislature enacts a more liberal provision, the
courts may decline to apply the more favorable statute to a disabled
claimant whose exposure to the occupational disease hazard took place
before the amendment was passed. For example, prior to September 1975
the Colorado Occupational Disease Disability Act 271 included a mini-
mum exposure rule272 and a last exposure rule.273 Claimants were barred
if they had not been exposed within the state, or under Colorado con-
tracts of employment, to asbestos, silica, or coal dust during five of the
ten years preceding their disablements. 274 They also were barred if they
were not disabled within "five years from the date of the last injurious
exposure to such disease while actually working for the employer against
whom compensation is claimed."
275
The constitutionality of the five year minimum exposure rule for
dust diseases was attacked in Stevenson v. Industrial Commission.276 The
claimant argued that the statute created an "arbitrary, unreasonable and
discriminatory" classification, thus denying him due process and equal
protection under both the Colorado and United States Constitutions.
277
The Colorado Supreme Court agreed that the rule invidiously classified
disabled workers into two classes: those exposed for five years or more
and those exposed for less. The court found that the purported rational
basis for the classification was inadequate;278 five years of exposure to
harmful dusts was not necessary to establish a causal connection between
the exposure and the subsequent disease.
279
270. Id. § 35-3-56(1)(b).
271. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-60-101 to -131 (1973 & Supp. 1983).
272. Id. § 8-60-110(g) (1973) (repealed 1975).
273. Id. § 8-60-110(d), (e) (1973) (repealed 1975).
274. See supra note 272.
275. COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-60-110(e) (1973) (repealed 1975).
276. 190 Colo. 234, 545 P.2d 712 (1976).
277. Id at 235, 545 P.2d at 714. He also argued that the Colorado residence requirement
impinged on his constitutional right to travel. Id
278. Ia at 238, 545 P.2d at 715-16. The classification bore "no reasonable relation to a
legitimate state objective." Id at 238, 545 P.2d at 716.
279. In a conclusion similar to that reached by the Indiana Court of Appeals in Bunker,
see supra notes 72-75 & accompanying text, the court concurred with the trial court "that the
duration of exposure to hazardous quantities of silica dust required to induce disabling silicosis
can vary from six months to ten or even twenty years." 190 Colo. at 238, 545 P.2d at 716.
In the court's view, those disease victims with less than five years exposure should be
given the opportunity to show the causal connection. "The denial of a hearing to such appli-
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The Colorado legislature replaced both exposure rules with a disa-
bility accrual statute effective September 1975.280 In March 1978, James
Stark filed a claim seeking compensation under the Colorado Occupa-
tional Disease Act.281 Stark was last exposed to silica dust in 1960. In
1972 he was diagnosed as having silicosis, at which time he was ruled to
have become disabled.28 2 The referee denied the claim, citing the last
exposure rule of the earlier statute. Stark attacked the last exposure por-
tion of the statute on constitutional grounds similar to those argued suc-
cessfully in Stevenson. The Colorado Court of Appeals, however, upheld
the rule, stating that "the limitation operates in the same manner on all
members of the class"28 3 and that "barring claims when disablement
does not occur within five years of the last exposure bears a reasonable
relationship" to the end of "preventing stale claims."9
284
Although Stark had argued in the alternative that the repeal of the
statute removed it "from consideration by the Commission, ' 2 5 the court
of appeals held that the rights and liabilities of the parties had become
fixed and vested in 1965 when five years had run from the time of Stark's
last exposure to silica dust. Therefore, to apply the new provisions to
this case would impermissibly allow the repeal to operate retroactively
and would "impair the employer's right to rely upon the prior statute as
a defense." 286 The clear implication of the court's holding is that whether
Stark was disabled before or after the effective date of the repeal was
irrelevant. The court relied on a vested rights concept to resolve the con-
trolling law question in favor of the law in effect when the statute of
limitations has run.
287
cants is a denial of due process; the denial of benefits to a class of workers indistinguishable on
the basis of relevant considerations from a class of workers who are granted benefits denies
them equal protection of the law." Id. at 238, 545 P.2d at 716 (quoting trial court quoting
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)).
280. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-52-105 (1975).
281. Stark v. Zimmerman, 638 P.2d 843 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981).
282. Id. at 846 (Berman, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 845.
284. Id. In dissent, Judge Berman held that the Stevenson rationale was directly applica-
ble to the last exposure rule. Id. at 846-47 (Berman, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 845.
286. Id. at 845-46.
287. This holding is opposed to that reached by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
Wood v. J. P. Stevens Co., 297 N.C. 636, 256 S.E.2d 692 (1979); see supra notes 202-15 &
accompanying text.
A result similar to that reached by the Colorado court in Stark was accomplished legisla-
tively in New Jersey. In enacting a new discovery rule for occupational diseases, the legisla-
ture expressly provided that it was not to apply retroactively, but only to claimants whose
exposure to hazards had ended after January 1, 1980. Delayed manifestation diseases such as
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Effective Date Limitations
Fourteen states have placed a limit on liability, usually by using as a
starting point for coverage the date the state's occupational disease law
was enacted.2 88 Generally, claims are not compensable in these states
unless the worker's last exposure occurred after the effective date. Ten of
the fourteen states which have these limits established them in the
1940's.289
Although some occupational diseases develop over very long peri-
ods, today very few new claimants fall outside these deadlines. For the
great majority of exposed workers, either their last exposure post-dates
the late 1940's, or they have already developed any occupational disease
which is likely to become manifest. The prototype, Bunker, whose dis-
ease was diagnosed in 1976, comes close to being affected by these cutoff
dates: although not diagnosed until 1976, his exposure began in Febru-
ary 1949 and continued for twenty two months. A claimant like Bunker,
however, would be barred by this effective date limitation in three states:
Montana (1959),290 Oklahoma (1953),291 and Kansas (1953).292
Statutes Which Permit the Bunker-type Claimant to Recover
Disability, Injury, or Discovery of Disease Rules
The majority of states now provide for some form of discovery rule
to begin the running of their limitation periods. The more restrictive of
these rules begin the period when claimants know, or should know, that
they are diseased. Because knowledge of the relation of the disease to
asbestosis, however, were exempted from the retrospective bar. See infra notes 321-24 & ac-
companying text.
288. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-287 0982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 35A7(6) (West Supp. 1983);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44.5a20 (1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 182 (1964); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 39-72-406(l) (1983); NEv. REv. STAT. § 617.170 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 281:2 (West Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-3-10 (Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-
56 (1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.68 (Page 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 1.1
(West Supp. 1983-1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 62-8-5 (Supp. 1982); TEX. STAT. ANN.
art. 8306, § 23 (Vernon 1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-2-13-(l) (1977).
289. Georgia (Apr. 30, 1946); Iowa (Oct. 1, 1947); Maine (Jan. 1, 1946); Nevada (1947);
New Hampshire (Aug. 31, 1947); New Mexico (Apr. 9, 1945); Ohio (Oct. 12, 1945); South
Dakota (July 1, 1947); Texas (1947); Utah (July 1, 1941).
An additional state, North Carolina, set its date in 1935. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-56
(1979).
290. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-72-406(1) (1983) (no recovery when last day of injurious
exposure occurred prior to July 1, 1959). Minor exceptions are listed id. § 39-72-405(3).
291. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 1.1 (West 1970 & Supp. 1984-1985) (no recovery when
last injurious exposure occurred before June 6, 1953).
292. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44.5a20 (1980) (no compensation if last exposure occurred prior
to July 1, 1953).
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employment is not required to begin these limitation periods, those work-
ers whose diagnosis of the disease precedes their knowledge of its occupa-
tional cause will be barred if they fail to acquire that knowledge before
the statutory period has run. A plaintiff like Bunker presumably would
recover under such a rule because Bunker's knowledge of the occupa-
tional relationship coincided with the diagnosis of his disease as asbesto-
sis. Inasmuch as a number of diseases, such as asbestosis, are specifically
related to occupational exposure, this simultaneity of diagnosis and
knowledge of at least partial occupational causation is likely in many
industrial cases. Limitation periods that commence from date of disabil-
ity, or the date of injury (where injury is defined as disablement), are
subject to the same shortcoming: workers may become disabled, yet be
unaware that their disablement is employment related.
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missis-
sippi, Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota, and Texas are states that have an
injury or disability accrual. 293 The date of disability or injury has some-
times been liberally construed. 294 For example, under the Ohio statute
the date of diagnosis by a physician is an alternative to the date of disa-
bility to trigger that state's limitation period.295 The statute requires a
claimant to file within two years after disability or within six months
after diagnosis.
Connecticut
Connecticut, on the other hand, has a fairly strict disability statute.
A claimant is required to give notice within three years from the first
293. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-294 (1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.19 (1981); KY. REV.
STAT. § 342.316 (1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 41 (West 1976); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 71-3-35 (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-137 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.85
(1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 62-8-29 (1978); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a
(Vernon Supp. 1984).
South Dakota has a notice requirement that might bar Bunker- type claimants. See supra
notes 258-61 & accompanying text.
Colorado now has a disability accrual statute, COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-52-105 (1973), but
under Stark v. Zimmerman, 638 P.2d 843 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981), this provision would not
apply to the Bunker-type claimant. See supra notes 280-87 & accompanying text.
Massachusetts permits employees to preserve their common-law tort rights against em-
ployers for personal injury, MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 153, § 1 (West 1958), but employees
will be held to have waived such rights if they are not preserved in writing at the time of
contract for hire. Id. ch. 152, § 24.
294. See, e.g., Richmond v. Industrial Comm'n, 533 P.2d 931 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Rich-
mond v. Industrial Comm'n, 33 Colo. App. 21, 513 P.2d 1088 (1973); Moore's Case, 362
Mass. 876, 289 N.E.2d 862 (1972); Trombetta's Case, I Mass. App. Ct. 102, 294 N.E.2d 484
(1973).
295. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.85 (1980).
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manifestation of a symptom of an occupational disease.296 Because many
occupational diseases, such as asbestosis and silicosis, develop over a long
period of time, many workers are likely to manifest a symptom long
before the condition becomes severe enough to motivate them to seek
medical help. Moreover, a plaintiff who sought immediate medical
assistance but lacked knowledge of occupational relationship could be
barred by Connecticut's statute. The statute certainly bars claims of peo-
ple who are initially misdiagnosed.
297
Nebraska
The Nebraska statute requires that claims for personal injury be
brought "within two years after the accident. '298 This statutory lan-
guage was interpreted in Osteen v. A. C. & S., Inc. 299 In Osteen, the em-
ployee had been last exposed to asbestos in 1974-1975 and entered the
hospital for diagnosis on February 1, 1977. The court found that the ear-
liest date upon which "the disease manifested itself in disability was Feb-
ruary 1, 1977. Using that 'date of injury,' it is plain that claimant gave
notice and filed her petition within the statutory time limits.
' '3°
Wisconsin
In Wisconsin a recent amendment extended the limitation from six
to twelve years from the date of injury. The twelve-year limit does not
cut off rights to recovery; it merely provides for payment from a different
source, the Work Injury Supplemental Benefit Fund.
30 1
Occupational Relationship Rules
In many of the discovery rule states, the limitation period, at least
for some diseases, is counted from the time that the claimant knows both
296. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-294 (1972); see also TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a
(Vernon Supp. 1984) The statute provides that a claimant must give notice within 30 days
after the first distinct manifestation of an occupational disease and claim compensation within
one year thereof. The Board, however, can waive these limitations for meritorious cases.
297. Compare the case of the Arkansas claimant, Clayton Hamilton, supra notes 92-105 &
accompanying text.
298. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-137 (1978).
299. 209 Neb. 282, 307 N.W.2d 514 (1981).
300. Id at 286, 307 N.W.2d at 518. The court also affirmed that in Nebraska peritoneal
mesothelioma was an occupational disease. The incidence of this disease in the population at
large is negligible, "but approaches 7 percent in asbestos workers. . . .Conversely, several
studies which traced the employment history of men who had died of mesothelioma found that
between 60 percent and 80 percent... had a history of prolonged exposure to asbestos in their
employment." Id
301. Wisc. STAT. § 102.17(4) (West 1973 & Supp. 1983-1984).
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the nature of the disability and its relation to employment. By far, the
largest number of states-twenty-two--fall into this category.
30 2 Occu-
pational relationship rules represent the legislative trend as states revise
their worker compensation statutes.
30 3
Among the states that have occupational relationship statutes, there
is considerable variation in the timing for giving notice or for filing a
claim.3° 4 The periods range from thirty or ninety days30 5 to three
years306 after discovery that the disease is occupationally related. A
claimant like Bunker, of course, would have a great advantage under this
type of statute, for it allows compensation even if the employee does not
discover the true nature of the disease, or that it is employment-related,
until twenty years or more after termination of exposure or employment.
Tennessee
In some states, however, the more liberal discovery rule results from
judicial interpretation rather than statutory enactment. 30 7 Tennessee
courts have interpreted their statute in such a manner. The Tennessee
statute requires that notice be given to the employer within thirty days
after the first distinct manifestation of an occupational disease.30 8 The
302. The states with this liberal discovery rule are Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware,
Hawaii, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, West Vir-
ginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.105 (1981); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 23-1061 (1983); CAL. LAB. CODE § 5412 (West 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 2361(c) (1974); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 386-82 (1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1031.1
(1964 & Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 26 (1957 & Supp. 1984); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 418.441 (1967 & Supp. 1984-1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.151 (West 1966 &
Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.430 (Vernon Supp. 1984); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
281, § 16-a (West Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-34 (West 1959 & Supp. 1984-1985);
N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 44-a (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1983-1984); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 65-05-01 (1960 & Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 24 (West 1970 & Supp. 1983-
1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.807 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-35-57 (1979 & Supp. 1984);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-305 (1983 & Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 65.1-52 (1950 & Supp.
1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.28.055 (1962 & Supp. 1984-1985); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-
15 (1981); WIS. STAT. § 102.12 (1973).
303. P. BARTH & H. HUNT, supra note 3, at 120, 124; Note, Issues, supra note 4.
304. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.105 (1981) (two years); CAL. LAB. CODE § 5412
(West 1971) (one year); LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 23:1031.1 (West 1964) (six months); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 287.430 (1978) (two years unless employer fails to file a report of injury or
death, in which case employee has three years).
305. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 24 (1970) (90 days); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-305
(1983) (30 days to give notice to the employer).
306. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-35-57 (1956).
307. See, e.g., Myers v. Rival Mfg. Co., 442 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); McKee v.
Crescent Spinning Co., 54 N.C. App. 558, 284 S.E.2d 175 (1981); Consolidated Coal Co. v.
Brown, 225 Tenn. 572, 474 S.W.2d 416 (1971).
308. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-503 (1983).
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courts have held, however, that failure to give such notice is excusable
30 9
and that the running of the period is postponed until the employee has
actual or constructive knowledge that the disability is employment-
related.310
Minnesota
One of the first states to enact an occupational-relationship rule,
Minnesota, did so in response to a case in which the claimant unsuccess-
fully presented arguments similar to Bunker's. Prior to 1973, Minnesota
employees were barred from bringing claims twelve months after con-
tracting a disease due to a hazardous employment if they had not yet
become disabled.311 In addition, asbestosis or silicosis claimants were
subject to a presumption, rebuttable by "conclusive evidence," that their
diseases were not occupationally related if they had not been exposed to
the hazards of the diseases for five of the ten years preceding
disablement.
312
In Graber v. Peter Lametti Construction Co.,313 the Minnesota
Supreme Court considered whether the three-year last-exposure provi-
sion was constitutional in the case of silicosis. The claimant, like Rich-
ard Bunker, argued that the provision denied him equal protection of the
laws because his exposure to silica dust ended in 1964, but his disease
was neither diagnosed, nor was he disabled, until 1968. The court found
a rational basis for upholding the statute because, with the passage of
time, "evidence of causal relationship of the hazard to the disease may
become stale for both the employee and employer. ' 314 Nevertheless, the
Graber court, noting that medical knowledge about the latency of silico-
sis had advanced since the three-year limitation was established in 1949,
urged the legislature to reform the provision by balancing the legitimate
interests involved. 315 One year later the Minnesota legislature enacted
legislation requiring only that occupational disease claimants give notice
309. See, eg., Christopher v. Consolidated Coal Co., 222 Tenn. 727, 440 S.W.2d 281
(1969).
310. See, e.g., Consolidated Coal Co. v. Brown, 225 Tenn. 572, 474 S.W.2d 416 (1971).
311. MINN. STAT. § 176.151(7) (1972).
312. Id. § 176.151 (1966). Three years of exposure had to occur within the state. Id.
313. 293 Minn. 24, 197 N.W.2d 443 (1971).
314. Id. at 30, 197 N.W.2d at 447.
315. The court suggested a return to the pre-1949 silicosis/asbestosis limitation period
which ran from the time "such disease was contracted," MINN. STAT. § 176.66(32) (1943),
rather than from last exposure. 293 Minn. at 30, 197 N.W.2d at 447. The supreme court had
decided in an earlier case that a disease is contracted only when clinical symptoms emerge,
even if the symptoms manifest after employment has terminated. Yeager v. Delano Granite
Works, 236 Minn. 128, 52 N.W.2d 116 (1952).
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"within three years after the employee has knowledge of the cause of
such injury and the injury has resulted in disability.
316
Missouri
A variation on the employment-related discovery accrual is found in
Missouri's statute, which provides that a claimant must file within two
years after it becomes "reasonably discoverable and apparent that a com-
pensable injury has been sustained. ' 317 Knowledge that the injury is
compensable, however, requires knowing the nature of the injury and its
relationship to the employment. 318 This interpretation was refined fur-
ther in Moore v. Carter when the court held that a claimant's mere
awareness of the presence of a work-related illness did not constitute
knowledge that she had a compensable injury.319 Thus, the claimant,
who in 1972 knew that she had pulmonary edema and in 1974 learned
that it was work-related, was not barred from filing a claim in 1977 be-




New Jersey adopted a discovery rule in 1980.321 By statute, it may
not be applied retroactively. 322 Employees whose exposure ended before
January 1980 are covered by the prior statute, a last exposure rule. The
prior statute, however, does not apply to diseases that are enumerated in
the statute:323 asbestosis, silicosis, and "any occupational disease having
the same characteristics of the . . . enumerated diseases.
324
316. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.151(4) (West. Supp. 1984).
317. Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.430 (1978).
318. See, e.g., Myers v. Rival Mfg. Co., 442 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
319. 628 S.W.2d 936, 941 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Myers v. Rival Mfg. Co., 442
S.W.2d 138).
320. The claimant was employed for one year working on carburetors which exposed her
to emery dust and occasionally to gasoline fumes. During the next three years, she worked
near employees who checked carburetors with gasoline and thus was exposed to fumes. The
following three years she experienced some fume exposure as an inspector, and finally, she
worked three to eight weeks in the flow test department which continuously exposed her to
gasoline fumes. She was hospitalized in September 1972, for acute pulmonary edema of unde-
termined etiology. Id. at 937-38. The claimant testified that her personal physician told her in
1974 that her condition was caused by gasoline fumes. The court, however, deferred to a find-
ing by the Commission that her illness was not "factually diagnosed as fully job-related and
compensable" until a specialist in chest diseases diagnosed it in April 1977, over one year after
she had filed her claim. Id. at 940-41.
321. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-34(a) (West Supp. 1984-1985).
322. See id.
323. Id.
324. Id. If the employee's disease does not fall within these exceptions, then she or he
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New York
New York has an occupational relationship rule only for certain
enumerated diseases. Section 28 of the Workers' Compensation Law re-
quires a claimant to file "within two years after the accident, or if death
results therefrom within two years after such death. '325 This section is
tolled in the case of compressed air illnesses and occupational diseases
resulting from exposure to benzol, certain metallic chemical elements,
and radiation, until such time as the claimant is disabled and knows
"that the disease is or was due to the nature of the employment.
'326
When claimants are disabled and have the requisite knowledge that the
employment is related to their illnesses, then they have ninety days to file
a claim.3
27
In addition, section 44a provides a special discovery rule for victims
of "silicosis or other dust diseases. '328 Claimants with these diseases
must file within ninety days after the claimant becomes disabled and has
knowledge of the relationship of the disease to employment. The em-
ployer "in whose employment an employee was last exposed to an injuri-
ous dust hazard" will then be liable for the payments. 329
Section 44a would apply to the Bunker-type claimant because asbes-
tosis is caused by exposure to asbestos dust.330 New York courts have
repeatedly ruled that section 44a is limited to dust diseases within the
pneumoconiosis group, and asbestosis seems clearly within this classifica-
tion even though few, if any, New York cases have ruled specifically on
asbestosis under section 44a.
331
Asbestos, however, has also been closely linked with a form of can-
cer called mesothelioma. 332 Often a person suffering from asbestosis
must file within one year after discovering the disability is employment-related, but within five
years of last exposure.
Kentucky and Wyoming also have retained their last exposure rules as alternative trigger
dates. See infra note 346.
325. N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 28 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1983-1984).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 44a (McKinney 1965).
329. Id.
330. Asbestosis is caused by inhalation of asbestos fibers which scars air sacs in the lung
tissue. I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, AsEsTOs AND DISEASE 143-56 (1978); Special Project, supra
note 9, at 573 n.10.
331. See, eg., Smith v. Certain Teed Prods. Corp., 85 A.D.2d 820, 445 N.Y.S.2d 649
(1981); Roberts v. Agway, Inc., 71 A.D.2d 733, 419 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1979); Lawton v. Port of
New York Auth., 276 A.D. 81, 92 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1949).
332. Mesothelioma, which is cancer of the membrane lining of the lungs, chest, or abdomi-
nal cavities, is not entirely peculiar to asbestos exposure. It has been estimated that 15-80% of
people with mesothelioma have had no documented contact with asbestos. Note, Issues, supra
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later develops mesothelioma. Sometimes asbestosis fails to manifest it-
self, and the initial disablement occurs from the mesothelioma.333 If the
Bunker-type claimants suffer from this disease rather than asbestosis,
their suits are likely to be barred.
334
If the claimant's disease is not among the enumerated exceptions
tolled under sections 28 or 44a, the claim would be governed by a second
limitation found in section 40, which runs backwards in time from the
date of disablement: with certain additional exceptions beyond those
enumerated in section 28, 335 no more than twelve months can have
elapsed between the time of disablement and the time of disease contrac-
tion.336 The disease must also have been due "to the nature of [the claim-
ant's] employment and contracted therein, or in a continuous
employment similar to the one in which he was engaged at the time of his
disablement, whether under one or more employers. ' 337 A claimant who
is disabled while still employed in the job in which he contracted the
disease is not subject to the twelve-month limitation. But a claimant who
is no longer in the hazardous employment when he becomes disabled in
1976 could be barred under the twelve month limitation.
In applying the twelve-month limitation period, the New York
Workers' Compensation Board has been given considerable latitude by
the courts to establish the date of disease contraction and the date of
disablement. A person who has left the hazardous employment can be
deemed to have been disabled at the time "the nature of the disease was
diagnosed" or "before diagnosis but after leaving employment. ' 338 Simi-
note 4, at 874-75 & n.29. In general, the closer the check for asbestos, the higher the correla-
tion. Id. at n.9 (citing Kannerstein, Churg & Selikoff, Pathogenic Effects of Asbestos, 101
ARCHIVES PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY MED. 623, 625 (1977); see also supra note 300.
333. See, e.g., Smith v. Certain Teed Prods., 85 A.D.2d 820, 445 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1981).
334. In Smith v. Certain Teed Prods., mesothelioma was found not to be a dust disease
within § 44a. Id.
335. N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 40(1) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984) provides:
Nor shall it bar compensation in the case of an employee who contracted compressed
air illness, or its sequelae, or whose disablement or death is or was caused by latent or
delayed pathological bone, blood or lung changes or malignancies due to occupa-
tional exposure to or contact with arsenic, benzol, beryllium, zirconium, cadmium,
chrome, lead or flourine.
N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 40(2) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter to the contrary, the time limit
for contraction of the disease and for disablement or death resulting therefrom as
prescribed by this section shall not bar compensation in the case of an employee
whose disablement or death is or was caused by occupational exposure to or contact
with x-rays, radium, ionizing radiation or radio-active substances.
336. N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 40(1) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
337. Id.
338. Garafolo v. Arms Hills Supermarkets, 74 A.D.2d 681, 682, 424 N.Y.S.2d 784, 785
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larly, the courts have ruled that an "[a]ggravation in a claimant's last
employment is the equivalent of contraction as that word is construed in
section 40 of the Workers' Compensation Law. ' 339 Therefore, the latest
date that the Board could designate the date of contraction is the day the
employee left the employment in which he experienced the exposure to
the hazard. Thus, the Bunker-type claimant would be deemed to have
contracted asbestosis no later than 1960, and because he was first diag-
nosed as having the disease in 1976, the New York Board would have
had no grounds to set his disablement any earlier than 1976 because his
earning ability suffered no impairment prior to that date.34° Bunker's
claim would have been barred because more than twelve months elapsed
between these dates.
In Smith v. Certain Teed Products Corp.,341 the claimant had left the
hazardous employment in 1972 and became disabled in 1975. In late
1974 he learned that he was suffering from mesothelioma and died from
the disease shortly after. Applying the twelve-month limitation period of
section 40, the Workers' Compensation Board and the court disallowed
his claims for disability and death on the ground that mesothelioma was
not a dust disease within the meaning of section 44a.342 Although
Bunker-type claimants apparently can recover for disability due to asbes-
tosis in New York, they will be barred if their occupational exposure
results in the dreaded asbestos-related cancer.
Virginia
The Virginia statute provides that claims must be filed within five
years of the last exposure, or within two years "after diagnosis has been
communicated to the employee," whichever occurs first.343 Several dis-
eases, including mesothelioma, are exempted from this limitation.344
(1980); Artman v. Saperstein's Bake Shop, Inc., 37 A.D.2d 651, 652, 322 N.Y.S.2d 334, 336
(1971).
339. See, eg., Garafolo, 74 A.D.2d at 682, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 785 (citing McCann v. City of
New York, 27 A.D.2d 618, 619, 275 N.Y.S.2d 733, 735 (1966)).
340. See, eg., Zambrona v. Renell Bake Shop, Inc., 34 A.D.2d 707, 309 N.Y.S.2d 758
(1970); Ryciad v. Eastern Precision Resistor, 12 N.Y.2d 29, 334 N.Y.S.2d 207, 186 N.E.2d 408
(1962).
341. 85 A.D.2d 820, 445 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1981).
342. Id. at 821, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
343. VA. CODE § 65.1-52(3) (Supp. 1984). Note that the limitation period for coal miners'
pneumoconiosis is three years from last exposure. Id. § 65.1-52(1). The limitation period for
byssinosis is seven years from last exposure. Id. § 65.1-52(2).
344. The diseases exempted include: cataract of eyes due to exposure to heat or glare of
molten glass or radiant rays, epitheliomatous cancer, radium disability or disability due to
radiation exposure, ulceration due to chrome compounds or to caustic chemical acids, and
angiosarcoma of the liver due to exposure to vinyl chloride. Id. § 65.1-52(3).
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Thus, the situation in Virginia was opposite to that in New York because
latent asbestosis victims were barred from recovery, while latent
mesothelioma victims were permitted to recover. In 1973 the statute was
amended to make asbestosis a compensable disease if the claim was filed
within "two years after diagnosis of disease is first communicated to the
employee. ' 345 The liberal Virginia statute thus allows claimants like
Bunker to recover.
Modified Last Exposure Rules
Some states have retained the last exposure date in their occupa-
tional disease statutes of limitation, but have coupled it with discovery
provisions in ways that permit Bunker-type claimants to recover. A typi-
cal statute designates the last exposure date as an alternative to the date
of discovery. 346 Under such a scheme, the claimant must file within a
certain length of time from either of these events, whichever occurs
last.347 Oklahoma, for example, stipulates that notice must be filed
within eighteen months following the date of last hazardous exposure, or
within three months following the disablement which the claimant attrib-
utes to an occupational disease.
348
West Virginia
West Virginia has a similar requirement. An occupational disease
claim must be filed three years from last exposure, or three years from
when the worker acquires actual or constructive knowledge of the exist-
ence of the disease, whichever occurs last.349 Claimants who were ex-
posed to hazards prior to the 1971 enactment of the discovery alternative,
however, were uncertain about which law should be applied to their
claims, the old three-year last exposure rule or the new law requiring
employee knowledge to commence the limitation period. The claimant
345. Id. § 65.1-52(2a). The ;tatute also provides that:
In any case in which a claim is being made for benefits for a change of condition in an
occupational disease (e.g., advancing from one stage or category to another) the
claim must be filed with the Commission within three years from the date for which
compensation was last paid for an earlier stage of the disease, except that a claim for
benefits for a change in condition in asbestosis must be filed within two years from
the date when diagnosis of the advanced stage is first communicated to the employee.
Id. § 65.1-52(3); see also infra notes 362-64 & accompanying text.
346. Kentucky and Wyoming also have retained their last exposure rules as alternative
trigger dates. However, instead of using discovery of the occupational nature of the disease as
the other alternative, these states use the time of disability. KY. REV. STAT. § 342.316(1)(b)
(1981); Wyo. STAT. § 27-12-503(b) (1977).
347. See, e.g. WYO. STAT. § 27-12-503 (1977).
348. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 24 (West Supp. 1983-1984).
349. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-15 (1981).
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in Lester v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner350 discovered
that he had occupational pneumoconiosis in April 1971; he filed his
claim on March 22, 1973. Because Lester's last exposure occurred on
March 13, 1970, the Commissioner ruled that the claim was not timely
under the three-years-from-last-exposure rule in effect at the time of his
exposure.3 51 On appeal Lester argued that his claim should not be
barred because before his three-year limitation period had expired, the
legislature had amended the statute so that the three-year limitation pe-
riod ran from the time the claimant knows or should have known that he
has occupational pneumoconiosis.3 52 The supreme court ruled that Les-
ter could take advantage of the new limitation period, thus making his
filing timely.
353
The court deemed that the legislature had intended the retroactive
application of the statute.3 54 The court rejected defendant's argument
that such an extension unconstitutionally impaired contractual obliga-
tions, noting that the right to workmen's compensation benefits was not
consensual or contractual,3 55 but arose from the duties and responsibili-
ties that the law attaches to the status of the employer-employee
relationship.
356
The court also rejected the argument that retroactive application
unconstitutionally impaired the vested property rights of the employer by
extending its liability beyond the previously established cut-off date. It
found that rights did not vest until the statute of limitations had com-
pletely run and the suit was barred.35 7 Because Lester's three years-
from-last-exposure period had not elapsed before the Legislature ex-
tended the period, the suit was not barred.
Arguably, the court's application of the statute would help only
those few claimants whose time to file had begun, but not ended, before
July 1, 1971. Anyone whose exposure ended before 1968 would be
barred. A subsequent decision further extended the Lester ruling. In
Bailey v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, the court held
that worker compensation statutes of limitation are procedural, not juris-
350. 242 S.E.2d 443 (W. Va. 1978).
351. Id. at 444.
352. Id. at 445; W. VA. CODE. § 23-4-15 (1981).
353. 242 S.E.2d at 447.
354. The court stated: "Keeping in mind the beneficient purposes of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act and the liberality rules as to its construction, and being aware of the mischief
sought to be remedied by the legislative amendments, we perceive no reason why the legisla-
ture would not have intended such amendments to be applicable .... " Id. at 445-46.
355. Id. at 449-50.
356. Id. at 450-51.
357. Id. at 452.
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dictional.358 Therefore, failure to comply with them is excusable. Thus, a
plaintiff who could demonstrate innocent mistake, excusable neglect, un-
avoidable cause, fraud, misrepresentation, other misconduct of an ad-
verse party, or "any other reason justifying relief,' ' 359 might recover in
West Virginia, although exposure to the hazard had terminated several
years before the more liberal statute was enacted.
Florida
Florida has retained its last injurious exposure rule in a different
way. The statute requires filing within two years from the date of in-
jury,3 60 which has been judicially defined as the date of disablement. The
claimant has the burden of proving that the date of last exposure was not
the date of disablement.
361
Virginia
Virginia applies a straightforward last exposure rule to most occupa-
tional diseases. Claimants must file within five years of their last expo-
sure.362 Mesothelioma and a few other diseases, however, are exempted
from the five year limitation. 363 Thus, Bunker-type plaintiffs whose dis-
eases fall within the enumerated categories can recover, while others,
who arguably are similarly situated, will not. Although this type of stat-
ute is especially subject to attack on equal protection grounds, that argu-
ment did not prevail in the Bunker case.
364
Oregon
Oregon has an unusual combination of discovery and last exposure
rules. 365 For most occupational diseases, claimants must meet two limi-
358. 296 S.E.2d 901, 905 (W. Va. 1982). The court again looked to worker compensation
history and the "fiction" about the consensual nature of the arrangement as the reason why
such statutes had been considered jurisdictional in the past. Id. at 904. The early workers'
compensation statutes were conceptualized as consensual in nature. Thus, to satisfy standards
of constitutionality, it was necessary for the early compensation programs to appear voluntary.
It was a claimant's right to "participate" that depended upon his satisfacton of statutory re-
quirements. While later decisions had recognized that the compensation system was a product
of state police power, and in effect was compulsory, judicial "inertia and neglect" prevented
the courts from recognizing the procedural nature of the limitation provisions. Id.
359. Id. at 905.
360. FLA. STAT. § 440.19(l)(a) (Supp. 1984).
361. American Beryllium Co. v. Stringer, 392 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 1980).
362. VA. CODE § 65.1-52 (1950 & Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).
363. Id.
364. See supra notes 58-71 & accompanying text.
365. OR. REV. STAT. § 656.807(1)-(4) (1983).
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tation requirements.366 First, they must fie within five years of last expo-
sure. Second, they must file within 180 days of either disablement or the
date they are informed by a physician that they are suffering from an
occupational disease, whichever is later.367 This second requirement
makes disablement a predicate for recovery, but disablement without
knowledge of the nature of the disease is insufficient to trigger the limita-
tion period under this provision. 368
In 1981 the five-year limitation provision was extended to forty years
for asbestos-related diseases. 369 In a recent asbestosis case the claimant
fied more than five years after his last exposure to asbestos, the statutory
limit at the time of his filing.370 By the time the Oregon Supreme Court
reviewed claimant's constitutional challenge to the shortness of the five-
year limitation period, the Legislature had acted to protect similar claim-
ants in the future.371 But because this claim had been filed prior to the
liberalizing amendment and after the five-year statute had run, no retro-
active application of the forty-year period was possible.372 As in Bunker,
the court was unpersuaded that the limitation denied claimant's right to
a remedy because the five-year limitation had barred his claim before the
disease had developed. 373
366. Id. § 656.807(1).
367. Id.
368. This provision tolls the 180 day limitation period until the disabled claimant acquires
knowledge of the occupational nature of the disease from a physician. A nondisabled person
with such knowledge is, of course, ineligible for wage compensation.
369. Id. § 656.807(4).
370. Stone v. State Accident Ins. Co., 57 Or. App. 808, 646 P.2d 668 (1982).
371. Id. at 811, 646 P.2d at 670 (citing OR. REV. STAT. 656.807(4) (1983)).
372. Claimant Stone voluntarily retired from work in 1973. The referee found that claim-
ant was not informed that he suffered from asbestosis until March 22, 1979, even though a
physician diagnosed his symptoms as asbestosis on October 5, 1978. Claimant filed within 180
days after he was informed by a physician that he suffered from asbestosis; however, his claim
was barred by the second provision of the section because he filed it more than five years after
his last injurious exposure.
If Stone had been disabled after the 1981 law became effective, presumably his claim
would then have been timely. Although the court stated that "[a]pplication of this [new] stat-
ute is not involved in this case," 57 Or. App. at 811, 646 P.2d at 670, it is evident that Stone
met both the 40-year last exposure requirement and the alternative 180-day discovery rule.
The result is consistent with the principle that the date of disablement should determine which
version of the law to apply to the claim. See infra notes 402-04 & accompanying text.
373. The Oregon Court of Appeals held that Stone's constitutional claims lacked merit,
citing Josephs v. Burns & Bear, 260 Or. 493, 503, 491 P.2d 203 (1971). In Josephs, the Oregon
Supreme Court held that it was "a permissible legislative function" to balance the possibility of
barring legitimate claims against the public need to put a time limit on potential litigation;
hence, the five year limit on filing claims was not unconstitutional. 57 Or. App. at 811, 646
P.2d at 669.
The Court further stated that, while the 1981 amendment extending the time limitation
for asbestosis and asbestos-related claims to 40 years evidences the Legistature's perception
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Discovery Rules with Conclusive and Rebuttable Presumptions Based on
Minimum Exposure
A few states that have discovery statutes have attempted to protect
employers from payment of nonoccupational disease claims by establish-
ing either a conclusive or rebuttable minimum exposure presumption. If
the claimant's exposure is shorter than the statutory period, it will be
conclusively or rebuttably presumed that the disease was not occupation-
ally caused. Louisiana, for example, creates a presumption that a disease
contracted in less than twelve months is nonoccupational. 374 This pre-
sumption can only be overcome by an "overwhelming preponderance" of
the evidence. 375 Since many occupational diseases are product-specific, 37
6
as was Bunker's, this burden of proof would not be difficult to meet in a
substantial number of claims.
377
Kentucky has a limited presumption in favor of pneumoconiosis vic-
tims. 37  Section 342.316(5) states that ten years of exposure to a pneu-
moconiosis hazard provides a presumption of causation. 379 Less than ten
that the short limitation period placed on claims for diseases with long latency periods works
an inequality, it does not render the five-year time limit of the former Act unconstitutional
because, "the legislature is entitled to right perceived wrongs one at a time." Id. at 811, 646
P.2d at 670.
374. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1031.1(D) (West Supp. 1984). Some states have liberally
construed their "contraction" requirements. See, e.g., Taylor v. Cone Mills Corp., 56 N.C.
291, 289 S.E.2d 60 (1982); Christopher v. Consolidated Coal Co., 222 Tenn. 727, 440 S.W.2d
281 (1969). Because the time of disease contraction plays a role in the limitation period of
several statutes, discrepancies in interpretation can occur. For discussions of state statutes
interpreting the word "contraction", see supra notes 218-24 (South Carolina), 230-37 (Ne-
vada), 313-16 (Minnnesota), 338-42 (New York) & accompanying text. If contraction is de-
fined as any time before disease symptoms become manifest, a Bunker-type claimant could be
barred if the statutory period runs out prior to his or her awareness that the disease exists.
While the trend is toward interpreting "contraction" to allow delayed manifestation injury
compensation, legislatures would be well advised to rid their occupational disease statutes of
the term given the temporal uncertainty inherent in it.
375. Id.
376. E.g., asbestosis is only caused by exposure to asbestos; silicosis by exposure to silica
dust; meatwrapper's asthma by exposure to heated polyvinyl chloride film; black lung by expo-
sure to coal dust.
377. At least one state has eliminated such presumptions from its statutes in the past sev-
eral years. See, e.g., TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 26 (Vernon 1967) (repealed 1971) (pre-
sumption that disability is not due to employment unless during 10 years immediately
preceding incapacity employee was exposed for five years to the hazard, of which two years
were within the state, and employee could not be exposed outside the state more than one year
prior to incapacity).
378. Ky. REV. STAT. § 342.316(5) (1983).
379. There also appears to be a judicially-created presumption that retirement creates the
presumption that an employee is aware of a manifestation of his disease. See, e.g., Inland Steel
Co. v. E.H. Terry, 464 S.W.2d 284 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971).
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years of exposure would appear to raise no presumptive bar to recovery,
except, perhaps, by implication.
Public Policy Issues
The chart in the Appendix summarizes the major characteristics of
the various state limitation statutes governing occupational disease
claims. We emphasize, however, that many jurisdictions have applied
considerable judicial gloss to these provisions and that a number of stat-
utes have recently (within the past ten to fifteen years) undergone major
legislative revision. We believe the revision process will continue and
will facilitate worker recovery. Yet, as is evident from the preceding dis-
cussion, compensation for delayed manifestation occupational diseases is
highly dependent upon a multiplicity of factors which vary widely from
state to state-factors such as dates of last exposure, last employment,
disablement, and contraction; length and severity of exposure to hazards;
the identity of the specific hazards causing disease; claimants' residence
in the state while exposed; claimants' knowledge of the existence of dis-
ease and its relationship to employment; and, finally, the choice of which
amendments to the original statutes will be applied to the claims. The
potential for inequity in such a hodge podge is significant. This section
explores the public policy problems that jurisdictions face when devising
and revising their worker compensation systems and the other compensa-
tion mechanisms that interact with them.
Retroactive Application-Which Law Should Control the Claim?
State occupational disease acts, including their statutes of limitation,
frequently have been amended in the past few decades; often the amend-
ments liberalize the acts. Therefore, the threshold question frequently is:
which version of the limitation statute should apply-the current law or
an earlier enactment?380 The problem arises because decades may pass
380. This Article has discussed several controlling statute cases. See supra notes 235-37 &
accompanying text (Prescott v. United States, 523 F. Supp. (D. Nev. 1981)), notes 113-18 &
accompanying text (Hall v. Synalloy Corp., 540 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Ga. 1982)), notes 280-87 &
accompanying text (Stark v. Zimmerman, 638 P.2d 843 (Colo. 1981)), notes 29-44 & accompa-
nying text (Bunker v. National Gypsum Co., 406 N.E.2d 1239 (Ind. App. 1980)), notes 172-76
& accompanying text (Davis v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 338 A.2d 146 (Me. 1975), note 215
(Smith v. American & Efird Mills, 305 N.C. 507, 290 S.E.2d 634 (1982)), notes 202-15 &
acccompanying text (Wood v. J.P. Stevens, 297 N.C. 636, 256 S.E.2d 692 (1979)), notes 358-59
& accompanying text (Bailey v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 296 S.E.2d 904 (W.
Va. 1982)), notes 349-57 & accompanying text (Lester v. State Workmen's Compensation
Comm'r, 242 S.E.2d 443 (W. Va. 1978)); cf supra notes 315-16 & accompanying text (Yaeger
v. Delano Granite Works, 236 Minn. 128, 52 N.W.2d 116, 117 n.1 (1952) (post-disability
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before an occupational disease develops to the point that the worker is
disabled and eligible to file a claim for compensation. Prior to disable-
ment, however, often there are several significant events that occur in the
history of these delayed manifestation diseases. Arguably, the law in ef-
fect when these events occur should govern the claim, even though the
actual filing comes much later. The first significant event is gaining the
employment in which the hazardous substance exists. The law governing
the original employment contractual relationship could be considered as
setting forth the rules under which the parties impliedly agreed to be
governed. 381 The second event is the employee's initial exposure to the
hazard that ultimately leads to a compensable claim.38 2 Next is that met-
aphysical moment when the disabling disease becomes inevitable,
although no symptoms or indications of its existence are yet manifest.
This moment is often indeterminable, even through hindsight analysis,
yet arguably it is the point when injury to the claimant first occurred.
383
Still later, in no certain order, come the manifestation of symptoms,
384
constructive knowledge of the relationship of the symptoms to the em-
ployment,385 the worker's actual knowledge of the relationship, 386 the
worker's last injurious exposure to the hazard, 387 amendment of the stat-
amendment not discussed)), notes 370-73 & accompanying text (Stone v. State Accident Ins.
Fund Corp., 57 Or. App. 808, 646 P.2d 668 (1982) (post-disability amendment not discussed)).
381. See Hall v. Synalloy Corp., 540 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Lester v. State Work-
men's Compensation Comm'r, 242 S.E.2d 443 (W. Va. 1978).
382. See Schmidt v. Merchant's Dispatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936).
In Schmidt, the court held that an employee's negligence claim against an employer for creat-
ing an unreasonable risk of pneumoconiosis accrued when the employee first inhaled deleteri-
ous dust: "when the forces wrongfully put in motion produce injury." Id. at 300, 200 N.E. at
827. This "impact" or "wrongful act" rule has been consistently upheld in New York tort
cases. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714,
188 N.E.2d 142 (1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963); Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47
N.Y.2d 780, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920, 391 N.E.2d 1002 (1979). The Schmidt court assumed that
because disease did develop, its development was inevitable from the moment the employee
first inhaled the dust. Thus, the first inhalation was actionable.
383. The Schmidt rule was reaffirmed in Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d
1008, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1981). In his dissent in Steinhardt, Judge Fuchs-
berg contrasted impact and harm. He argued that while impact to the plaintiff occurs upon
first exposure, harm occurs only if the disease begins to develop. He concluded that if symp-
toms do emerge, the trier of fact should decide when the disease began. Id. at 1011-14, 430
N.E.2d at 1301, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 244-48 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). The Indiana Supreme
Court has cited the Schmidt rule with approval. See supra note 44 & accompanying text. The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, questioned whether the Indiana court had cited
these cases to adopt an "impact" rule or merely to reject a "discovery" rule. See Braswell v.
Flintkote Mines, Ltd., 723 F.2d 527, 532-33 (7th Cir. 1983).
384. See supra notes 292-300 & accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 301-41 & accompanying text.
386. Id.
387. See supra notes 100-224, 347-73 & accompanying text.
[Vol. 36THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
STATE OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ACTS
ute before the employment has terminated, 388 the termination of employ-
ment, 389 amendment of the statute after the employment has
terminated, 390 the running of an earlier version of a statute of limita-
tions, 391 temporary total disability of the worker, 392 temporary or perma-
nent partial disability,3 9 3 total permanent disability, and premature, job-
related death.
Many of these milestones in occupational disease development have
been the focus of litigation to resolve the controlling law problem. Part
II of this Article presented many of the arguments for and against adopt-
ing one or the other of these trigger dates. 394 We conclude that no
formula for choosing the law to govern a long developing claim is with-
out problems. A suggestion that has some appeal comes from Professor
Larson, who favored using the time of disability for resolving the control-
ling law question. Professor Larson noted that "in most instances the
[disabled] claimant ought to know he has a compensable claim,"
395
although he may not.396 And while, as Larson observed, the time of disa-
bility seems to be a definite event,397 some flexibility is introduced in de-
termining the date through the conscious choice of the claimant, on the
one hand, and the judgment of the physicians and the tribunal which
388. See supra note 381.
389. See supra notes 242-70 & accompanying text.
390. See supra note 381.
391. See supra notes 280-87, 369-73 & accompanying text.
392. See supra note 34 & accompanying text. Richard Bunker was totally, but only tem-
porarily, disabled. In his dissent, Justice Hunter argued that Bunker's claim should be denied
solely because Bunker was not disabled within the meaning of the statute. Bunker v. National
Gypsum Co., 441 N.E.2d 8, 14-18 (Ind. 1982) (Hunter, J., dissenting). The majority opinion
ignored this argument.
393. As used here, partial disability means an inability to earn full wages in any employ-
ment. In Nevada, however, only totally disabled employees may file claim. See supra notes
231-37. This Article assumes that absent an express statutory requirement of total disability,
claimants can fie for benefits when first partially disabled. If the claimants later become to-
tally disabled, they may fie for additional compensation. The special state rules for additional
compensation are beyond the scope of this discussion.
394. See supra note 380.
395. 4 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 95.21, at 17-85. Professor Larson no longer urges using
the date of disability to solving the controlling statute issue in disputes between insurers. He
simply notes that: "In the search for an identifiable instant in time which can be used to
determine when the 'injury' occurred for purposes of determining which year's statute to ap-
ply, and who is the last employer for purposes of the last injurious exposure rule, the date of
disability is frequently chosen." Id. § 95.25(a), at 17-149 to -150. The "last injurious exposure
rule" mentioned by Larson is, however, solely a method of determining liability among multi-
ple carriers for a claim; the rule does not help determine whether a claim is compensable.
396. See Hamilton v. Jeffrey Stone Co., 6 Ark. App. 333, 641 S.W.2d 723 (1982); supra
notes 90-105 & accompanying text.
397. 4 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 95.21.
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must fix the exact date, on the other. Perhaps the most compelling rea-
son advanced by Professor Larson for choosing the time of disability to
govern the choice of law is that it is the moment when the claim becomes
actionable. 3
98
Yet there is considerable force in the vested rights, retroactive appli-
cation, and contractual impairment arguments which have been ad-
vanced to resist application of newly enacted discovery rules, or
lengthened limitation periods, to claims, rights, and liabilities long be-
lieved, with reasonable justification, to have been in repose. Once a five
year statute of limitations has run, perhaps that should be the end of it,
even though the claimant later becomes disabled after a new discovery
rule has come into effect.
399
The application of earlier versions of these laws, however, frequently
leaves the worker or ex-worker without relief;4°° the humanitarian objec-
tives of the workers' compensation system are ill served if substantial
numbers of claimants are denied relief for injury arising out of and in the
course of their employment. Nor are the objectives of economic effi-
ciency served when the enterprises that generate physical harm fail to
bear the full costs of that harm, inducing the claimant to rely on other
compensation mechanisms-Social Security disability, local welfare, hos-
pitalization insurance, and the like-or worse, to resort to the inefficient
tort system for relief by bringing product liability claims against third
parties. 4° 1
398. Id. Larson states that: "Legally, it is the moment at which the right to benefits
accrues."
399. See supra notes 279-86 & accompanying text.
400. Occasionally a claimant may seek to apply an earlier law to avoid the exclusivity of
the state's workers' compensation statute. This is especially true when the employee wishes to
bring a common-law action for negligence against the employer. See, e.g., supra notes 29-44,
112-22 & accompanying text. More often, it is the employer who seeks the protection of ear-
lier, more restrictive language. See, e.g., supra notes 202-15 & accompanying text.
401. There have been a number of estimates of the cost effectiveness of tort litigation,
especially with respect to product liability claims. One study places product liability personal
injury defense costs at 35 cents per dollar of claim payment, or 26% of the total cost. INSUR-
ANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY: A TECHNICAL
ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 11 (1977). Using the Insurance Services Office defense cost
figures and typical contingency fee arrangements, it is reasonable to estimate that successful
plaintiffs recover a net amount of about 40% of the total premium dollar. Another study
places the plaintiff's total legal costs at 54% of recovery (77 cents for every 66 cents of recov-
ery). Schwartz, Historical Overview of Workplace Compensation & Evolution of Possible Solu-
tions, in FINAL EDITED PROCEEDING OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORKERS'
COMPENSATION & WORKPLACE LIABILITY 39, 43 (1981) (citing American Insurance Associa-
tion study).
Still another figure was derived by dividing the $234 million in claims paid out in 1979 by
the $1252 million taken in that year by the five top insurance companies. This results in an 18
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On balance, the time of disablement is probably the best choice for
determining the law and running the statute of limitations. Although ar-
guments opposed to this trigger date have prevailed infrequently,4°2 state
legislatures can address employers' reasonable objections to unexpected
retrospective application of later-enacted amendments by enacting a stat-
ute providing that current occupational disease law will apply to any em-
ployee not yet disabled, no matter when exposure took place or when the
disease is presumed to have been contracted. As a result, employers and
insurers will be on notice that future amendments are likely to be applied
the same way.
It is surprising and unfortunate that the controlling law problem is
still so frequently litigated. A system like workers' compensation, which
is based on certainty, needs more certain ground rules. Although using
"the time of disability" as the event that determines the controlling law
will create a more speculative insurance environment than underwriters
would prefer, it is probably better for the economy if the workers' com-
pensation system bears the uncertain risks than if the tort litigation sys-
tem or the welfare system is the arena for allocating the costs. Workers'
compensation eliminates the expensive determination of fault,4°3 yet it
3/4% net return to claimants. Bendorf, Broadening the No-Fault Compensation Option, in
FINAL EDITED PROCEEDING OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION &
WORKPLACE LIABILITY, 284, 287 (1981) (citing Product Liability Supplements filed by insur-
ance companies). Although revenue and disbursement figures for 1979 demonstrate very lit-
tle, they do raise the important and controversial question of investment income. Cost
effectiveness calculations must include the time value of the premium dollar. Today's premium
dollar should yield more than a dollar's worth of future claims. The interest earned on re-
served funds is a cost that should be assigned to the litigation system.
Another statistic on asbestos-related disease is illustrative. A Rand Corporation study
shows that victims who litigated asbestos-related claims in the 1970's recovered an average of
$35,000, but incurred an average of $60,000 for legal expenses. Miller, Drawing Limits on
Liability, Wall St. J., Apr. 4, 1984, at 26, col. 4.
In contrast, the workers' compensation system probably returns over 60% of the pre-
mium dollar. See Comments by M. Markman, Minn. Ins. Comm'r., in FINAL EDITED PRO-
CEEDINGS OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION & WORKPLACE
LIABILITY 112 (1981).
402. Of the 11 controlling statute decisions discussed in this Article, see supra note 380,
only Hall v. Synnalloy Corp. and Stark v. Zimmerman rejected explicitly or implicitly the date
of disablement as the controlling date for determining which version of the limitation statute to
apply.
403. Under workers' compensation law, fault is not at issue except for cases of intentional
torts by the employer, or intentional or reckless conduct by the employee. Causation, how-
ever, is increasingly disputed. See Phillips, The Relationship Between the Tort System & Work-
ers' Compensation, in FINAL EDITED PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
WORKERS' COMPENSATION & WORKPLACE LIABILITY 50 (1981). "These cases are being liti-
gated vigorously today .... They are being litigated on the question of causation because
often there is multiple causation. As for asbestos and brown lung,. .. [the litigation levels]
are already near the tort system. . . ." Id. at 56.
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retains incentives for the employer to perform better in the future.
Although workers' compensation provides injured employees with only
partial relief, it does so with more certainty than the tort system and with
more efficiency and dignity for the claimant than either the tort or wel-
fare systems. These characteristics make the workers' compensation sys-
tem the compensation mechanism of choice for work-related health
impairments. 4° 4 A "time of disability" rule for determining the control-
404. But see Phillips, supra note 403, at 50-56. Professor Phillips argues that the workers'
compensation system provides inadequate safety incentives to the employer. He would restore
the worker's negligence tort action as a parallel remedy. In support of this suggestion he
makes three points. First, 20% of the covered employees and 80% of the covered employers
are not experience-rated. Second, third party actions demonstrate how employer compensa-
tion compensation is only slightly more cost effective than the tort system with respect to
transaction costs-60% payout ratio for workers' compensation versus 40% payout ratio for
tort. Nevertheless, he questions running these costs through the welfare and social security
systems which now absorb $2.2 billion annually. Id. at 56.
Professor Phillips overstates the experience-rating problem. He notes that some commen-
tators argue that only large employers can be efficiently experience-rated. In contrast, small
employers, generally stores and fast food outlets, less frequently pose the life threatening
hazards of heavy industry. If a small business does incur a series of severe losses, its assigned
risk premium level will generally increase greatly. This sanction should inhibit the likelihood
that large companies might subcontract risky jobs to small non-experience-rated risk entrepre-
neurs.
Phillips correctly assumes that the primary responsibility for workplace safety rests with
the employer. See infra note 512. This, however, presents an even stronger reason both to
eliminate third party actions and reduce barriers to worker recovery under workers' compen-
sation. The negligence remedy should not be one-sided. If employers must provide certain
and prompt workers' compensation relief without regard to worker negligence, employers
should not be liable for additional penalties when they are negligent. There is no quid pro quo
for the employer's acceptance of compensation system can be adjusted to provide them.
Finally, Professor Phillips finds the transaction cost differences between the two systems,
e.g., 60% and 40%, less than decisive. The real payout gap, however, is probably greater than
this. See supra note 401. But even as stated, the cost-effectiveness differential between tort and
workers' compensation is substantial. Moreover, while workers' compensation efficiency can
be improved, the cost-effectiveness of tort litigation is likely to worsen. The recent Agent
Orange settlement, see Nat'l L.J., May 21, 1984, at 1, col. 1, and the "claims facility" proposed
by asbestos defendants and their insurers, see Bus. Ins., Apr. 10, 1984, at 1, col. 5, however, are
promising developments.
Many workers' compensation claims are being litigated today because designers of the
occupational disease funding structure did not anticipate the magnitude of the problems en-
countered by workers exposed to toxins. The courts, however, are not the place to fight these
battles. Perhaps a legislative or voluntary structure for no-fault tort compensation will emerge
and diminish judicial activity.
Tort litigation regarding workplace injuries should be restricted to egregious conduct by
employer or employee. For example, courts should grant exceptions to the exclusivity princi-
pIe when employers are charged with the intentional tort of concealing hazardous workplace
conditions from employees. See infra note 496 & accompanying text. Alternatively, employee
right-to-know statutes should provide for private causes of action against violating employers
(Right-to-know statutes require an employer to disclose to an employee all known hazards in
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ling law would exploit these characteristics by making a greater number
of claimants eligible for relief under the system.
Equal Protection and Due Process-Tort and Workers' Compensation
Statutes Compared
When worker compensation statutes were first passed, they came
under constitutional attack on substantive due process grounds.4° 5 New
York's statute, enacted in 1910, was held unconstitutional in Ives v. South
Buffalo Railway,406 primarily on the ground that holding employers lia-
ble without regard to their fault denied them due process. 407 Other con-
stitutional challenges to the new statutes were based on deprivation of
the substantive due process right of freedom to contract.4° 8 To overcome
these constitutional challenges, statutory coverage in many states was
made elective, and the compensable injuries were limited.409 In 1917 the
United States Supreme Court upheld a compulsory worker compensation
law as being a "reasonable exercise of the police power of the state.
'410
The court concluded that the public had a direct interest in compensat-
ing workers "for human life or limb lost or disability incurred. ' 411 Since
that time, coverage has become increasingly compulsory and
the workplace. New York has such a statute, N.Y. LABOR LAW § 880 (McKinney Supp.
1984-1985)). The merits of such proposals, however, are beyond the scope of this Article.
Phillips further develops the legal and conceptual basis for his dual track compensation
scheme in a working paper. See Phillips, Compensation-The True Cost, FINAL EDITED PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WORK-
PLACE LIABILrrY 84 (1981).
405. Lester v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 242 S.E.2d 443, 447 (W. Va.
1978); 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 5.20.
406. 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911); see E. BLAIR, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
1-1 (1968); Special Project, supra note 9, at 732 n.1059.
407. Ives, 201 N.Y. at 280, 94 N.E. at 439. The New York constitution was subsequently
amended to allow a compulsory law, and a workers' compensation law was passed in 1913.
See Lester v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 242 S.E.2d 443, 448 (W. Va. 1978)
(discussing New York law). The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the 1913 law in New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). Cf Mountain
Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917) (similar Washington statute upheld).
408. See, e.g., Bailey v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 296 S.E.2d 901, 905 (W.
Va. 1982).
409. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 5.20. New Jersey was the first state to pass an "elec-
tive" or "optional" statute. Several states limited their statute's coverage to "hazardous" em-
ployment because of questions regarding the extent of the states' police power. Id.
410. New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 206 (1917). Plaintiffs challenged
the statute on the substantive due process ground that it denied them the opportunity to
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comprehensive. 412
Although the beneficent, noncontractual nature of worker compen-
sation statutes has long been recognized, many workers are uncompen-
sated for work-related disabilities.413 Increasingly, the workers who
suffer delayed manifestation occupational diseases are the ones who fall
outside the statutes. Today, the primary constitutional challenges to the
worker compensation laws are mounted on behalf of these individuals
because the time for filing their claims elapses before they can become
aware of, or before they are disabled by, their injuries. Bunker's equal
protection and due process challenges discussed above exemplify these
arguments.
4 14
Similar due process and equal protection arguments have been used
to challenge tort statutes of limitation and repose which abrogate rights
before knowledge of the injury, or even the injury itself, has occurred.
415
While the great majority of states use a discovery-of-injury statute of lim-
itations for torts,416 an increasing number of states have set a limit on
how long the plaintiffs in certain classes of torts have to discover the
injury caused by the defendant's act. This limit, applied commonly in
the medical malpractice,4 17 architect-builder, 4 18 and product liability41 9
412. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 5.30; P. BARTH & H. HUNT, supra note 3, at 2-3.
413. See, e.g., Lester v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 242 S.E.2d 443, 445-46
(W. Va. 1978); Bailey v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 296 S.E.2d 904, 906, (W.
Va. 1982); Special Project, supra note 9, at 736-42.
414. See supra notes 58-79 & accompanying text.
415. See, e.g., Dworkin, Product Liability of the 1980s: "Repose Is Not the Destiny" of
Manufacturers, 61 N.C.L. REV. 33 (1982); McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutional-
ity of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 579, 584-85 (1981).
416. See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949); Warrington v. Charles Pfizer &
Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 564, 80 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1969); see also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 144 (4th ed. 1971).
417. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-104 (1973) (3 year limitation); 18 DEL. LAWS
§ 6855 (1974) (3 year limitation); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (Supp. 1984) (10 year limita-
tion); IND. CODE § 16-9.5-3-1 (1982) (2 year limitation); IOWA CODE § 614.9 (1950) (6 year
limitation); Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.105 (1952) (10 year limitation). While the great majority of
these statutes toll or extend the repose period for minors, a few do not. See, e.g., IND. CODE
§ 33-1-1.5-5 (1982).
418. Since Wisconsin passed the first architect and builder repose statute in 1961, Wisc.
STAT. ANN. § 893.155 (West Supp. 1984), 44 states and the District of Columbia have enacted
similar protective legislation. Witherwax, Special Statutes of Limitation for Action Against the
Contractor-A Defense to the Surety, 16 FORUM 1057, 1065-79 (1981). Only Arizona, Iowa,
New York, Vermont, and West Virginia have not enacted such limitations. The courts of
several states have subsequently declared these repose limitations unconstitutional. See infra
note 421.
419. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-502 (Supp. 1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551
(1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(3) (Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a
(West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.031(2) (West 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11(b)(2)
(1982); IDAHO CODE § 6-1403(2) (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.2(b) (Smith-
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areas, is established by a statute of repose that generally runs out eight to
ten years after the defendant's tortious act.420
Constitutional challenges to these statutes have met with varying
success.421 In most successful challenges, however, the statutes have
Hurd Supp. 1982); IND. CODE § 33-1-1.5-5 (1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(b) (1976); KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1979); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-224 (1979);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2 (Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(16) (Supp. 1981);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02 (Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905 (1981); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-1-13 (Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-12.1 (Supp. 1982); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3(1) (1977); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 7.72.060 (Supp. 1982).
420. The architect and builder statutes of limitation, which ranged from four years, TENN.
CODE ANN. § 28-30-202 (1980), to 15 years, MINN. STAT. § 27A.5839 (Supp. 1980) (repealed
1981), generally are in the eight- to ten-year range.
Product liability repose statutes range from a low of five years, KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 411.310(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1979), to a high of 12 years, ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-551
(1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5805 (1968); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.72.060 (Supp.
1982). But most set a 10-year repose period. See, eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a
(West 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11(b)(2) (1982); IDAHO CODE § 6-1403(2) (Supp. 1982);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.2(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IND. CODE § 33-1-1.5-5 (1982);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(b) (1976); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-224 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-52(16) (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02 (Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-
13 (Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (1980).
For the limitation periods for medical malpractice statutes of repose, see supra note 417.
421. Twenty-three states have upheld their architect and builder statutes; 12 have found
them unconstitutional. Architect and builders' repose statues were upheld in Carter v. Harten-
stein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 901 (1971); Martinez
v. Traubner, 32 Cal.3d 755, 653 P.2d 1046, 187 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1982); Salinero v. Pon, 124
Cal. App. 3d 120, 177 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1981); Mullins v. Southern Co. Servs. Inc., 250 Ga. 90,
296 S.E.2d 579 (1982); Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp. Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 644
P.2d 341 (1982); Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2, 366 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1978);
Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 437 N.E.2d 514 (1982); O'Brien v. Hazalet & Erodal, 410
Mich. 1, 299 N.W.2d 336 (1980); Anderson v. Fred Wagner & Roy Anderson, Jr., Inc., 402
So. 2d 320 (Miss. 1981); Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647 (1976); Rosen-
berg v. Town of N. Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972); Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688,
568 P.2d 214 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assocs. Inc., 43 N.Y.2d 389, 372 N.E.2d 555, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767
(1977); Lamb v. Wedgewood S. Corp., 286 S.E.2d 874 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); Josephs v. Burns,
260 Or. 493, 491 P.2d 203 (1971); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270,
382 A.2d 715 (1978); McMacken v. State, 320 N.W.2d 131 (S.D. 1982); Watts v. Putnam
County, 525 S.W.2d 488 (Tenn. 1975); Ellerbe v. Otis Elevator Co., 618 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1981); Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974); State Comptroller ex rel. Virginia
Military Inst. v. King, 217 Va. 751, 232 S.E.2d 895 (1977); Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co.
v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P.2d 108 (1972); Bailey v. State
Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 296 S.E.2d 904 (W. Va. 1982); Swanson Furniture Co. v.
Advance Transformer Co., 105 Wis. 2d 321, 313 N.W.2d 840 (1982).
See infra note 423 for decisions overturning architects' and builders' statutes.
Five states have found their product liability repose statues unconstitutional; four have
upheld them. See infra notes 428, 430 & accompanying text.
Medical malpractice reform statutes have been overturned based on barriers to plaintiffs'
right to sue. While these impediments vary, see, ag., Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570
January 1985]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
been overturned on state constitutional grounds. 422 The Supreme Court
so far has refused to review any of the state statute of repose decisions.423
Thus, the likelihood of successfully mounting constitutional challenges to
restrictive worker compensation laws probably depends on the particular
state court's interpretation of its state constitution.
Many states are overturning their medical malpractice,424 architect-
builder, 425 and products liability statutes of repose. The product liability
statutes of repose are most analogous to the worker compensation limi-
tations because they also primarily affect victims of delayed manifesta-
P.2d 744 (1977) (posting bond); Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980) (review panel);
Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187 (Mont. 1981) (limitation on evidence); Arneson v. Olson, 278
N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978) (limitation on damages); Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d
190 (1980) (arbitration panel), the grounds have included unconstitutional statutes of repose.
See infra note 424.
422. See, e.g., Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982); Over-
land Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979); Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455,
459, 231 N.E.2d 588, 590 (1967); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973); Bolick v. Ameri-
can Barmag Corp., 54 N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E.2d 188 (1981), modified, 293 S.E.2d 415 (N.C.
1982); Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143, 147 (Okla. 1977); Phil-
lips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821, 842 (Wyo. 1980).
In some decisions, however, it is unclear whether federal or state constitutional grounds
are the basis for the decision. See, e.g., Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973);
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. All Elec., Inc., 660 P.2d 995 (Nev. 1983); Henderson Clay
Prods., Inc. v. Edgar Wood & Assoc., Inc., 122 N.H. 800, 451 A.2d 174 (1982); Pacific Indem.
Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977); Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C.
227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978).
423. See, e.g., Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal dis-
missed, 401 U.S. 901 (1971) (dismissed for want of a substantial federal question); Anderson v.
Wagner, 79 Ill.2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 807 (1980); Howell
v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214, cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977).
424. See, e.g., Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470, 298 S.E.2d 484 (1983); Jones v. State Bd. of
Med., 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); State ex rel.
Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979) (en banc); Carson
v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
425. Architect and engineers' repose statutes were declared unconstitutional in Bagby Ele-
vator & Elec. Co. v. McBride, 292 Ala. 191, 291 So. 2d 306 (1974); Overland Constr. Co. v.
Simmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979); Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973);
Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218
(Ky. 1973); Pacific Idem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977); State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. All Elec. Inc., 99 Nev. 49, 660 P.2d 995 (1983); Henderson Clay
Prods., Inc. v. Edgar Wood & Assoc., Inc., 122 N.H. 800, 451 A.2d 174 (1982); Loyal Order
of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977); Broome v. Tuluck, 270 S.C.
227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225
N.W.2d 454 (1975); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980).
Seven of these states, Alabama, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and
Wisconsin, subsequently revised their statues. The supreme courts of Alabama, Plant v. R.L.
Reid, Inc., 294 Ala. 155, 313 So. 2d 578 (1975), and Hawaii, Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii,
Ltd., 65 Hawaii 26, 647 P.2d 276 (1982), again declared the statutes unconstitutional, while
the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld its statute. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. E.D. Wesley
Co., 105 Wis. 2d 305, 313 N.W.2d 833 (1982) (prospective application only).
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tion injuries. 426 Thus, judicial treatment of these repose statutes is an
indicator of how a state's high court will rule on restrictive workers'
compensation limitations.
Five states have held their product liability statutes of repose uncon-
stitutional.427 Some of these states had made similar decisions regarding
architect and builder,428 or medical malpractice repose statutes.429 Four
states, however, have upheld their product liability repose statutes.
430 Of
these four, Illinois has interpreted its statute to bar only strict liability
suits; 431 thus, claimants can still sue for negligence in Illinois without
being barred by the limit.432 If the trend of these early decisions contin-
ues, two assumptions seem fair: first, more states will be unwilling to
426. Product liability statues of repose were passed primarily to protect manufacturers
against the occasional suit based on injury from a very old product. See, e.g., Johnson, Prod-
ucts Liability "Reform" A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C.L. REv. 677, 690-91 (1978); MODEL
UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 110 Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,734
(1979). Due to the tremendous increase in both kinds and numbers of delayed manifestation
injuries caused by products, however, victims of these injuries constitute the primary group
being barred. See Lawscope-Toxic Time Bombs, 67 A.B.A. J. 139, 140 (1981); Note, Market
Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 HARv. L. REv. 668 n.7 (1981);
Jones, Microwave Suits Heat Up, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 14, 1981, at 24, col. 1; Masters, Asbestos
Liability Suits Strain Manufacturers, Court Systems, Legal Times, Mar. 30, 1981, at 1, col. 2.
427. Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982); Battilla v. Allis
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512,
464 A.2d 288 (1983); Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 54 N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E.2d 188
(1981), modified, 306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E.2d 415 (1982); Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co.,
471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984).
In Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., the North Carolina Court of Appeals declared the
state's products liability statute of repose unconstitutional. 54 N.C. App. 589, 590, 284 S.E.2d
188, 189. The North Carolina Supreme Court modified that holding stating that the statute
was not to be applied to the case because such application would have been retroactive. Ac-
cordingly the supreme court ruled that the court of appeals was not empowered to decide the
issue. 306 N.C. 364, 370-72, 293 S.E.2d 415, 420-21.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has since held the North Carolina statute to be
constitutional. Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1984).
428. Bagby Elevator & Elec. Co. v. McBride, 292 Ala. 191, 291 So. 2d 306 (1974); Over-
land Constr. Co. v. Simmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979); Henderson Clay Prods., Inc. v.
Edgar Wood & Assoc., Inc., 122 N.H. 800, 451 A.2d 174 (1982).
429. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
430. Thornton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 Ili. App. 3d 722, 425 N.E.2d 522 (1981); Dague v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 1981); Davis v. Whiting Corp., 66 Or. App. 541,
674 P.2d 1194, cerL denied, 297 Or. 82, 679 P.2d 1367 (1984); Mathis v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F.
Supp. 35 (E.D. Tenn. 1981).
431. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13.213(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); Thornton v. Mono
Mfg. Co., 99 Ill. App. 3d 722, 425 N.E.2d 522 (1981).
432. In addition, the Tennessee statute has been narrowly interpreted. Federal courts have
held that it is tolled for minors, Tate v. Eli Lilly & Co., 522 F. Supp. 1048 (M.D. Tenn. 1981),
and that it should not be applied retroactively, Murphree v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 696
F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1983). The Murphree court also held that asbestos-related claims were
exempted from the 10-year limit under a 1979 statutory amendment.
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deny individuals the right to sue before their delayed manifestation inju-
ries develop; and second, those states which previously have held their
tort repose statutes to be unconstitutional may similarly hold unconstitu-
tional a worker compensation statute that abrogates the right to claim
compensation before occupational disease develops. Because the worker
compensation system is designed to be less restrictive than the tort sys-
tem, the constitutional arguments seem even more persuasive in this
context.
43 3
The primary grounds for overturning state product liability statutes
have been due process arguments based specifically on a denial of the
right of access to the courts guaranteed under a number of state constitu-
tions. Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, and Rhode Island courts have
so held.
4 34
For example, Alabama's statute required that suit be brought within
one year of injury unless the injury was latent or developed slowly, in
which case suit had to be brought at the time of discovery of the injury.
In no event, however, could suit be brought more than ten years after
first use by the consumer.435 In reviewing this statute, the court found
that it violated the Alabama constitutional provision that "all courts
should be open; and that every person, for any injury done him. . . shall
have a remedy by due process of law . . ",436 The court concluded
that the provision incorporated into the constitution a fundamental prin-
ciple of fairness and a limitation on the power of government to act arbi-
trarily and to infringe on individual rights.437 A two-tier review
approach was used to determine if the statute met these principles. The
court stated that if legislation alters or abolishes common law rights,
then the legislation will be reviewed more strictly. The review will deter-
mine whether rights were voluntarily exchanged for equivalent benefits
or protection-a quid pro quo-or alternatively, whether the legislation
eradicated a perceived social evil and was thus a valid exercise of the
police power.438 The Alabama court found neither a quid pro quo nor a
433. See Bailey v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 296 S.E.2d 904, 906 (W. Va.
1982); 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 1.20 (1964).
434. Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982) (applying ALA.
CONST. art. I, § 13); Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980) (applying
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21); Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 54 N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E.2d
188 (1981) (applying N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18), modified, 306 N.C. 293, S.E.2d 415 (1982);
Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g. Co., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984) (applying R.I. CONSr. art. I,
§ 5).
435. ALA. CODE § 6-5-502(c) (1975).
436. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
437. Lankford, 416 So. 2d at 999.
438. Id. at 1000-01.
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social evil that the legislation would eradicate.439
Compulsory worker compensation statutes have long been consid-
ered a legitimate exercise of the states' police power, exercised for the
good of society by granting benefits to injured workers. 440 This exercise
of power loses its legitimacy, however, if the statute fails to achieve this
purpose. For workers injured by delayed manifestation occupational dis-
eases, arguably there is no substantial relationship between the statute
and its goal.44 1 Thus, excessively short time limitations for these types of
workers may be overturned under a substantial relationship test.
The Alabama Court's finding that there was no quid pro quo to jus-
tify that state's product liability repose provision would be even more
relevant in the workers' compensation context. The historic bargain by
which workers surrendered their common-law rights to sue employers in
exchange for partial, but certain, no-fault relief provided workers with a
more than adequate quid pro quo because common-law rights, in prac-
tice, had left the injured worker without a remedy. 4 2 Today, however,
the quid pro quo is no longer adequate for victims of delayed manifesta-
tion diseases in states with restrictive limitation provisions; these workers
receive no equivalent benefits for their loss of the right to sue.
Another constitutional infirmity of the product liability repose stat-
utes lies in the seemingly arbitrary distinctions made between various
classes of people injured by products. Some of these distinctions were
held to be arbitrary because they discriminated among victims who dis-
covered their product-related injuries within months of each other,
granting the right to sue only to those who made the discovery before the
limitation period ended.443 The repose statutes also made arbitrary dis-
tinctions between people injured by products and those injured in other
439. The legislature stated in § 6-5-500 that the "social evil" was the substantial increase
in the volume and cost of product liability litigation, and the resultant increase in consumer
prices and cost of product liability insurance. ALA. CODE § 6-5-500 (1975).
The court, after citing several studies, found that individual state reform had no effect on
insurance rates because the rates are set on a nationwide basis. In addition, they found there
was no product liability "crisis." 416 So. 2d at 1001-03.
440. See, eg., New York Cent. R. R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Bailey v. State Work-
men's Compensation Comm'r, 296 S.E.2d 901, 904 (W. Va. 1982).
441. See, eg., Special Project, supra note 9, at 736, 738-39.
442. See, e.g., 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 5.20; Note, Compensation and the Asbestos
Industry, 33 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1073, 1079-80 (1982).
443. See, e.g., Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 1003 (Ala. 1982):
The statute, by tying the period to date of use, as opposed to the accrual date of the
cause of action, would permit a purchaser of a defective product to sue for injuries
received nine years and eleven months after the first use, whereas it would bar the
action of a purchaser who was injured by the same defective product ten years and
one month after he first used the product.
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tortious ways. 444 Whether these distinctions were challenged on due pro-
cess or equal protection grounds, they failed to pass muster under a
heightened standard of review.
When the worker compensation statutes are examined under this
heightened standard, they seem similarly flawed. Most states which have
restrictive limitation periods for delayed-manifestation occupational inju-
ries provide a discovery rule for at least one of these diseases.44 5 Such a
distinction for one kind of delayed-manfestation disease, which com-
monly applies to disease resulting from radiation exposure, serves no im-
portant state objective. Thus, an arbitrary result can occur depending on
what type of occupational injury the worker develops. Because the
workers' compensation statutes are meant to provide comprehensive
compensation for workplace injuries, denying compensation because one
develops the "wrong" kind of occupational disease appears capricious.
In addition, it seems arbitrary to distinguish between employees who de-
velop the same disease from the same initial exposure by allowing com-
pensation only to those who develop symptoms or who become disabled
sooner. There also seems little rational basis to distinguish between two
workers who develop the same disease at the same time by permitting
recovery only to those who remained in the hazardous employment for a
longer period.
Another distinction in workers' compensation statutes that can be
challenged is allowing compensation to those injured by accident, but not
to those injured over time by slowly developing diseases, even though
both injuries are workplace-related. 44 6 Using similar reasoning, New
Hampshire overturned its product liability repose statute, concluding
that distinctions made between plaintiffs injured by products and those
injured by other means were unconstitutional.
447
A final distinction that is subject to challenge is based on the protec-
tion of certain types of employers. Statutes that effectively bar claims
based on delayed-manifestation diseases arguably insulate from liability
only employers who use products that cause slowly-developing injuries.
The Rhode Island44 8 and Alabama 4 9 courts concluded that the statutory
444. See, e.g., Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288, 195 (1983);
Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984).
445. See Summary Chart in the Appendix.
446. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-147 (1977 & Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-281
(1983); IDAHO CODE § 72-448(1) (Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE § 85A.12 (Supp. 1984); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 44.5901(c) (1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1006 (1978).
447. Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288, 295 (1983).
448. Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36
STATE OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ACTS
distinction between manufacturers of long-lived as opposed to short-lived
products was arbitrary.
While ample precedent exists for overturning restrictive worker
compensation statutes, some state courts have not been persuaded. As
exemplified by Bunker's case and others mentioned above,450 some courts
find other factors more persuasive or apply a rational basis test, rather
than a heightened review, to the limitation statute out of a policy of def-
erence to the legislature.
In predicting how state courts will respond when faced with chal-
lenges to restrictive occupational disease limitations, perhaps the best in-
dicator is the state's policy on other restrictive time limitations.
Although as many states have enacted restrictive product liability stat-
utes of repose 451 as have enacted restrictive worker compensation limita-
tions, 452 the overlap between the two is not high. Only nine states with
product liability repose statutes also have restrictive worker compensa-
tion limitations.453 Of these nine, two, Alabama and North Carolina,
have declared their state's product liability repose statutes unconstitu-
tional.454 In addition, Illinois has restricted its product liability repose
statute to strict liablity actions.4 55 Nebraska recently has stated that its
medical malpractice statute of repose is not a complete bar,456 and Ne-
449. Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 1004 (Ala. 1982) (Torbert,
C.J., concurring).
450. See eg. supra text accompanying notes 65-71, 313-15.
451. See supra notes 419-20.
452. See Summary Chart in the Appendix (under headings of Last Exposure, Minimum
Exposure, and Last Employment).
453. Those states are Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska,
North Carolina, and Utah.
454. Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982); Bolick v. Ameri-
can Barmag Corp., 54 N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E.2d 188 (1981), modified, 293 S.E.2d 415 (N.C.
1982).
Alabama also has enacted a statute which begins accrual for civil actions resulting from
exposure to asbestos on the first date the plaintiff should have reason to discover the injury.
ALA. CODE § 6-2-30(b) (Supp. 1984); see supra note 89.
455. Thornton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 Ill. App. 3d 722,425 N.E.2d 522 (1981). Illinois has
also held its statute should not be applied retroactively. Blazer v. Inland Steel Co., 100 Ill.
App. 3d 1071 (1981). The Illinois architect and builder statute of repose was held unconstitu-
tional in Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).
The Kansas product liability statute also does not completely bar suit; it merely creates a
presumption that after 10 years the harm was caused after the useful safe life of the product
had expired. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3301 (1981). This statutory presumption was interpreted
to be substantive, and therefore inapplicable retroactively. Chamberlain v. Schmutz Mfg. Co.,
532 F. Supp. 588 (D. Kan. 1982).
456. Sacehi v. Blodig, 215 Neb. 817, 341 N.W.2d 326 (1983). In Sacchi, the plaintiff was
hospitalized in 1967 for treatment of depression. In 1980 he sued his treating physician for
negligent misdiagnosis. Plaintiff asserted that his suit should not be barred by the state's 10-
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vada has overturned its architect and builders' repose statute. 457 Thus, in
several states the courts seem willing to entertain arguments regarding
the unconstitutionality or undesirability of cutting off claims before the
sufferer is even aware that an injury has occurred.458 On the other hand,
other states, like Indiana, seemingly will continue to allow workers to be
denied compensation if they develop delayed-manifestation occupational
diseases which fail to lead to disability within two or three years of the
worker's last exposure to an injurious hazard.
459
The Objectives of Workers' Compensation: Is There a Need for Greater
Uniformity and Coordination?
The Roots of Workers' Compensation Statutes
In the nineteenth century, the prevailing American view was that
workers assumed those ordinary and extraordinary risks of industrial in-
jury for which they had notice. 460 They were free to pursue their com-
year repose statute because he did not discover the negligence until his mental incompetency
was removed. The court found that the repose statute was not meant to be absolute and uncon-
ditional, and allowed the claim.
Georgia recently held that the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice
actions, which runs from the time of the negligent or wrongful act or omission, could not be
applied to bar a wrongful death action in which the alleged malpractice occurred June 3, 1978,
death occurred June 11, 1979, and suit was filed June 8, 1981. The court stated that to allow
such application would create two classes of wrongful death claimants in medical malpractice
actions, and bar actions for one class before they accrue. Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470, 298
S.E.2d 484 (1983).
457. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. All Elec., Inc., 660 P.2d 995 (Nev. 1983).
458. Other states with restrictive occupational disease time limitations have overturned
their medical malpractice reform statutes because they put unreasonable barriers in the way of
plaintiff's suit. See, e.g., Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347
N.E.2d 736 (1976); State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner,
583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979) (en banc); Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187 (Mont. 1981); Mattos v.
Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980).
459. Indiana's repose statutes have been upheld against all attacks. See, e.g., Braswell v.
Flintkote Mines, Ltd., 723 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1983) (product liability); Pitts v. Unarco Indus.,
Inc., 712 F.2d 276 (7th Cir.) (wrongful death claim barred by 10-year product liability repose
statute), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 509 (1983); Tolen v. A.H. Robins Co., PROD. LIAB. REP.
(CCH) T 10,117 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Beecher v. White, 447 N.E.2d 622 (Ind. App. 1983) (archi-
tect and builder's repose statute).
460. See, e.g., Brazil Block Coal Co. v. Hoodlet, 129 Ind. 327, 331-32, 27 N.E. 741, 743
(1891):
The law is well settled that a servant assumes all of the ordinary and usual risks of
the business upon which he enters, so far as these risks are known to him, or could be
readily discernable . . . in the exercise of ordinary care . . . . It is also settled law
that . . . the employe [sic] who voluntarily continues in the master's service after
notice of defects in tools, machinery, or other appliances . . . thereby assumes the
risk as increased by the defect, unless the master expressly or impliedly promises to
remedy the defect.
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mon-law remedies only if they fell victim to unexpected events caused by
the negligence of their employers. Besides assumption of risk, employers
had available to them two other complete common-law defenses: the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff and the fellow servant doc-
trine.461 In addition, wrongful death actions were not available for much
of the century,462 and many personal injury cases were decided as mat-
ters of law, effectively averting the tendency of sympathetic juries to ig-
nore legalistic barriers to recovery.
463
Thus, the economic development of the North American continent
claimed the lives, limbs, and health of an incredible number of work-
men.4 64 Yet, the increasing urbanization and industrialization that it
brought swelled the ranks of the American working class, and with its
greater numbers came political power.465 This power brought changes in
the law. Wrongful death statutes466 and health and safety regulations
were enacted by legislatures;467 plaintiff-oriented rules, such as the last
clear chance doctrine,468 res ipsa loquitur,469 the vice-principal doc-
trine,470 and negligence per se,471 were adopted by common law courts.
Above all, more cases were sent to juries, so that in the first decade of the
twentieth century a substantial number of injured workmen, or their sur-
vivors, were recovering in negligence actions against employers.472 Then
as now, however, the tort system was viewed as an uncertain and expen-
sive path to compensation.
473
The presumption that employees were compensated for the known
461. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 412-13 (1973); B.
SCHWARTZ, THE LAW IN AMERICA 58-59, 123 (1974); G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA
38-56 (1980).
462. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 461, at 415.
463. Id at 417. See G. WHITE, supra note 461, at 57-58. White points out that nineteenth
century legal scholars practicing 'legal science' sought to distill certain rules of negligence law
from recurring fact situations. They believed that judicial application of such "rules" would
make a jury determination unnecessary. For example, scholars proposed that in railroad
crossing cases plaintiffs would be contributorily negligent as a matter of law if they failed to
stop, look, or listen. Id at 57.
464. "At the turn of the century, industrial accidents were claiming about 35,000 lives a
year, and inflicting close to 2,000,000 injuries." L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 461, at 422.
465. Id at 426-27.
466. See id at 421-22.
467. Id. at 419-21.
468. Id at 418; G. WHrrE, supra note 461, at 45-50.
469. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 461, at 418-19.
470. Id. at 423-24; G. WHITE, supra note 461, at 51-55.
471. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 461, at 421.
472. Id at 423.
473. Id. at 425.
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risks they incurred by adjustment of their wage rates474 was a particu-
larly unrealistic, inhumane, and inefficient principle for governing the
distribution of costs attributable to work-related accidents and health im-
pairments. The concept rested on several dubious assumptions: first,
that notice of risk to workers allowed them to determine accurately the
probability and severity of harm that was threatened;47 5 second, that
there was roughly equal bargaining power between employer and em-
ployee;476 third, that whatever risk premium employees received as part
of their wages would be used to purchase insurance or some other buffer
against catastrophe;477 and fourth, if no insurance or savings were avail-
474. See Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 57 (1842):
The general rule, resulting from considerations as well of justice as of policy, is, that
he who engages in the employment of another for the performance of specified duties
and services, for compensation, takes upon himself the natural and ordinary risks
and perils incident to the performance of such services, and in legal presumption, the
compensation is adjusted accordingly.
475. Economists have not yet been able to determine empirically whether workers overes-
timate or underestimate the actuarial risks they face. There is, however, some evidence that
workers as a group systematically underestimate employment dangers. See Akerlof & Dick-
ens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 307 (1982).
Akerlof and Dickens describe "[a] great deal of anecdotal information [which] suggests that
workers in dangerous jobs are often quite oblivious to the dangers that are involved." Id.
They suggest that the cause of the underestimation may be found in the hiring process. Id.
The workers who underestimate are the ones who take the hazardous jobs as being "a good
deal" and thus skew the makeup of the workforce at risk. The authors also advance the theory
of cognitive dissonance, under which workers who have already opted for the hazardous em-
ployment tend to ignore or disbelieve evidence of job risks because these workers refuse to
admit to themselves that they have erred. Id. at 308-10. For a review of the cognitive disso-
nance theory, see Rea, Workmens' Compensation and Occupational Safety Under Imperfect
Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 80 (1981). Not all economists, however, subscribe to this
theory. See W. Viscusi, EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS: AN INVESTIGATION OF MARKET PER-
FORMANCE 239 (1979).
476. If equality of bargaining power is an economic concept, it is not easily quantifiable.
Yet, the nineteenth century "will theory" of contract formation assumed that both parties
negotiating a price for a commodity or service had reasonable alternatives due to a fairly ro-
bust market for the subject matter of the transaction. Heavy immigration and slower growth in
the latter part of the past century, however, so depressed the price of American labor that
workers were bitterly disappointed with the bargains they were able to strike with employers in
individual negotiations. As a result, "[in the [post-civil] war years, a trade-union movement
grew rapidly-as rapidly perhaps as industrial combination." L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 461,
at 485. This unionization was accompanied by unprecedented levels of violence. Id. at 485-86.
Deep worker dissatisfaction with the laissez faire bargaining process for employment strongly
suggests that the will theory's fundamental assumption of equal bargaining power was
incorrect.
477. "In practice, however, many workers will prefer current consumption over protection
and will demand the risk premium in cash. If they are injured on the job later, both they and
society suffer." NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMENS' COMPENSATION LAWS,
COMPENDIUM ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION 23 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMPENDIUM].
The Compendium authors also argue that "[iun a perfectly competitive economy in which
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able or sufficient to bear the costs of injury, those costs would neverthe-
less come to rest only on the injured workers or on their immediate
families.478 The reality, however, increasingly came to be that, as medi-
cal science improved, disabled workers lived for longer periods as inca-
pacitated charity cases supported by their employers' largesse, church
and private philanthropy, and eventually governmental institutions.479
And when workers finally died, spouses and children still required
support.
Despite the increasing opportunity for injured workers actually to
prevail in negligence suits against their employers, 480 the delay, uncer-
tainty, and costs of the tort system devastated worker and employer
alike.48 1 The profitless dispute over the fault issue was a particular
source of displeasure to employers.
482
In this environment reform groups, supported at first only by busi-
ness interests, sought a comprehensive system to meet the legitimate
needs of injured workers and the desires of employers to allocate the
basic costs of industrial injury in a businesslike way without regard to
fault.4 3 European models of worker compensation legislation were ex-
amined, and finally, with organized labor's belated blessing, were enacted
in this country,484 but on a state by state basis. 48 5
Uniformity in Workers' Compensation Law
This Article has demonstrated that the current state systems vary
considerably, not merely in degree, but also in the fundamental approach
employees perceived accurately the hazard differentials among various occupations, employees
would demand a risk premium in their wages that would substantially exceed their expected or
average losses in the long run." Id. The authors conclude, however, that "[p]erfect perception
of occupational hazards and a perfectly competitive labor market are also unrealistic assump-
tions." Id.
478. The cost of industrial accidents was to be shifted from the entrepreneur to the
workers themselves. Insofar as there was any responsibility toward destitute workers
and their families, society as a whole, through its poor laws, would bear the burden,
rather than leaving it to the most productive sector of the economy.
L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 461, at 414.
479. See id. at 428-34.
480. Id. at 423; COMPENDIUM, supra note 477, at 17 (quoting Posner, A Theory of Negli:
gence, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 29 (1972)).
481. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 461, at 425.
482. COMPENDIUM, supra note 477, at 14.
483. Id. at 16.
484. Id. at 16-17.
485. A federal statute was enacted in 1908 at President Roosevelt's urging but only to
cover "certain Federal employees." Id. at 17. From the beginning, the regulation of health and
safety of employees in the private sector was considered appropriate for state legislation under
state police powers, rather than a matter of interstate commerce.
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they take to the problem of compensation. A short and fixed limitation
period,486 for example, represents a more conservative philosophy than
does a discovery rule which begins to count only when claimants learn
the true relationship of their disabilities to their employment.
487
These state disparities compel the question whether the objectives
sought by the enactment of the original workers' compensation statutes
require more state uniformity than exists today. We first observe that
certain of the system objectives appear to be in tension. On the one hand,
workers' compensation seeks to address the economic needs of injured
workers: the humanitarian objective of the system; on the other hand,
the system seeks to allocate work-related health and accident costs effi-
ciently within an actuarily sound insurance mechanism: the system's effi-
ciency objective.488 The successful realization of both objectives is
interdependent. Setting the proper balance between these goals is an es-
sential task for the system designer, the state legislature.489 Legislatures,
administrative tribunals, and courts must realize the importance of both
objectives: the humane and the efficient. Employees who suffer employ-
ment-related injury from incalculable risks should increasingly find relief
in their workers' compensation programs as earlier, uncertain risks be-
come calculable.4 90 But demands for that relief must also be contained
486. See supra notes 85-292 & accompanying text.
487. See supra notes 293-310 & accompanying text.
488. One authority lists five system objectives: "(1) income replacement, (2) restoration of
earning capacity and return to productive employment, (3) industrial accident prevention and
reduction, (4) proper allocation of costs, and (5) achievement of the other four objectives in the
most efficient manner possible." COMPENDIUM, supra note 477, at 24. Of these five, the first
two and the last two are included in either the "humanitarian" or "efficiency" goals referred to
in the text. Objective three, however, the "prevention and deterrent" objective, can be viewed
as a by-product of the others. If the needs of injured workers are met and the costs of doing so
are properly allocated, then incentives for reducing aggregate injury costs will flow from mar-
ket forces. This result will obtain, however, only if there is a free flow of adequate information
to those parties-workers and employers-who can take remedial action.
489. Legislatures must seek to meet worker needs without removing incentives for workers
to avoid injuries, to enable injured workers to rehabilitate themselves to the maximum extent,
and to enable them to return to the workforce as soon as possible. Legislatures must also strive
not to assign an industry or activity more than its appropriate share of injury costs so that its
productivity and output will not be overly restricted. For these reasons, the workers' compen-
sation system has several built-in limitations, including wage replacement of less than full take-
home pay, waiting periods for compensation, and statutory maximum benefits. The wide vari-
ation among state limitation provisions indicates that solutions to system design problems are
not easily calculated.
490. Workers' compensation depends on actuarial probabilities for its predictability.
Some critics argue that highly speculative risks should be excluded. Yet once the probability
and severity of injury become actuarially predictable, these risks should be included within the
system even if the projected costs are high. Legislators, however, should carefully phase in
earlier incurred costs to avoid burdening current enterprises for practices that were justifiable
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and limited to protect the system from great actuarial unpredictability
and unreasonable benefit levels, forces that could inundate and bankrupt
the programs.
491
At first glance, there is no compelling reason why each jurisdiction
should not establish its own balance. The interests involved-workers'
health and welfare and the productivity of the plants in which they
work-traditionally have been controlled by state law. While employers
are influenced in their plant location and expansion decisions by matters
such as state workers' compensation insurance premium levels,492 rea-
sonable constraints on the uncontrolled growth in workers' compensa-
tion benefit levels resulting from the states' vigorous competition for jobs
is not an entirely unwelcome by-product of state, rather than federal,
administration.
493
Nevertheless, the need to coordinate with other compensation sys-
tems may ultimately overwhelm the traditional assignment to state law
of the task of administering workers' compensation. Workers' compensa-
tion is only one of several mechanisms that offer potential relief for em-
ployees who suffer physical harm caused by workplace hazards. Private
medical insurance plans, private disability and retirement plans, and So-
cial Security disability are alternative sources of financial support. The
various welfare systems, as well as informal employer wage and salary
maintenance policies, provide important additional support systems. Co-
ordinating these mechanisms leads to some problems, which for the most
part are manageable because it is generally acknowledged that if injury
arises out of and in the course of employment, the workers' compensa-
tion insurance should pay the bills. 494 These other support mechanisms
are activated only if the claim is not work related, or if the state workers'
in a previous legal, commercial, and ethical environment. For example, unless a legislature
develops a funding scheme to externalize part of the costs of asbestosis, an attempt to saddle
the contemporary asbestos industry with the full cost of asbestos-related diseases incurred
from exposures 20 to 40 years ago will prove counterproductive.
491. The affordability of recent liberalizing trends in state workers' compensation adminis-
tration was addressed at a national conference in 1981. See Panel Discussion, Workers' Com-
pensation Viewed From the State Level, in FINAL EDITED PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WORKPLACE LIABILITY 100-59 (1981).
492. See supra note 17 & accompanying text.
493. For critiques of the three workers' compensation systems administered by the federal
government, see An Examination of Federal Workers' Compensation Programs, Including
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, The Black Lung Benefits Act, and the
Federal Employees' Compensation Act, in FINAL EDITED PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION & WORKPLACE LIABILITY 161-259 (1981).
494. This assumes that the workers' compensation system benefits and coverage in the
jurisdiction are reasonably adequate. Where benefits are inadequate, augmenting legislation
might have to be encouraged. See infra notes 529-32 & accompanying text.
January 1985]
compensation benefits prove clearly inadequate. 495 As administrative
tribunals, courts, and legislatures expand the scope of a compensable in-
jury under workers' compensation, the importance of the alternative
compensation mechanisms should diminish.
The tort system has once again become an important potential
source of relief for the injured worker. 496 Now, however, the tort defend-
ants generally are not employers, but are third parties, usually manufac-
turers of allegedly dangerous, defective workplace products which cause
injury.497 Coordinating these third party actions with workers' compen-
sation claims poses greater difficulties.
The foremost problem presented by extensive reliance on the tort
recovery in the workplace context is tort law's inefficiency 498 and uncer-
tainty.499 In a tort action the parties battle over full compensation and
special damages, often several times the plaintiff's economic losses. Both
sides are motivated to mount expensive legal campaigns, which fre-
495. This is not always the case: "workers' compensation has not been nearly rigorous
enough in eliminating payments which duplicate other payments from collateral sources,
whether of a governmental or private nature-whether Social Security or private pensions or
accident and health insurance." O'Connell, Broadening the No-Fault Compensation Option, in
FINAL EDITED PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORKERS' COMPENSA-
TION & WORKPLACE LIABILITY 262 (1981).
496. The "sole remedy" principle has exceptions known as the intentional injury doctrine,
see, e.g., Johns Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 858 (1980), and the dual capacity doctrine, see, e.g., Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69
Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977); Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d. 460,
432 N.E.2d 814 (1982). See Birnbaum, Inroads in the Immunity Shield: Employee Tort Action
Against Employers, in FINAL EDITED PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
WORKERS' COMPENSATION & WORKPLACE LIABILITY 142 (1981). Birnbaum concluded that
neither doctrine had caused severe compensation. Id. at 147. More recently, Professor Birn-
baum published a less sanguine report. Birnbaum, Worker Compensation Exclusivity Under-
mined by Ohio Decision, Nat'l L.J., May 31, 1982, at 17, col. 1.
497. Common-law actions by injured workers against third party tortfeasors are generally
permitted. The employer receives a lien against compensation benefit payments. If the worker
does not bring a third party action, the employer or the compensation carrier can usually bring
a direct or subrogation action against the product manufacturer. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 22-3-
2-13 (1982).
498. See supra note 401 & accompanying text.
499. This, then is the present tort insurance system:
not a system for paying accident victims from accident insurance (as sensible as that
simple idea would seem to be), but a system for fighting accident victims about pay-
ing them from accident insurance; a system so cumbersome and tricky that the typi-
cal accident victim, even after consulting a lawyer. . . cannot know what he will be
paid, when he will be paid, or if he will be paid; a system hugely wasteful . . .; a
dilatory system. with the outcome more dependent on luck and emotion than on
need and reason.
J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: NO-FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND
SERVICES 54 (1975) (emphasis in original).
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quently after years of litigation leave plaintiffs empty-handed and defend-
ants with either devastating defeats or costly "victories." If the resources
dedicated to the relatively few but generally large tort judgments and
settlements, and their attendant transaction costs, could be reallocated
on a no-fault basis to greater numbers of injured workers, the cost-effec-
tiveness of the compensation process certainly would be improved. Sev-
eral commentators advocate increasing workers' compensation benefits
as a quid pro quo for making it the sole remedy available to the injured
worker. 500 But whether one is philosophically for or against such a "re-
form," the pressures of international competition ultimately may force
efficiencies in American compensation policies. American producers
cannot continue to carry product liability insurance costs running sub-
stantially higher than what competitive foreign producers pay.501 For
workplace products, one solution is greater use of the more efficient com-
pensation delivery system: workers' compensation.502
One precondition for blending the tort and workers' compensation
systems, however, is greater uniformity and internal coordination of each
system than now exists. For example, workplace product manufacturers
might be required to contribute the equivalent of their product liability
insurance premiums to a reformed and augmented workers' compensa-
tion program.503 The administration of this interaction would be compli-
500. See id.; U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIA-
BILITY: FINAL REPORT VII 103 (1978) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
501. See Fuchs, Product Liability and International Trade, in EDITED PROCEEDINGS
CONFERENCE PRODUCT LIABILITY TORT LAW REFORM 149 (1982). "The fact that the [Euro-
pean] product liability insurance premium limits are lower is a direct consequence of the fact
that damages awarded are generally much smaller in Europe than the U.S.A." Id. at 149.
"The difference in rates between [the] U.S.. . . and Europe. . . is hard to estimate, but one
can say that for Europe we are talking about fractions of per mil or per thousand [of sales],
while in the U.S. we are now working with fractions of percent or percent." Id. at 151.
Another writer points out that greater liability exposure in the U.S. need not result in a
comparative advantage for foreign manufacturers because they will purchase coverage equal to
their American competitors. As for Americans who export to Europe, he concedes that they
"will be carrying a heavier burden than competitors overseas. . . . [b]ut. . . once they de-
velop sufficient trade to have a separate insurance program, the costs will be comparable with
those of competitors overseas." Marriott, Product Liability and International Trade, in ED-
ITED PROCEEDINGS CONFERENCE PRODUCT LIABILITY TORT LAW REFORM 152, 154 (1982).
In the short run, however, the higher domestic product liability exposure will hinder the devel-
opment and initial penetration of American products, while lower foreign rates shelter the
development of the foreign competitors and their products. Some American products may
disappear altogether, leaving the American market to foreign manufacturers. One example
was reported by Robert Muth, Executive Vice-President of ASARCO, Inc.: "Today the U.S.
market [for ASARCO's need] is supplied solely from foreign sources, and at prices 600%
above that which previously prevailed." Id. at 146.
502. See supra notes 402, 405 & accompanying text.
503. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 500, at 103-13. The authors discuss two schemes
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cated by the great variety of standards, benefit schedules, and limitations
that now exist. Allocating this product manufacturer's contribution to
fifty different state programs would be an administrative nightmare.
The possibility of federal preemption of product liability law makes
this sole remedy scheme less than visionary. 5°4 The proposal for a fed-
eral product liability act has some strong bipartisan support.50 5 The
Kasten bill,50 6 currently under consideration in the Senate, 50 7 would
under which workplace manufacturers would contribute to the workers' compensation system.
The first is a "pre-accident," taxlike contribution to state funds in exchange for immunity for
third party tort suits. The second scheme calls for a contribution from the product manufac-
turers after the accident or health impairment has occurred. An arbitration proceeding will
determine the contribution and the employer can recover indemnification or contribution. Id.
at 110-11. The pre-accident scheme raises two problems. First, if such a scheme is adopted
one state at a time, resale of products across state lines may be ineffective in shielding employ-
ers who contributed in only the first state. Second, a manufacturer's incentive to strive for
safety may be reduced because its contribution to the fund would be based on sales and not
"the number and extent of injuries caused by his product." Id. The proposed post-accident
arbitration proceeding, however, would include some of the transaction costs of the present
tort system.
The sole remedy scheme is sensible and can be legislated nationally without federalizing
the workers' compensation system. The "pre-accident contribution" concept is workable under
a national product liability statute. Employers would act as better "gatekeepers" and provide
the incentive to manufacturers to market safe workplace products. They would purchase safer
workplace products because the quid pro quo for worker acceptance of the loss of common-
law rights would be an augmented workers' compensation system with higher workers' com-
pensation premiums. The authors of FINAL REPORT noted concern that an augmented system
with higher benefits in a state with already generous benefits may encourage fraud and malin-
gering. FINAL REPORT, supra note 500, at 105. But greater allocation of resources to workers'
compensation systems need not translate into greater weekly wage benefits. Better rehabilita-
tion programs and better medical treatment are alternative uses of such resources that will not
encourage fraud or malingering. Increasing the maximum number of weeks of benefits is an-
other quid pro quo with less chance for abuse.
Although less desirable, the employer's arbitration proceeding for indemnity is also feasi-
ble. The chances of achieving minimal transaction costs are excellent with no contingency
fees, much lower stakes per dispute, arbitration rather than litigation, and insurance compa-
nies as adversaries on both sides.
504. See Business Bulletin, Wall St. J., May 17, 1984, at 1, col. 5 (predicting that "[a] Fed-
eral Law on product liability is likely to be adopted this year").
505. The Democratic Chairman of the House of Representatives Energy & Commerce
Subcommittee on Health and the Environment stated: "I believe that a balanced Federal Uni-
form Product Liability Act is needed. The current patchwork of 50 different state laws on
product liability causes confusion, conflict and unnecessary costs for everyone concerned."
Banquet Keynote Speech by Rep. Henry A. Waxman, in EDITED PROCEEDINGS PRODUCT
LIABILITY TORT LAW REFORM 35 (1982). President Reagan, in his 1984 annual report to
Congress on the state of small business, called for federal legislation to deal with products
liability problems. President Asks Products Liability Reform, 2 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) No.
541 at 9 (Mar. 26, 1984).
506. S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982).
507. The bill cleared the Senate Commerce Committee in late March 1984. Miller, Draw-
ing Limits on Liability, Wall St. J., April 4, 1984, at 26, col. 4.
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eliminate the employer's subrogation lien against an employee's product
liability judgment.508 Although the provision purports merely to sepa-
rate the two systems, 50 9 it would channel more claims through workers'
compensation, rather than through both systems.510 Claimants who opt
for both a tort remedy and workers' compensation benefits would re-
ceive, if they are successful, their full workers' compensation recovery
from their employer and only the balance of their judgment from the
third party tortfeasor.
511
Eliminating the employer's lien should restore much of the relative
importance of workers' compensation vis-a-vis the tort system. Another
desirable result of such a rule would be that employers will be motivated
to act as gatekeepers to control more effectively the introduction and use
of dangerous products in the workplace.512 Yet another rationale for im-
proved coordination is that it may lead to the eventual elimination of
workplace tort claims altogether, while funding improved benefits
through workplace product manufacturers' contributions to the workers'
compensation system.
If greater uniformity, and perhaps federalization, of workers' com-
pensation standards5 13 is forthcoming, what effect should this have on
occupational disease statutes of limitation? Given the twin objectives of
508. S. 2631, 97th Cong. 2d Sess., § 11(b) (1982) (S. 2631 was reintroduced as S. 44 in the
98th Cong.); see supra note 506.
509. S. REP. No. 670, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 46, reprinted in Prod. LIAB. REP. (CCH) No.
507 (Dec. 15, 1982).
510. Under present law, the employer's workers' compensation carrier is motivated to re-
cover its payment of workers' compensation benefits from the manufacturer of the defective
workplace product. Eliminating the employer's lien removes the incentive for the employer or
insurer to bring direct or subrogation actions. One report found that 63.5% of bodily injury
product liability claims (representing 68.5% of total judgments or settlements) were filed by
workers' compensation carriers or employers. INSURANCE SERVICES OFcE PRODUCT LIA-
BILITY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY: A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 64 (1977).
Without subrogation, far fewer claims would go beyond workers' compensation. Some em-
ployers oppose this provision. The Fight Over Product Liability Law, NATION'S BUSINESS 54
(November 1983).
511. Nothing in the pending legislation would preclude third party actions by an em-
ployee. Even so, without carriers and employers to file these claims, employee ignorance and
higher friction costs will likely eliminate many viable product liability actions.
512. Increasing the employer's exposure to liability while reducing that of third party
manufacturers will probably improve safety and health levels. Among the worker, employer,
and workplace product manufacturer, it is the employer who has most control of the work-
place safety environment. The employer hires, trains, sensitizes, supervises, selects the tools
and material, sets the rates, provides the first aid, disciplines the safety rule violator, maintains
the equipment, and updates the safety and health system. Although not absolutely in com-
mand of all accident and health factors, the employer is still properly the primary obligor.
513. See infra notes 529-30 & accompanying text. We neither favor federalization nor do
we think its adoption is soon likely.
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humanitarianism and efficient allocation of resources, a limitations policy
should seek to include the maximum number of bona fide claims for
work-related health impairments under the workers' compensation um-
brella. Enactment of a discovery rule, a realistically long last exposure




Although the states have undergone a dramatic and accelerating
shift from restrictive limitation provisions to more liberal discovery rules,
in a substantial number of jurisdictions concerns over unmanageable
costs, problems with multiple causation, and fears of encouraging fraud
and malingering have inhibited both legislative and judicial actions to
broaden the scope of worker recovery under state occupational disease
acts. 515 These concerns are legitimate. Yet, there is a powerful consen-
sus that all workers who suffer injury or health impairments arising from
employment hazards should be compensated.5 16 Despite the difficulties,
the no-fault workers' compensation approach offers the best opportunity
for allocating the appropriate costs to the enterprises which generate
them.517 Limitation provisions that bar otherwise meritorious workers'
compensation claims shift those costs to systems and parties that are ill-
equipped to bear them. In addition, this shift shelters hazardous indus-
tries from worker compensation expenses, thus providing those indus-
tries with subsidies that arguably lead to the inefficient allocation of
economic resources. 51
8
What is the appropriate governmental response when a jurisdiction
has not expanded the scope of its workers' compensation coverage as fast
514. Either of these provisions would shift cases from the tort, welfare, hospitalization
insurance, and Social Security systems to workers' compensation.
515. See supra notes 85-292 & accompanying text. Nineteen states would probably bar the
Bunker-type claimant: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Utah, and Vermont.
516. The best support for this conclusion is the increasing potential for recovery under the
provisions of the workers' compensation system and through the other compensation mecha-
nisms discussed in this Article. Without a supporting consensus, legislatures and courts would
not be facilitating recovery. See Hollenshead, Can the Compensation System Cope with Occu-
pational Diseases: An Overview of Recent Legal Developments, in FINAL EDITED PROCEED-
INGS OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION & WORKPLACE LIABILITY
341, 351 (1981).
517. See supra note 503 & accompanying text.
518. If market forces lead to maximum economic efficiency, then intervention, e.g., subsi-
dies, will distort the conduct of the economic actors. For example, if the true cost of produc-
ing toxic substances is externalized, the price of these substances will be reduced and more will
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as medical knowledge and fiscal prudence would deem appropriate?
State courts, of course, may address the problem under equal protection
and due process principles. As discussed above, some courts have ac-
cepted these arguments to strike down limitation provisions in contexts
other than workers' compensation, while other courts have declined to
do so in similar situations.5 19 The lack of judicial agreement on the ap-
plication of these constitutional principles to statutes of limitation may
discourage such challenges. Perhaps it is time for the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari in one of the many cases involving claimants who have
been barred by limitation or repose statutes before they can discover their
injuries, or even before they are injured. Whether such claimants are
entitled by general due process principles to a remedy is a matter that
should be settled at the highest level.
5 20
Another reason for greater uniformity in workers' compensation law
is the problem of coordination with the other compensation mecha-
nisms.5 21 Achieving such uniformity and coordination, however, is not a
task for the judiciary. The impact of delayed manifestation occupational
diseases on our health support systems makes the need for substantial
legislative overhaul increasingly apparent.
We make the following recommendations: First, the controlling law
problem should be settled explicitly by statute in each jurisdiction, using
the date of the claimant's disability to determine the law that applies.
5 22
Moreover, although we also favor the date of disability to commence the
period within which a claim must be filed, the imposition of some definite
statutory outer cutoff is also recommended.5 23 Because workers' com-
be produced than if the producers involved were required to absorb and/or pass through these
costs.
The short term effects on one country's industry when another country subsidizes pro-
duction of a hazardous product is beyond the scope of this Article.
519. See supra notes 400-59 & accompanying text.
520. See, eg., Braswell v. Flintkote Mines, Ltd., 723 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1983). In Braswell,
the plaintiffs brought a product liability action against an asbestos manufacturer for personal
injury. Relying on Bunker, the court ruled that, under Indiana law, a cause of action accrues
no later than the date of last exposure to asbestos even though no symptoms have emerged, or
will emerge, during the two years that the tort statute of limitations has to run. In their
petition to the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, the plaintiffs argued that the case
should have been certified to the Indiana Supreme Court. "Further, they contend[ed] that the
decision violates the due process and equal protection clauses because those who suffer from
injuries with a long latent period are treated differently from those whose injuries are immedi-
ate." Asbestos Workers Attack Court's Failure to Certify Issue, 2 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) No.
544, at 1 (May 4, 1984).
521. See supra notes 460-514 & accompanying text.
522. See supra notes 379-404 & accompanying text.
523. It may seem politically unrealistic to propose the imposition of a more restrictive
limitation than some jurisdictions now have, but Florida's experience shows that room for
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pensation is an insurance concept and a social support mechanism, both
of which are based on reasonable predictability, we recommend a bifur-
cated cutoff provision, preferably for all occupational diseases, such as:
forty years from the first employment in which the hazard exists, or ten
years from last employment, whichever period is most favorable to the
claimant. These times are definite and encompass the majority of merito-
rious claimants, but will prevent the system from becoming completely
open-ended.5 24  Furthermore, claimants should be required to notify
their employer when they have reason to believe that they may become
disabled at some future time.5 25 Such notice should be excusable for good
cause and should also suffice to toll the outer cutoff limitations if early
symptoms do in fact ripen into disabling occupational disease.
5 26
Knowledge of the occupational origin of a disability should not be
necessary to commence a limitation period. Although symptoms are
sometimes misinterpreted and diseases are misdiagnosed, the moment
when actual or constructive knowledge of the occupational relationship
political "horse trading" may exist in workers' compensation system revisions. The Florida
legislature enacted "reform" legislation which more closely tied workers' compensation bene-
fits to actual wage loss, rather than to arbitrary permanent partial disability awards. Wage loss
benefit percentages were raised in Florida, but abusive "wash outs" of partial impairment cases
were placed under tighter control. As a result, litigation was significantly diminished and
insurance premiums were correspondingly reduced. See J. INMAN, WAGE-Loss IN FLORIDA,
WORKERS' COMPENSATION: PERSPECTIVE FOR THE EIGHTIES 67-76 (Society of Chartered
Property & Casualty Underwriters Monograph Fall 1981.)
524. The Oregon statute, OR. REV. STAT. § 656.807(4) (1981), has a 40 year limitation
period that runs from the claimant's last exposure to asbestos. In addition to this limitation,
the claimant must file within 180 days of disablement, or within 180 days of learning of the
nature of the disease, if that knowledge comes after disablement. See supra notes 365-73 &
accompanying text. Both the Oregon law and the discovery rule laws may create a large class
of elderly claimants, who file new claims even though they may not have worked in decades.
For example, an asbestos worker who began working with asbestos at age 20, and was last
exposed at 50, could conceivably first bring a compensable claim in Oregon for medical ex-
penses when he is in his late 80's. Health problems of the elderly are usually bound up with a
multitude of possible causes; these cases are probably best dealt with by social support mecha-
nisms unrelated to employment.
At a December 1984 meeting of The National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC), NAIC's occupational disease advisory committee unveiled a proposal which called
for workers' compensation statutes to run "from a current event, such as date of disability or
the date the worker knew or should have known of the disabling condition and its relationship
to employment." Diamond, Workers' Comp Proposal Winning Board Support, NATIONAL UN-
DERWRITER, Dec. 28, 1984, at 1.
525. Some objective evidence, such as tentative medical diagnosis, should be required
before notice would be effective.
526. One of the harshest effects of many of the last exposure laws is the bar to claims by an
employee who knows he is developing an irreversible occupationally related disease, but is not
disabled until after the statute of limitations has run.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36
STATE OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ACTS
occurs is difficult to fix. 527 In the interest of certainty, the basic claim
fling limitation should run from date of disability, providing a generous
period for discovering the occupational relationship; a period two to five
years following disability would be reasonable. The notice provision sug-
gested above will protect those claimants who prior to their disablement
have good reason to suspect an employment-related cause for their
symptoms.
Claimants must bear the burden of showing that their injuries arose
in and out of the course of their employment. We endorse a minimum
exposure presumption to assist the administrative determination of the
occupational relationship to their health impairments, but we believe that
the presumption should favor the claimant, not the employer.5 28 For ex-
ample, two or more years exposure to an occupational disease hazard,
coupled with a medical diagnosis that the claimant has the specified dis-
ease, should establish a presumption of a relationship between the disease
and the occupation.
Although we do not favor the federalization of workers' compensa-
tion, uniformity in state law provisions such as statutes of limitation
should be encouraged. Recommendations of the National Commission
on State Workmen's Compensation Laws529 led in the 1970's to greater
527. See, eg., Stone v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 57 Or. App. 808, 646 P.2d 668
0982). In Stone the claimant was examined by a physician who filed a diagnosis of asbestosis.
Because there was no evidence that the physician informed the claimant of the diagnosis, it
was necessary for the referee to ascertain the moment at which the claimant first had knowl-
edge over seven months later.
528. See supra notes 378-79 & accompanying text. Presumptions favoring the claimant
have been used extensively in federal "black lung" legislation. See Strader & Sheehe, Federal
Black Lung: Ten Years of Legislation & Litigation, in FINAL EDITED PROCEEDINGS OF NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION & WORKPLACE LIABILITY 204, 206
0981). The results from the use of these presumptions were criticized at the above noted
Workplace Liability Conference by speakers Erlenborn, id. at 165, 195, Strader, id. at 174, and
Elisburg, id, at 183. These critics persuasively attacked the federal Black Lung Program assert-
ing that the Program's problems and high costs are traceable to excesses in administrative and
legislative generosity, rather than to the presumptions themselves. As another speaker stated:
"We may not want to replicate Black Lung because it hasn't been a successful system. But the
other lesson is that Black Lung was born out of desperation; it was born out of the dissatisfac-
tion with the systems that weren't doing what they were supposed to be doing." Id. at 299
(statement of Professor Barth). In another panel at the Workplace Liability Conference, Pro-
fessor Barth argued for the general use of presumptions. He recommended that they be
designed by medical experts with cooperation from labor and business. Comments of Peter
Barth, in FINAL EDITED PROCEEDINGS OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORKERS' COMPEN-
SATION & WORKPLACE LIABILITY 319-20 (1981). Presumptions administered at the state level
should be less prone to excess than federally administered systems because of market forces,
e.g., competition for jobs. See supra note 17 & accompanying text.
529. The Commission's report was submitted to the President and Congress on July 31,
1972. The Commission also issued two publications: COMPENDIUM ON WORKMEN'S COM-
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alignment of benefit and other standards,530 and that mission should con-
tinue. This Commission, or a similar one, should coordinate the occupa-
tional disease policies of the tort, welfare, Social Security, and
hospitalization insurance systems. 531 Greater uniformity in workers'
compensation statutes is necessary for effective coordination with the
other social support systems. While federal preemption of workers' com-
pensation may not be a practical way to achieve uniformity, federal en-
couragement of state efforts to align their policies may be effective.
532
Although courts must intervene when fundamental rights are abro-
gated by legislation, the invalidation of statutes rarely solves complex
social and economic problems. However the various state courts view
the scope of their constitutional mandates, the problems highlighted in
this Article are legislative ones that ultimately may require action by the
PENSATION (1973) and SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS (1973).
530. See J. TRIESCHMAN & D. HARDIGREE, WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE, WORKERS' COMPENSATION: PERSPECTIVE FOR THE EIGHT-
IES 55-66 (Society of Chartered Property & Casualty Underwriters, Monograph Fall 1981).
Eighty-four recommendations were made by the Commission, of which 19 were considered
essential. Even so, none of the 50 states have enacted all of the essential recommendations
made by the Commission. Id. at 56. Nevertheless, "improvements have occurred." Over
"1400 amendments relating to workers' compensation were passed between 1972 and 1978." Id.
531. In January 1976, the policy group of the Inter-Agency Workers' Compensation Task
Force, along with members of several federal agencies, urged the reform of state workers'
compensation programs. The group recommended federal monitoring of state progress and
federal technical assistance to the states. After submitting its report, the Task Force was
merged with the Division of State Compensation Programs, Department of Labor. UNITED
STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS VII
(1984). To influence state legislatures, however, a federal commission needs high level state
representatives as well as independent experts.
532. There have been a number of attempts to mandate federal standards for state admin-
istered workers' compensation systems. See, e.g., S. 420, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). This bill
sought to implement the 19 essential recommendations of the National Commission on State
Workmen's Compensation Laws. See supra note 530.
In his introductory remarks to this bill, co-sponsor (with Senator Javits) Senator Williams
stated:
The results of this bill will be to shift some of the current costs of industrial
accidents and diseases to our workers' compensation system, and away from the so-
cial security system, the welfare system, the medicare system, the employer health
benefits plan systems, and from the private savings of the victims of industrial acci-
dents and diseases.
National Workers' Compensation Standards Act of 1979, S. 420, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 420,
reprinted in WORKMEN'S COMP. L. REP. (CCH) No. 23, at 56 (Feb. 23, 1979).
This proposal, which would give the power to set benefit levels to the federal government,
but leaves to states the administrative chores, goes too far. An ongoing national commission
should recommend or suggest standards and procedures for the various interested constituen-
cies within the states to use as a focus for lobbying, debate, implementation, and administra-
tion at the state level.
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United States Congress.533
533. In the 1985 legislative session of the Indiana General Assembly, a bill, H.B. 1171, was
introduced in the House that would extend the last exposure period for asbestos related dis-
eases from 3 to 20 years. The bill as amended would permit claimants disabled prior to July 1,
1985, to bring claims for compensation until July 1, 1986. Unlike previous bills introduced in
the legislature that failed, this bill is cosponsored by the powerful Indiana Manufacturers'
Association and various state labor organizations. Indianopolis Star, January 23, 1985, at 8,
col. 5. It should be noted, however, that Richard Bunker would have failed to qualify even
under this limitation period; 26 years had elapsed between his last exposure to asbestos and the
manifestation of his asbestosis. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
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Appendix
SUMMARY CHART:
STATE OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ACT
TIME LIMITATIONS
State Prim.Stat. Last Min. Exp. Last Disc. Disc.Occ. Retro. Eff. Date F.N. Ref.
Sec. Exp. Emp. Rel. App. Lim.
Ala. 25-5-117 X 0 P, R 85-89
Alaska 23.30.105 X 302
Ariz. 23-1061 S X 302
Ark. 81-1318(2) Xa Pre. re A,S R 90-105
Cal. 5412 X 302
Colo. 8-52-105 X no 271-87
Conn. 31-294 X 296-97
Del. 2361 X 302
D.C. 13(a) X
Fla. 440.19 Pre. X 360-61
Ga. 34-9-280(2) X Pre. re A,S R 1946 106-22
Hawaii 386-82 X Some Dis.b 302
Idaho 72-439 XC Sd X
e  R 123-47
Note. The chart indicates the primary type of occupational disease time limitation for each state by an "X" in
column 3 (last exposure), 4 (minimum exposure), 5 (last employment), 6 (discovery), or 7 (discovery of occupa-
tional relationship). In some states there is an alternative trigger rule, which is indicated by "Alt." in the appropri-
ate column. Presumptions regarding timing limitations are indicated by "Pre.". The presumption runs against the
claimant unless otherwise indicated by a footnote. Also indicated on the chart are the primary statutory timing
section cite (column 2), whether the statute is retroactively applied (column 8), and last exposure effective date
limitations (column 9). Column 10 indicates where the state is discussed in the text by keying to the appropriate
textual footnotes. Chart footnotes give additional details regarding that state's classification. Finally, the chart
indicates timing exceptions carved out for individual diseases. These diseases are indicated by the following
symbols:
A = Asbestos(is) L = Lead Poisoning
B = Byssinosis 0 = Occupational Pneumoconiosis
D = Dust Diseases P = Coal Miners' Pneumoconiosis
Dis. = Disease(s) R = Radiation
H = Hearing Loss S = Silicosis
a. A, S claimants must file within 3 years of last exposure and one year of disablement.
b. Injuries from compressed air, arsenic, A, benzol, beryllium, zirconium, cadmium, chrome, lead, flourine,
or other minerals with carcinogenic properties, and R governed by discovery of occupational relationship.
c. Notice must be given (except regarding R, S) within five months after employment ceased and 60 days
after first manifestation, and disablement must be within one year (S, four years) of last exposure.
d. There is also a 60-day minimum exposure rule for nonacute diseases.
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State Prim.Stat. Last Min. Exp. Last Disc. Disc.Occ. Retro. Eff. Date F.N. Ref.
See. Exp. Emp. ReL. App. Lim.
Ch. 48
Ill. 172.36(1)(E) X Pre.e 7-1-5 1f 148-53
Ind. 22-3-7-9(f) X Pre. R g 29-79
Iowa 85A.12 X Pre. re 0 10-1-47 154-57
292
Kan. 44.5aOl(c) Xh Pre. re S 7-1-53 158-65
378-79
Ky. 342.316 Alt. Pre. re Pi X 346
La. 23:1031.1 Pre. Alt. X 375-78
Me. tit.39,S189 XJ Pre. re S XJ 7-1-41 166-76
*Md. Art.101, S26 X 302
Mass. 41 X 293
Mich. 418.441 X 302
Minn. 176.151(4) X 311-16
Miss. 71-3-35 Xk 293
MO. 287.430 A,H,R,S X 317-20
290
Mont. 39-72-403 S X 7-1-59 242-45
Neb. 48-137 X 298-300
Nev. 617.330 D
I  Xm yes 1947 227-37




N.M. 52-3-19 A,S X R 4-9-45 238-41
e. There is a conclusive presumption that the claimant was exposed if he worked in an occupation or
process in which the hazard exists (limited exceptions).
f. Act applies to diseases incurred after this date.
g. No liability for disability occurring prior to act.
h. One year for disability except R (no limit) and S (three years for death only).
i. Presumption disability or death due to compensable P if exposed for ten years.
j. Must file within two years after disablement and three years after last exposure.
k. For R, date of accident is date of disablement.
1. Minimum exposure required for S; occupational disease of the respiratory tract from exposure to dust
defined to be the same as S.
m. Must file within ninety days of knowledge of disability; occupational disease must be contracted within
twelve months of disability.
n. 1980 discovery rule not retroactively applied in cases of A, S, and other diseases including those having
the same characteristics as these diseases as determined by the National Institute for Occupational Safety &
Health.
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State Prim.Stat. Last Min. Exp. Last Disc. Disc.Occ. Retro. Eff. Date F.N. Ref.
Sec. Exp. Emp. Rel. App. Lim.
N.Y. 18;28;40 Pre. re DO XP Some Dis.q 325-42
N.C. 97-58 A,L,S A,L,Sr X R yes 3-26-35 177-217
N.D. 65-05-01 X 302
Ohio 4123.85 D,P,S,R
s 
A Alt. X 295
tit.85




Pa. 411;415 A,P,S X 246-57
R.I. 28-35-57 Alt. X 302
S.C. 42-11-70 X B R 218-24
62-8-11; 293
S.D. 13;29 S Xu X u  R 7-1-47 258-61
Tenn. 50-6-305 X 307-10
Tex. 8307S4(a) v X v 1947 293
Utah 35-2-13 s X IR 7-1-41 262-70
Vt. 1006 X R
Va. 65.1-52 Xw A;Alt.x yes 343-45
Wash. 51.28.055 X 302
W.Va. 23-4-15 Alt. X yes 349-59
Wis. 102.12 XY 301
Wyo. 27-12-503 X R;Alt.z 346-47
o. Exposure for sixty days to harmful dust within state after September I, 1935 presumed to be injurious
exposure.
p. Unless in same employment as when contracted disease, disability must occur within twelve months of
contraction.
q. Compressed air illness, S, D, R, disease from exposure to arsenic, benzol, beryllium, zirconium, cad-
mium, chrome, lead, flourine.
r. Employee who is removed from industry is limited to payment for 104 weeks; compensation for A
complicated by TB reduced by 1/6.
s. Last exposure rule does not apply to disability or death from exposure occurring after January 1, 1976.
t. Claimant must file within five years (ten years, R; forty years, A) of last exposure in employment and
within 180 days of disability or diagnosis of occupational disease, whichever is later.
u. Must file within two years of disability and give notice within six months of cessation of employment
with employee in which disease contracted.
v. If injured before August 30, 1971, old law applies which presumed A and S not due to employment
unless minimum exposure.
w. Last exposure rule does not apply to cataracts, some skin cancers, R, ulceration due to chrome com-
pounds or caustic chemical acids or alkalides, undulant fever caused by industrial slaughtering & processing of
livestock and handling hides, mesothelioma, and angiosarcoma of the liver due to vinyl chloride exposure.
x. Must file within two years of diagnosis of occupational disease or five years of last exposure-whichever
first occurs; A, after diagnosis.
y. Benefits due after a twelve-year period paid from supplemental fund.
z. Must file within one year of diagnosis of occupational disease or three years of last exposure-whichever
first occurs; R, after diagnosis.
